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ABSTRACT
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 led to extraordinary government intervention
in firms and markets. The scope and depth of government action rivaled
that of the Great Depression. Many traded markets experienced dramatic
declines in liquidity leading to the existence of conditions normally assumed
to be promptly removed via the actions of profit seeking arbitrageurs. These
extreme events motivate the three essays in this work. The first essay seeks
and fails to find evidence of investor behavior consistent with the broad
’Too Big To Fail’ policies enacted during the crisis by government agents.
Only in limited circumstances, where government guarantees such as deposit
insurance or U.S. Treasury lending lines already existed, did investors impart
a premium to the debt security prices of firms under stress. The second
essay introduces the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis (IIS Basis) in examining
the large differences between cash and derivative markets based upon future
U.S. inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). It reports
the consistent positive value of this measure as well as the very large positive
values it reached in the fourth quarter of 2008 after Lehman Brothers went
bankrupt. It concludes that the IIS Basis continues to exist due to limitations
in market liquidity and hedging alternatives. The third essay explores the
methodology of performing debt based event studies utilizing credit default
swaps (CDS). It provides practical implementation advice to researchers to
address limited source data and/or small target firm sample size.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This work is motivated by the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its implications
for financial institutions and markets. The three essays contained herein
examine large financial institutions and the U.S. markets for inflation indexed
securities and derivatives. The last essay is a methodological examination of
the performance of event studies using credit default swaps.
In essay 1, I consider the moral hazard mechanism of government ’Too Big
To Fail’ support of large financial institutions. This government support,
through direct assistance and programs to improve market liquidity, during
the worldwide financial crisis of 2007-2008 is unprecedented since the Great
Depression. Whether a given firm is ex-ante ’Too Big To Fail’ in the mind
of government agents is not the principal issue for moral hazard, however.
It is investor perception of ’Too Big To Fail’ that drives the economically
inefficient reduced funding cost for the firm. This essay examines the U.S.
government’s crisis actions as well as two international bank bailouts in a
series of event studies employing both debt and equity returns. I conclude
that only the largest of the banks and the government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, already perceived to be recipients of
explicit or implicit government guarantees, experienced any ’Too Big To Fail’
premiums in their debt securities. There is no evidence that these premiums
extended to other large financial firms such as broker dealers, insurers or
surety firms, in spite of the bailout of Bear Stearns. There is no evidence
that letting Lehman Brothers fail was a surprise to investors. In addition,
there is no evidence that AIG’s large derivative exposures and their associated
losses prior to and during the crisis led investors to infer it would be rescued.
Federal Reserve programs to improve liquidity and extend lending to non-
banks did not lead to ’Too Big To Fail’ premiums for firms.
Essay 2 introduces inflation linked securities and derivatives in the U.S.,
where government debt markets represent the most liquid in the world. The
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extension in 1997 of Treasury instruments to inflation protected securities
(TIPS) provided investors with a truly risk free security. It also helped spur
the growth of over-the-counter (OTC) traded inflation derivative markets
in the U.S. As TIPS may be combined with nominal Treasury securities
to produce similar positions in inflation to that of OTC inflation swaps,
one would expect them to have very close values for priced future inflation.
However, this is not the case. I examine the difference between said markets
and taking a cue from corporate markets create the Inflation Indexed Swap
Basis (IIS Basis) measure. I find it to be positive at all liquid tenors over a
recent five year period including before, during and after the financial crisis.
I explore the IIS Basis in time series and cross section finding it to be related
to debt market funding, liquidity, and inflation. I conclude that it continues
to exist for either of two reasons, supply limitations in the OTC derivative
market or imperfect hedging opportunities, particularly given the lack of zero
coupon TIPS of any size and depth.
Essay 3 introduces credit default swaps (CDS) and their potential for use
in debt based event studies. The market for CDS has continued to grow
each year both in the total transaction amount and in the scope of firms
traded. Given their constant tenor and improved liquidity, CDS present
a compelling alternative to bond prices for the performance of debt based
event studies over daily time intervals. However, there is no methodology
guidance for the performance of event studies utilizing CDS spreads. I carry
out Monte Carlo experiments similar to Brown and Warner (1985) to rectify
this situation. I examine a range of performance measures to include those
used in the empirical event studies completed to date. I undertake tests of
size and power on these performance measures under varying portfolio sample
size and differing models of daily spread change. I provide implementation
guidance to researchers including how to proceed in cases where they need to
rely on a market index due to limited source data and/or their study entails
a small portfolio of sample firms.
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CHAPTER 2
CHANGING MARKET PERCEPTIONS OF
WHO IS TOO BIG TO FAIL DURING THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007-2008
In the introduction to their text ’Too Big To Fail’, Stern and Feldman
(2004) describe the lack of consensus among researchers and policymakers to
the following two issues:1
1. Does ’Too Big To Fail’ remain a problem for financial firms within the
United States given the existing legal and regulatory structure?2,3
2. If so, is there a meaningful cost to ’Too Big To Fail’ support policies?
The credit crisis of 2007-2008 definitively provided an affirmative answer to
the first question.4,5 Further, it confirmed the predictions of Stern and Feld-
man (2004) as to which firms would be considered for ’Too Big To Fail’
1As defined in Stern and Feldman (2004), an institution is ’Too Big To Fail’ if its
uninsured creditors receive discretionary government support when said creditors are not
automatically entitled to said support.
2The choice of the word “problem” is meant to address whether the existing regula-
tory apparatus obviates the need for government agents to support systemically important
financial firms. While it may be argued that such support is a rational response to avoid-
ing the contagion effects of systemically important institutions failing, such support also
produces economic distortion effects. For example, there is significant evidence that gov-
ernment ownership and control of banks is inefficient.
3As detailed in Pike and Thomson (1992) the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) rules of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991,
regulators of deposit taking institutions are required to put the prevention of taxpayer
losses above all other considerations in closing struggling banks, assuming the systemic
risk exception is not invoked. However, Todd (1993) reviews the changes in collateral
requirements under FDICIA for non-banks, suggesting and documenting testimony by
Senator Christopher Dodd that the changes adopted to section 13(3) of the Federal Re-
serve Act were specifically meant to enable future emergency Federal Reserve support of
securities firms in response to the observed events following the 1987 stock market crash.
Fettig (2002) and Fettig (2008) review the history of section 13(3) lending to non-banks
from its creation as a 1932 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act to its modification
under FDICIA to its use in supporting Bear Stearns.
4For a detailed time line of the events of the credit crisis through the present day see
either
http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/timeline/timeline1.shtml or
http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/pdf/CrisisTimeline.pdf
5During the events of the crisis, Bear Stearns, GSEs and mortgage guarantors Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, insurer American International Group, and large banks Citigroup,
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support by government agents. Ex-post costs of the bailouts may greatly
exceed the $124 billion in taxpayer expenses incurred from the savings and
loan crisis of the late 1980s as estimated by Curry and Shibut (2000). From
an ex-ante perspective, the cost is one of moral hazard, the tendency of in-
vestors to anticipate government support in place of assessing the risk and
return of firm securities absent support. In this work, a series of event stud-
ies is performed during the credit crisis to look for evidence of moral hazard
in the pricing of firm debt and equity securities. I conclude that only the
largest of the banks and the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), al-
ready perceived to be recipients of explicit or implicit government guarantees,
experienced any ’Too Big To Fail’ premiums in their debt securities. There
is no evidence that these premiums extended to other large financial firms
such as broker dealers, insurers or surety firms, in spite of the bailout of Bear
Stearns. There is no evidence that letting Lehman fail was a surprise to
investors. In addition, there is no evidence that AIG’s large derivative expo-
sures and their associated losses prior to and during the crisis led investors
to infer it would be rescued. Federal Reserve programs to improve liquidity
and extend lending to non-banks did not lead to ’Too Big To Fail’ premiums
for firms.
Principal contributions in this work are the introduction and modeling of
’Too Big To Fail’ support as a stochastic guarantee. A put option contingent
on the behavior of an index of assets monitored by government agents is
explored with the relation of the index to a specified barrier value providing
the stochastic nature of the guarantee. It is shown that when combined with
a simple Merton (1974) structural model for risky debt, significant asset de-
clines can lead to positive debt returns during a crisis event. This relies upon
changing investor belief in government support for that portion of the firm’s
capital structure. The integrated examination of debt and equity security
event study abnormal returns are critical to pursuing the existence of the
stochastic guarantee. Proxy return measures for credit default swap (CDS)
contracts are proposed and implemented in a systematic debt return model
Bank of America, and Wachovia would be determined to be ’Too Big To Fail’ while
securities firm Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual, the largest savings and loan,
would not. Countrywide Financial and Merrill Lynch would both be absorbed by Bank of
America before a clear determination of their ’Too Big To Fail’ status could be ascertained
but reporting by the financial press of government encouragement in each case is consistent
with their status being ’Too Big To Fail’. See Ng and Kelly (2007), for example.
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to permit the measurement of event study abnormal debt returns. Common
misperceptions regarding the principal causes of the most extreme portions
of the credit crisis, the failure to rescue Lehman Brothers after rescuing Bear
Stearns, are also examined and found wanting.
The government rescue of Bear Stearns was the watershed event of the
crisis. In order for Bear Stearns to avoid a bankruptcy filing on Friday, March
14, 2008, the Federal Reserve had to provide lending support under section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. This marked the first time since
the Great Depression that the Federal Reserve directly supported a non-bank
with taxpayer funds.6,7 The U.S. Government provided further support in its
prodding of J.P. Morgan to purchase Bear over the ensuing weekend at the
cost of $30 billion in asset guarantees by the Federal Reserve.8
Prior to the start of the crisis there were two extremes for determining
which U.S. institutions were ’Too Big To Fail’.9,10 At one end was the ar-
gument that if any U.S. institution were truly ’Too Big To Fail’ only the
big three commercial banks Bank of America, Citigroup, and J.P. Morgan
Chase could meet such a standard. At the other end of the spectrum were
6Although the Federal Reserve is not part of the government budget process, it does
remit its annual operating surplus to the U.S. Treasury. Thus, to the extent any of its
support actions reduce the available funds supplied to Treasury, its actions indirectly lead
to an increase in taxpayer outlays for government activity.
7While characterized as an investment bank and a dealer of U.S. government securities,
Bear Stears was neither a bank by the definition of a deposit taking and lending entity
nor was it a member of the Federal Reserve System with access to the Fed’s discount
window lending facility, the very facility it borrowed from in order to open on March
14th. Schwartz (1992) provides a history of discount window lending and argues that the
policy enacted following the 1970 Penn Central Railroad failure marked the turning point
from using the window for liquidity provision to solvent banks to support of insolvent
institutions, “the ’too big to fail’ doctrine in embryo.”
8See Kelly, Ip, and Sidel (2008) for broad details on the secured credit line approved
on Friday, March, 14th. Initially, Sidel, Berman, and Kelly (2008) reported $30 billion in
assets would receive Federal Reserve support but Sidel and Kelly (2008) noted that, as
part of the renegotiation leading JP Morgan to raise its per share bid for Bear Stearns
from $2 to $10, JP Morgan agreed to take the first $1 billion of losses and the Federal
Reserve the remaining $29 billion. Lanman (2008) reported the final figures were $1.15
billion for J.P. Morgan and $28.8 billion for the Federal Reserve.
9Principal pre-crisis events in the history of financial firm ’Too Big To Fail’ were that
Franklin National Bank (1974), Continental Illinois Bank (1984) and hedge fund Long
Term Capital Management (1998) were ’Too Big To Fail’ while Drexel Burnham Lambert
(1990), Barings Bank (1995), Enron (2001), Refco (2005), and hedge fund Amaranth
Advisors (2006) were not.
10The crisis is presumed to have begun in the summer of 2007 when rating agency
downgrades of subprime mortgage backed securities led to losses and valuation problems
for hedge funds and financial institutions around the world.
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the complexity arguments captured in Stern and Feldman (2004) that any
institution of great enough complexity or relative size in critical markets such
as payments processing, securities settlement, or over the counter derivatives
trading would be ’Too Big To Fail’. This resulted in nearly 30 candidate
firms. Bear Stearns, given its scope of derivatives trading and mortgage
market securities activity, clearly met this broader definition.
In this work, the debt and equity security returns of 42 large U.S. financial
firms are examined over a series of ten events through the fall of 2008.11 The
firms are organized by sub-industry in Table 2.1. A total of ten events are
selected from the beginning of the crisis in July, 2007 to the height of the
crisis in September, 2008 culminating in the failure of Lehman Brothers and
the rescue of AIG.12 The events include international bank bailouts, extreme
interventions in credit markets by the Federal Reserve, events of systemic
importance, and the support decisions of government agents in the survival
of Bear Stearns, the GSEs, Lehman Brothers and AIG. Table 2.2 provides a
summary list of the selected events while Appendix B provides institutional
details.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews
the limited empirical literature of ’Too Big To Fail’, addresses possible means
of measuring the moral hazard from government support, introduces a model
of the stochastic ’Too Big To Fail’ guarantee, and discusses inferences of such
support through the examination of returns from firm securities. Section 3
presents an overview of the target series of events selected from the current
crisis before describing the measurement methodology and data. Section 4
presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2.1 Too Big To Fail
While Stern and Feldman (2004) first attribute the term ’Too Big To Fail’
to a 1975 Business Week article entitled “When Companies Get Too Big To
Fail” discussing both the 1971 US government loan guarantees for Lockheed
11While Westpac is Australia’s largest bank, its U.S. dollar denominated debt and ADRs
enable its inclusion in this study. This was done in response to the very limited number
of U.S. banks with acceptable time series observations of their debt return data.
12As described in the post events summary in Appendix B, there are simply too many
government actions in quick succession after this point to attempt a meaningful separation.
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as well as support for railroad firms, it has risen to prominence in its applica-
tion to bank bailouts. During congressional banking committee testimony on
September 19, 1984 given by Comptroller of the Currency C. Todd Conover
over the bailout of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust with funds
provided by the FDIC the previous May, Congressman Stewart B. McKinney
stated, “We have a new kind of bank. It is called too big to fail. TBTF, and
it is a wonderful bank.”13The Comptroller acknowledged that some banks
were simply ’Too Big To Fail’. Since that time regulators have walked a
fine line between supporting these large institutions and declaring said sup-
port was neither guaranteed nor to be expected, permitting institutions to
fail whenever possible to emphasize the point. Market reaction has been
haphazard. In response to the testimony offered by Comptroller Conover re-
garding the eleven multinational banks falling under OCC purview via their
national bank charters, O’Hara and Shaw (1990) found that it was a non-
identical group of the eleven largest U.S. multinationals as of the end of the
prior year, 1983, mentioned in a following day Wall Street Journal article that
responded with a positive one day abnormal equity return when compared
to other large banks with publicly traded equity.14
When a financial institution experiences trouble in its fund raising activ-
ities, particularly capital market fund raising, regulatory authorities must
balance two competing ideals. First, the encouragement of market discipline
in the determination of an appropriate risk adjusted cost of capital and sec-
ond, ensuring that markets properly function with liquidity reflective of trust
in solvent counterparties. The problem is inferring whether firm funding dis-
ruptions are liquidity events or solvency events. Suppose market participants
fear trading because a counterparty cannot be trusted to perform and there
is no substance to the fear? Then the Federal Reserve, as the lender of last
resort, must intervene to ensure that market disruptions based upon rumor
do not impact the viability of healthy firms with concomitant damage to the
real economy.15 However, if the counterparty is at or near insolvency, the
potential purchaser of an obligation from the firm is correct in refusing to
buy. Government support in this case is both counterproductive and a waste
13See appendix of Kaufman (2002) for an excerpt of the transcript with the relevant
testimony.
14See Carrington (1984) for the original Wall Street Journal article.
15Todd (1988) references Walter Bagehot that the principal duty of the lender of last
resort during a panic is to discount freely on all sound assets, but at a penalty rate.
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of taxpayer resources. Even ignoring firm specific support actions during the
recent crisis, Federal Reserve actions to foster liquidity contradict past guid-
ance that liquidity shortages may be effectively managed via open market
operations alone.16
Repeatedly during the crisis the Federal Reserve has sought to extend dis-
count window borrowing in amount, tenor and even the universe of eligible
firms beyond banks. Stern and Feldman (2004) conclude that the best expla-
nation of the growth in ’Too Big To Fail’ support is the fear of spillovers from
the failure of a ’Too Big To Fail’ firm. The larger the institution’s relative
size within a critical market, the more likely its perceived trouble, whether
true or not, will spill over to other firms in that market with negative effects
to said firms’ liquidity or even solvency.17 An early proponent of the spillover
rationale is found in Schwartz (1992) who points to fear of contagion as a
historical explanation for the expansion of support to insolvent institutions
by the Federal Reserve.
2.1.1 Literature
Besides the O’Hara and Shaw (1990) work described at the start of this sec-
tion examining the equity returns of banks mentioned by the Wall Street
Journal as being ’Too Big To Fail’, Black and Collins (1997) examine the
same event and find long term relative increases in institutional ownership
and a reduction of the signal value in dividend cuts and omissions among pos-
tulated ’Too Big To Fail’ banks. Morgan and Stiroh (2002) and Morgan and
Stiroh (2005) extend O’Hara and Shaw (1990) to bond spread levels for ’Too
Big To Fail’ banks finding flatter spread rating relationships consistent with
reduced market discipline of these firms’ new debt issuances. Carow (2001)
examines the effects of the mega-merger between Citicorp and Travelers upon
other large bank and insurance companies. He finds positive abnormal eq-
uity returns in large institutions consistent with a ’Too Big To Fail’ premium
assessed by investors. Finally, Kabir and Hassan (2005) perform an event
study of the Long Term Capital Management crisis finding both evidence of
16See Todd (1988) or Schwartz (1992) for example.
17For example, Stern and Feldman (2006) point out that only two banks, Bank of New
York Mellon and J.P. Morgan Chase, offer major market participants the complete set of
services needed to “settle” transactions in U.S. Treasury securities.
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a ’Too Big To Fail’ policy and contagion from banks to non-bank financial
firms using equity returns.
2.1.2 Moral Hazard
The moral hazard of ’Too Big To Fail’ support for firms is the mis-allocation
of economic resources resulting from the inefficiency of investment at two
levels.
1. Investors will pay a premium for the securities of the ’Too Big To Fail’
firm in expectation of government support should the firm encounter
financial difficulty.
2. Firm management will interpret this premium, in the form of a lower
cost of capital, as encouragement to increase risk taking in the pursuit
of larger returns.
How big a problem is this and how can it be modeled and measured? Be-
gin by considering non-’Too Big To Fail’ explanations for firm and investor
behavior. Firm compensation policies lack any type of claw back provisions
for the return of compensation. Thus, excess risk taking behavior leading to
large losses and endangering the firm’s survival is not penalized other than
through job loss. While equity or staggered incentive compensation can limit
the payoff to managers of the firm, there is no liability for the return of com-
pensation already paid. During the initial stage of the crisis, extremely large
public severance agreements were paid to leaders of those firms most identi-
fied as engaging in the risky behavior leading to the crisis.18 These severance
agreements were paid on top of large annual compensation amounts collected
in the years leading up to the crisis and can only serve to motivate similar
future behavior whether the firm is rescued or not.
Explicit government support policies such as FDIC insurance for banks or
state guarantee funds for insurance companies already provide below market
funding costs to firm managers in the absence of any ’Too Big To Fail’ argu-
ments.19 Loopholes to permit other financial firms such as broker dealers to
18Merrill Lynch’s Stan O’Neal collected $162 million while Citigroup’s Charles Prince
collected $95 million. Both were announced in November, 2007.
19Such guarantees protect depositors and policyholders and provide a floor for extremely
negative asset value movements.
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purchase savings banks or industrial loan companies help spread this below
market funding beyond banks.20 Arguments to increase the level of FDIC
insurance, programs to help bank customers skirt the existing insurance limit
by automatically establishing new accounts at competitor banks when limits
are breached, and regulatory waivers to directly fund broker dealer activities
through bank funding operations spread the benefit of below market funding
costs even further. These all help drive excess risk taking, again without any
implicit ’Too Big To Fail’ insurance in place.
Any model of ’Too Big To Fail’ insurance must reflect pre-existing govern-
ment guarantees such as that of FDIC insurance for banks.21 As asset values
decline, the FDIC guarantee will become more valuable. Measurement of
the ’Too Big To Fail’ guarantee on top of the pre-existing guarantee will be
challenging during positive economic environments as both guarantees will
be “far from the money” in option pricing terms. An event study capturing
changes in market perception during a period of crisis will be more likely to
identify the existence of the ’Too Big To Fail’ guarantee even in the presence
of a deterministic guarantee like FDIC insurance.
2.1.3 Models of Government Support
We begin by asking how changes in firm equity and debt returns are related.
From a structural credit model perspective,22 any traded securities of the
firm represent claims on the firm’s assets, where value may not be observed
directly. Thus, we may argue there is a distinct relationship between the
common equity of the firm and any of its debt securities courtesy of their
joint dependence on the assets of the firm. Empirical results to date find lim-
20Pennacchi (2009) reports a dramatic increase in the number of non-bank financial
firms applying for bank or thrift holding company status to include broker dealers, finance
companies and insurers.
21While individual state guaranty funds exist to support insurance companies in the
case of insolvency, it is illegal in most states for insurers to advertise their existence. Like-
wise, broker dealers provide privately funded Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(SIPC) Insurance backing brokerage accounts. Yet, in congressional committee testimony
following the failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990, then SEC commissioner Richard
Breeden pointedly noted that the SEC had no access to funds similar to deposit insurance
available to bank regulators in resolving large institutions that may or may not be ’Too
Big To Fail’ otherwise. This is reviewed on pages 82-83 of Stern and Feldman (2004).
22The structural credit model is generally credited to Merton (1974) after Black and
Scholes (1973). For a current overview of the structural credit model along with the
recent literature, see Pennacchi (2008). For in depth coverage see Lando (2004).
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ited explanatory power for spread changes in terms of firm specific variables
such as leverage which depend upon equity value.23Without consideration
of external government support for a firm, the structural model perspective
would lead us to state that firm asset value and equity or debt values should
move in tandem since the equity is a long call option position on the assets
while the debt position is a combination of a short put option on the assets
combined with a risk free loan. As we will confine our work to the returns
generated by changes in risky debt spreads, we may ignore the risk free loan
and compare a long call option with a short put option. A decline in the
underlying unobservable asset will have a negative value effect on either po-
sition. A change in asset volatility, however, will have opposite effects on
each position. A decline in asset volatility will hurt the value of the long
call option but help the value of the short put option. It is the combination
of changes in the asset value and volatility that enables us to draw certain
conclusions regarding observed debt and equity positions but the structural
relationship restricts the relative changes in observed debt and equity val-
ues. For example, should both equity and debt returns increase (from a
risky spread decline in the latter), we can state that firm asset value could
not have decreased. If it had, the only explanation for an increase in equity
value would be an offsetting increase in asset volatility but this would cause
debt return to decline, contradicting our original assumption of increasing
debt return.
Marcus and Shaked (1984) use the structural credit approach to value
FDIC deposit insurance for banks. They posit that such insurance adds to
firm value which is included in the market valuation of firm securities through
the following accounting identity:
Assets + Insurance = Debt + Equity (2.1)
This is important because ’Too Big To Fail’ is an implicit form of such insur-
ance and is not limited to banking institutions backed by deposit insurance
23Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) find statistically significant but weak
economic significance for firm leverage and firm returns in explaining spread changes while
Acharya and Johnson (2007) find single digit R2 when measuring spread returns in terms
of both firm equity returns and the interaction of spread level with firm equity returns.
They then call into question the explanatory power of structural models given their high
reliance on firm specific measures such as leverage.
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funds. Although its application is uncertain, to the degree it is expected
by market participants, ’Too Big To Fail’ insurance should also be additive
to firm value. From a structural perspective, it should act to increase asset
value and reduce asset volatility by eliminating default from extreme nega-
tive economic states. This, in turn, will lead to a certain increase in debt
value and an increase in equity value reliant upon the offsetting degree of
volatility reduction compared to asset value increase. Unlike the deposit in-
surance available to banks, ’Too Big To Fail’ insurance is not guaranteed
and its application to a given firm by government agents is stochastic. While
deposit insurance is applied to the highest level of a banking firm’s capital
structure, ’Too Big To Fail’ insurance is applied at an unknown point of the
capital structure which may be at lower capital structure levels to include
junior debt holders or even preferred stock.24
Consistent with Merton (1974), begin with a deterministic government
guarantee (like FDIC insurance) of the debt issue for a firm with a simplified
capital structure of common stock paying no dividends and a single issue of
zero coupon debt.25 Denote the current value of the assets of the firm as
A0 and let them behave with geometric Brownian motion characterized by
a constant volatility of σA. Represent the face value of the debt as X, with
a time until maturity of T years. Assume that risk free rates in markets
are constant and equal to an annual rate of r at all maturities. The debt
holders have sold a put option to the owners of the firm for a premium over
what they would have required for an equivalent risk free loan. The value of
this European style put option may be determined by applying risk neutral
valuation. If we denote the expected value in a risk neutral world as Eˆ, the
24The bank holding company will typically have one or more bank and non-bank sub-
sidiaries. The deposits are part of the liability structure of a subsidiary bank while the
debt and equity we will empirically model will be at the holding company level. As the
FDIC is able to attach all assets of the bank in order to minimize the cost of protecting the
depositors without consideration of holding company claims, the deposits are the highest
level of claims from a holding company perspective. Exceptions do exist, however, in the
form of preferential treatment of derivative exposures as well as Federal Reserve advances
to the bank.
25In more realistic examples, there will be a series of traded claims with differing priority
in bankruptcy as well as the non-traded liabilities of other creditors. For example, a
typical financial firm capital structure will include senior secured, senior unsecured, senior
subordinated, subordinated, and junior subordinated debt as well as varying levels of
preferred stock.
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resulting value we seek is:
Eˆ[Max(X − AT , 0)] (2.2)
If we represent the cumulative normal distribution function by Φ(x) and
apply Black and Scholes (1973) to value this option the result is the familiar
value:
Xe−rTΦ
(
− ln(A0
X
)− (r − σ2A
2
)T
σA
√
T
)
− A0Φ
(
− ln(A0
X
)− (r + σ2A
2
)T
σA
√
T
)
(2.3)
This value serves two purposes in our most simple example. As a put position
the debt holders have provided to the owners of the firm it represents the
value reduction of the resulting bond compared to a risk free bond. Equiva-
lently, it is the increased yield the debt holders will receive over an equivalent
risk free loan. To the degree that all or part of the debt issue is assumed to
be backed by the equivalent of government provided deposit insurance, it is
an offsetting long put position in the government guarantee. This will act
to cancel out any value decline the debt holders would have in those states
where the put they have sold to the owners of the firm would have value - in
times of firm distress. To depict this in a simple Merton (1974) style model
with a class of zero coupon debt and a class of non-dividend paying stock
requires us to assign values to the variables in equation (2.3). First, normal-
ize firm asset value in terms of a $ of debt so that asset value is a direct
indication of market leverage. Now, assume 5 years to maturity, a zero risk
free rate and a 5% asset volatility for the firm in question.26 Finally, for the
deterministic government guarantee, assume that 75% of the debt is backed
by the equivalent of deposit insurance. In our normalized world of assets ex-
pressed per $ of debt, this is equivalent to a second long put option at $0.75
offsetting the short put option embedded in the risky debt. The resulting
risky debt and the effects of the government guarantee are illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.1. Note that while the guarantee acts to halt the effect of asset value
26There is a very limited empirical literature for the measurement of financial firm asset,
as opposed to equity, behavior. Nikolova (2004) examines asset volatilities of U.S. banking
institutions with average market value of assets of approximately $40 billion. Average
annual asset volatility levels inferred from a series of methods produces resulting values of
3% to 4.5%. 5% is used in this study as banks should be the least risky of the financial
firms examined given their access to deposit insurance.
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declines on the debt as the guarantee amount is approached, there is little
observable difference between the risky and guaranteed positions at positive
asset levels above the face value of the debt.
In the case of banks with deposit insurance, while the exact amount of
the guarantee may not be visibly clear absent a real time updated internal
system, the support only applies to those holders contractually entitled to
it. In the case of discretionary support such as that of ’Too Big To Fail,’
government agents may selectively support varying classes of a firm’s security
holders, for instance all the debt holders but not the preferred or common
stock holders.27 As the support level provided by the government increases
to include ever more junior level claims the value of the guarantee increases.
This may be seen by increasing the strike price, X, in equation (2.3).28
It is now necessary to introduce the stochastic nature of the government
guarantee as applied to a potential ’Too Big To Fail’ firm. Introduce a
government agent selected and monitored index of systemic firm assets, AG,
as well as a boundary point for this index, HG, below which the government
agent supports the potential ’Too Big To Fail’ firm. It may be the case that
each systemically important firm in the mind of government agents has a
different index the agents create and monitor before determining whether to
provide support. Or else government agents may create a single index used
for all systemically important firms or even that the firm’s own assets are
monitored by government agents in isolation. Keeping the existing Merton
style model environment already introduced, assume that the asset index
behaves with geometric Brownian motion with constant volatility σAG and
its Wiener process is correlated with that of the assets of the firm in question
via ρA,AG . The value of this modified put option is the following risk neutral
27The Economist (2008b) in assessing the logic in Treasury Secretary Paulson’s approach
to supporting firms during the crisis posited that if Paulson believed the unexpected failure
of a firm could be catastrophic, he would make ”... sure taxpayers get first claim on the
assets, common and preferred shareholders pay a steep price, and management is replaced.”
28In this simplified Merton (1974) model example with only two classes of securities,
common stock and zero coupon debt, the increase in junior claims is proxied by converting
more of the common to debt via an increase in the strike price. In reality, the problem is
much more complex as the debt classes would be coupon bonds (see discussion in Merton
(1974)) as opposed to zero coupon bonds. It would also be necessary to take a series of
differences in applying the coupon bond equivalent of equation (2.3) in order to settle the
assets in order of bankruptcy priority. Each class treats all classes below it as equivalent to
common equity. For example, if we split the zero coupon debt of our simple situation into
senior and subordinated, the senior debt holders see no difference between subordinated
debt and common stock if we may assume absolute priority in bankruptcy.
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expectation consistent with equation (2.2):
Eˆ[Max(X − AT , 0) ∗ 1{AGT<HGT }] (2.4)
where the first term is the value of the deterministic guarantee and the in-
dicator function serves to capture the government agents’ perception of the
degree of systemic risk and contagion in the economy given the relation of
the index to its boundary. The value of this guarantee has no closed form
solution and may be valued using Monte Carlo simulation. This is reviewed
in Appendix A.
Expanding our simple Merton (1974) style model to include the govern-
ment agent index we assume an asset index volatility of 5% and a base
correlation between the asset process for the firm and that of the govern-
ment agent monitored index of 40%.29 Similar to our treatment of firm asset
behavior, we will normalize the index asset value in terms of a $ of index
barrier. In contrast to our deposit insurance example, we will assume that
any guarantee applies to all of the debt in question and not a portion of it
such as 75% in Figure 2.1. Both the deterministic model in equation (2.3)
and the simulation solution to the stochastic model of equation (2.4) may
be observed in Figure 2.2. The line entitled deterministic put is the value
of the put option in equation (2.3) ignoring any uncertainty of government
support. One may see how the decline in the index monitored by govern-
ment agents proxies for the existence of government support in the mind of
an investor. With the index 20% above the barrier, there is little likelihood
of support and little or no value ascribed to government support at any asset
(leverage) value depicted. As the index to barrier ratio declines to 110% or
the index reaches the barrier the guarantee begins to approach that of the
deterministic guarantee. Also shown is the very limited value to the guar-
antee at traditional debt to equity leverage values for financial firms of 10:1
29Lopez (2004) examines portfolios of firms within US and other geographic regions
finding average asset correlation increasing in firm size and increasing (decreasing) in firm
credit quality (default likelihood). He finds that the largest U.S. firms with the highest
credit quality have a measured average asset correlation of 30%. 40% is used in this study
as a base case to reflect the further constraint of only U.S. financial firms of large size and
high credit quality. To the degree we specify contagion as rising correlation in falling asset
environments, it is unclear how to apply his results. Falling asset value is indicative of
falling credit quality which is synonymous with falling asset correlation in his study. This
is a question for future research, however, and is not addressed in the remainder of this
paper.
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or less when the index is 20% above the barrier. Another empirical observa-
tion during a crisis is the tendency of firm asset values to decline in tandem,
consistent with increasing correlation or contagion. Figure 2.3 captures this
effect by introducing an increasing degree of correlation between the assets of
the firm and the index of assets observed by government agents. This acts to
futher increase the value of the stochastic guarantee as the tendency of firm
assets to decline while the index is declining acts to increase the likelihood
of government support just when it is needed.
The aforementioned effects may be observed in Figure 2.4 which reintro-
duces the underlying risky debt position first depicted in Figure 2.1. It may
be seen that the effect of declining asset value on the risky debt position may
easily be overcome by an increase in the guarantee value (see the large open
arrow in the figure). Thus, investor belief in a stochastic ’Too Big To Fail’
guarantee should be more pronounced in that firm’s security returns during
a crisis than during non-crisis times. The focus on returns also points to an
event study methodology instead of measuring price premiums for ’Too Big
To Fail’ financial firms. These returns or price changes should be much more
marked than that resulting from the fixed guarantee of FDIC insurance for
banks. While the FDIC insurance can slow the debt value decline as the
guarantee level is approached, it cannot provide a means of increasing debt
values. This is clear from examination of Figure 2.1. The positive ’Too Big
To Fail’ guarantee value change resulting from decreasing the ratio of AG to
HG and its tendency to ensure the indicator function in equation (2.4) is 1
rather than zero can more than make up for the decline in underlying debt
value from reducing A0 in equation (2.3).
30
2.1.4 Identifying the ’Too Big To Fail’ Guarantee
The modeled stochastic guarantee of equation (2.4) may be used to explore
investor reaction to government actions. Government support of markets
through increases in liquidity may act to reassure firms and investors.31
30Recall that equation (2.3) is not only the value of a deterministic government guar-
antee, but also the determinant of risky debt value compared to risk free as investors
have sold a put on the debt to firm owners comparable to the guarantee they seek from
government agents. This is observable in Figure 2.1.
31The crisis displayed a variety of actions from extreme efforts to lend to firms, govern-
ment guarantees of risky firm securities to improve funding as well as changes to accounting
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However, such efforts may have the opposite effect by highlighting economic
conditions that may be worse than widely perceived.32 In support of this
latter position, recognize that government agents are the primary measure-
ment and reporting representatives of economic state information. Changes
in asset prices, volatility, and asset correlations will be the principal levers
for these possibilities within the model. Successful market interventions may
act to increase prices and reduce volatility while economic surprises may
lead investors to reduce their valuations of assets leading to increased asset
volatility. These results have unambiguous effects on debt, increasing its
value in the former case and decreasing it in the latter. Equity value change
depends upon the relative offset between asset value change and asset volatil-
ity change. For the simple capital structure example already presented the
debt level, X, is fixed. Declines in asset values will affect the index asset
value AG observed by government agents and as it moves toward the barrier
point HG investors will increase their expectations of government support.
Likewise, common declines of assets will tend to increase the measured cor-
relation of any given firm’s assets with that of the index. This will further
increase the likelihood of government support to prevent contagion. The
repeated references to contagion or spillovers as the guiding principle of gov-
ernment agents acting to support firms may be interpreted as a relationship
between default events and firm support. In those states where default is
more likely for a given firm, it is presumably more likely for other firms and
support also becomes more likely.
The Economist (2008a) notes in addressing the bailout of Bear Stearns
and its impact on CDS spreads on March 17, 2008 that
the CDS premiums on the debts of other American banks also
dropped, even as their shares were taking a pasting. That sug-
gested investors had decided that the Fed, while penali[s]ing share-
holders, would not allow another member of Wall Street’s finest
requirements and the prevention of shorting classes of firm securities.
32In response to the first coordinated credit market intervention by central banks on
August 8th, 2007, Kennedy (2007b) reports “Martin Slaney, head of spread betting at
GFT Global Markets, said that while the central banks may be trying to improve liquidity,
they may also be legitimizing fears about the credit market by injecting so much money.”
In Beales and Dennis (2007) we find that Nick Nelson, European equity strategist at
UBS, said: “The central banks are doing exactly what you’d want them to under the
circumstances. But the interpretation in the market is more sinister, making investors
more nervous.”
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to fail outright
From a structural perspective this result is difficult to reconcile absent a gov-
ernment guarantee as the decline in debt spreads (positive debt return from
an increase in price) is a condition of asset value (volatility) increase (de-
crease) consistent with government support on the downside. But the large
equity decline is a result of asset value and/or volatility decrease consistent
not with downside protection but the removal of positive future economic
states from the return distribution. With equation (2.4) this is easily ex-
plainable as a simultaneous decline in the index asset value and that of a
given firm’s assets for a fixed point in the capital structure, X.33 Multiple
support events in rapid succession may signal, through an implied fear of
contagion by government agents, a significantly worse economic environment
leading to further asset value declines through the actions of investors.34
A crisis provides a simultaneous asset value decrease and government sup-
port likelihood increase for a given firm as perceived by investors. The de-
creases in A and AG along with increases in σA, σAG , and ρA,AG will all lead
to an increase in the value of the guarantee modeled in equation (2.4).35 As
contagion, by definition, is the tendency of one firm’s asset value decline to
lead to asset declines in other firms, seeking to find the guarantee value dur-
ing good times could be challenging. High index asset values in comparison
to the government’s barrier for action imply small values to any ’Too Big
To Fail’ guarantee for a given firm in equation (2.4). The use of both CDS
and equity returns in an event study setting will permit identification of as-
set value changes consistent with the existence of a perceived guarantee by
investors.
A given event may be assessed by first examining the market index in ques-
tion as a proxy for asset values given a point in the capital structure under
consideration (equity or debt). Next, the absolute debt and equity return of
a given firm can be considered. Finally, the abnormal debt and equity re-
33The use of CDS spreads in the Economist quote are consistent with expected govern-
ment support at the senior unsecured debt level and above.
34Lauricella, Rappaport, and Lobb (2008) notes “Investors say the government takeover
of AIG and Lehman’s bankruptcy filing are evidence that the situation is grimmer than all
but the most pessimistic had expected.” Guha, Mackenzie, and Tett (2008) states “Some
analysts have critici[s]ed US authorities for adopting an arbitrary approach to rescues -
saving AIG, but not Lehman - that was impossible for investors to predict and therefore
did not boost confidence.”
35This is more clearly related in Appendix A.
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turn sans respective index movement may be examined. A ’Too Big To Fail’
institution, at minimum, should display a positive abnormal debt return con-
sistent with investors giving its debt securities a price premium above that
associated with the firm’s relation to the market index absent the event.
Stronger cases of support to debt holders would be positive absolute and
abnormal debt returns in the face of debt market index declines. Although
unlikely, positive abnormal equity returns would indicate investor perception
of some level of equity support. Large abnormal declines in debt returns
would reflect investors’ interpreting government action as some combination
of a reduced likelihood of government support for the firm in question and
government action as a signal that the economic environment is much worse
than expected. For events entailing general programs to improve market
liquidity, success on the part of government agents should translate into ei-
ther tighter spreads or increased equity valuation for all firms via the market
index in question. Firm specific abnormal returns from liquidity interven-
tions imply either expectations of support on the upside or economic state
reconsideration on the downside.
2.2 The Events, Methodology and Data
Ten chronologically ordered events are examined inclusive of interventions
by both U.S. and foreign regulators in markets and and in the support of
troubled financial firms36:
1. IKB, the German government organized rescue of business lender IKB
Industrie Deutschebank as a result of its U.S. subprime exposure during
the last weekend of July, 2007.
2. Fed Discount Window, the Federal Reserve’s extension and encour-
agement of discount window borrowing by U.S. banks in August, 2007
3. Northern Rock, the rescue of Britain’s Northern Rock in September,
2007 following the first public bank run in Britain since 1866
36The events were selected based upon examination of daily financial market press cov-
erage over the course of the crisis. A set of hypothetical drivers of investor perceptions of
’Too Big To Fail’ among major financial firms were constructed in result.
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4. TAF, the expansion of Federal Reserve intervention in money markets
in December, 2007 through the introduction of term auction facilities
for banks
5. Countrywide, the near failure and purchase of the largest mortgage
lender and servicer, Countrywide, by Bank of America in January, 2008
6. Monoline Downgrades, the near collapse of large AAA monoline
insurers Ambac and MBIA around their rating agency downgrades also
in January, 2008
7. Bear Stearns, the rescue of Bear Stearns in March, 2008
8. GSEs I, the explicit acknowledgment of the need to offer greater gov-
ernment support to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in July, 2008
9. GSEs II, the formal conservatorship of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
in September, 2008
10. Lehman, Merrill & AIG, a single event composed by the overlap
of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy, the purchase of Merrill Lynch by
Bank of America, the Reserve Prime money market fund “breaking the
buck” and the AIG rescue, also in September, 2008
These events are described with institutional details as well as crisis ac-
tions before and after the selected events in Appendix B. Stern and Feld-
man (2008) mention several of these events (Northern Rock, Countrywide,
and Bear Stearns as of May, 2008) as characteristic of ’Too Big To Fail’
type thinking as reported in the financial press. The chronologically ordered
events may be classified into four categories:
1. international bank crises followed by bailouts (events 1 and 3)
2. government attempts to increase liquidity for bank (events 2 and 4)
and non-bank (event 7) institutions
3. general systemic concerns and inferred US government intervention
(events 5, 6 and 10)
4. direct observable US government intervention in firm survival (events
7 through 10)
20
We might expect that the international events could lead to one of a sys-
temic reminder; a transmission/contagion fear to the downside; or a change
in investor ’Too Big To Fail’ support expectations resulting from the bailouts.
Any one of these could heighten the need for government support of U.S. fi-
nancial institutions from an investor’s point of view. The initial liquidity
interventions should primarily apply to banks, but the need for action might
lead to investor responses regarding government support for non-banks. The
systemic events are indicative of the heightened need for support. The direct
support events affect investor support expectations for other financial firms
via the mechanism of contagion. In each of these events, investors must both
identify a need for potential support and then determine whether government
agents will step in and fill it through protection of uninsured creditors.
The planned series of event studies differs from the literature in a number
of ways due to the need to address particular aspects of the financial crisis.37
We have ten target events identified spanning just over a year. The rapidity
of events and sheer number of government actions during the crisis will make
it impossible to cleanly separate each event from the others. Further, within
events it will not always be possible to clearly separate government action
in markets from government support or lack of support to troubled firms.38
Thus, the conclusions from a compound event will need to reflect multiple
possible interpretations of government action with a “majority” conclusion
based upon the abnormal return measure in question (firm debt and/or eq-
uity). The events are short with only one in excess of seven trading days,
making any tests to rule out changes in firm return variance processes result-
ing from the event itself impractical. Alternative approaches such as using a
post-event observation period will not work in most cases because an ensu-
ing event can not be included in the observation period for a prior event.39
Shorter observation periods of 100 trading days are used to capture the fluid
nature of the crisis reserving more standard lengths of one year for robust-
37See Peterson (1989), Henderson, Jr. (1990), MacKinlay (1997), Binder (1998), or
Khotari and Warner (2006) for literature reviews.
38For example, the simultaneous rescue of Bear Stearns along with the introduction of
the Primary Dealer Credit Facility permitting non-bank primary dealers of government
securities to borrow directly from the Fed took place the same weekend. Likewise, the
decisions not to bail out Lehman Brothers but to support American International Group
were separated by only two business days.
39Events 3 and 7 permit a split of the 100 day observation period into a 50 day pre-event
period and a 50 day post-event period without impinging on the ensuing event period.
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ness tests. As the primary focus is the assessment of an individual firm’s
’Too Big To Fail’ perception by investors as opposed to general conclusions
about groups of firms, the choice of event study methodologies is limited.40
The examination of any group of firms within an event will be limited by
cross-sectional correlation in the residuals of any model implemented. This
is due to all of the firms both being members of the financial industry and
sharing the same clustered event windows. The two alternatives mentioned
in MacKinlay (1997) for analyzing a related group of firms and/or clustered
event are to create a portfolio of firms and work with the portfolio returns
or else to work with individual firms by utilizing the multivariate regres-
sion model (MVRM).41,42 Both of these techniques have easily implemented
single firm analogs. Only the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) methodol-
ogy is presented. Both methods (CAR and MVRM) were implemented and
provided very similar conclusions throughout this study with CAR results
stronger in terms of statistical significance. This is consistent with the com-
ments about the MVRM approach lacking power in MacKinlay (1997). After
a review of the CAR approach, the return models implemented for equity and
debt securities will be described.
2.2.1 Cumulative Abnormal Return Approach
Begin with the definition of abnormal return for a single event day based
upon an observation period fitted market model. The typical form of the
event period prediction error or abnormal return in the literature is as follows
(from equation 4 in Patell (1976)) where R˜it and R˜mt are either the portfolio
or the individual firm, i, and market returns for event day t. The market
model fitted portfolio or firm returns during the observation period utilize
40The typical corporate finance study seeks to make a statement about a class of firms
by analyzing events such as the announcement effects of mergers, earnings, or dividends,
enabling broad independence assumptions over both the time and firm dimensions.
41From the brief literature review of ’Too Big To Fail’ in Section 2.1.1, the only classic
event studies are O’Hara and Shaw (1990) and Kabir and Hassan (2005) both of which
use the portfolio approach for equity returns to examine a group of firms.
42See Binder (1985a), Binder (1985b), Schipper and Thompson (1983), Schipper and
Thompson (1985), or Thompson (1985) for examples of the multivariate regression model
approach
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parameters ai and bi as follows:
u˜it = R˜it − (ai + biR˜mt) (2.5)
These one day abnormal returns may be aggregated into cumulative abnor-
mal returns (CAR) through simple summation over each day, t, of the τ day
event window for firm i:
CARi =
τ∑
t=1
ARit (2.6)
In order to test for statistical significance of either AR or CAR, the variance
must be estimated through a sample measure taken during the observation
period. The variance must then be adjusted for the sampling error of the
coefficients applied to the event values of the market factor(s) in question.
The measurement of the sampling error variance adjustment is reviewed in
Appendix C. Since all firms use identical observation and event periods our
adjustment to the residual variance for firm i on event day t will utilize Ct
in place of Patell (1976)’s designation of Cit. Let us represent the number of
market factors used to model portfolio or firm returns as K and then define
the standard deviation of residuals for portfolio or firm i determined during
the T day observation period as si:
si =
√ ∑T
t=1 ˆ
2
it
T −K − 1 (2.7)
This leads to the following statistic for measuring the significance of the
abnormal return on a given event day:
ARit
si
√
Ct
∼ t(T −K − 1) (2.8)
and in a similar manner a test statistic for the CAR of the portfolio or firm:
CARi
si
√∑τ
t=1Ct
∼ t(T −K − 1) (2.9)
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2.2.2 Model of Equity Return
The exclusive use of financial firms is a challenge as past studies of firm eq-
uity returns such as Fama and French (1992) have often excluded financial
firms as a first step due to their significant degree of leverage.43 MacKinlay
(1997) suggests consideration of a multi factor model for studies like this one
emphasizing firms from a similar industry, although this will not matter for
individual firm testing and a simpler one factor model will be used for robust-
ness testing. Begin with the three factor model of Fama and French (1992)
including the excess market return as well as the zero investment portfolios
for size (SMB) and book to market value (HML). Next, add the momentum
factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) first implemented as a fourth explana-
tory factor in Carhart (1997) and labeled UMD on Ken French’s website. The
equity return model is thus:
(Excess Stock Return)i,t = αi + βi1(Rm - Rf)t
+ βi2(SMB)t + βi3(HML)t + βi4(UMD)t + µi,t (2.10)
Daily stock returns for each firm were collected from CRSP. The necessary
equity market factor returns as well as the daily risk free return measured
from one month Treasury bills were collected from Ken French’s Data Li-
brary.44
Two fitting exercises were performed across the firms in question. First, the
return generating model was fit across the entire period under consideration
(from the start of the observation period for the first event through the last
day of the final event) on a pooled basis for all firms (with clustered standard
errors). Second, each of the event observation periods were fit separately on
a firm by firm basis consistent with the modeling approach used in Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and described in their footnote 12.
The pooled model and average firm model fits for each event are collected in
43Barber and Lyon (1997) test and find similar explanatory power for the 3 factor
Fama and French model when applied to financial firms. In contradiction, Fraser, Kolari,
Sorescu, and Viale (2007) find no explanatory power for the firm size and book to market
variables in explaining returns to bank stocks.
44The daily risk free return was used to calculate individual daily firm excess returns.
All return measures were converted to continuous compounding prior to modeling. For
Ken French’s Data Library see http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.
french/data_library.html
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in Table 2.3.
2.2.3 Model of Debt Return
The event study literature utilizing debt spreads is limited. The task is
complicated by the lack of an accepted method for modeling debt returns
similar to the widely used methodology for equity returns. CDS spreads
are used in place of bond prices, yields or spreads to take advantage of the
improved price transparency and liquidity as well as the constant tenors
available for CDS spreads. As CDS return measurement is complex it is
reviewed along with two alternative proxies derived in Appendix D.
Studies of spread changes should be instructive for modeling CDS returns
in an event study setting. As described in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and
Martin (2001) models of changes in credit spreads are subject to poor ex-
planatory power compared to risky yield levels and the residuals leave evi-
dence of a strongly significant but unknown systematic factor.45 In “Predict-
ing Credit Spreads,” Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2008) implement
a three factor model of the risk free term structure using U.S. Treasury se-
curities as part of their explanatory model. The risk free term structure
has often been used as an indicator of future economic changes. The level,
slope and curvature changes they introduce are implemented in this study as
well. However, the implemented risk free slope term adopts the marketplace
convention of the difference between the 10 year and 2 year yields. The 5
year U.S. Treasury tenor, consistent with the chosen tenor for modeled CDS
spread returns, is used as the risk free yield curve level. Thus, twice the 5
year yield minus the sum of the 2 and 10 year yields is defined as risk free cur-
vature measure. Finally, the crisis repeatedly demonstrated flights to quality
leading to near zero and sometimes negative U.S. Treasury Bill rates. The
45Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) reference a Kwan (1996) study showing
that a regression of high-grade bond yield changes on US Treasury yield changes and stock
returns produces an adjusted R2 of 60% but this falls to 5% for spread changes. They
conclude that the changes in industrial firm bond spreads over US Treasury yields as
explained in their structural credit models united with market factors for equity indices
and index option volatility produce low adjusted R2 values of only 25% due to the exclusion
of this systematic factor. Similar to Fama and French (1992) they exclude financial firms
from their analysis. When they add a market factor via the change in the yield of a BBB
bond index over the 10 year Treasury yield to an expanded “kitchen sink” model, average
adjusted R2 values increase from 35% to nearly 60% for their dataset of industrial firms.
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Treasury - Eurodollar or TED spread is a candidate to measure these liquid-
ity changes. The resulting model implemented in this study is composed of
the contemporaneous and trailing Markit CDX index returns measured by
proxy as described in Appendix D as a systematic risk measure, the changes
in the level, slope and curvature of the constant maturity Treasury (CMT)
curve, and the change in the TED spread as a liquidity proxy:
(CDS return)i,t = αi+βi1(CDX Index return)t+βi2(CDX Index return)t−1
+ βi3(∆CMT Level)t + βi4(∆CMT Slope)t
+ βi5(∆CMT Curvature)t + βi6(∆TED Spread)t + µi,t (2.11)
The daily CDS spread data is collected from Datastream, which sources it
from Credit Market Analysis (CMA), purchased by the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange in March, 2008. The CMA data includes daily bid and ask quotes
at tenors of 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years at the senior unsecured claim level of
the debtor’s assets. The midpoint of the 5 year tenor, the most frequently
populated for any given firm, is used in this study. All large financial firms
with consistent time series, lacking frequent missing or repeated values, were
collected - see Table 2.1 for the firm list. The Markit CDX index was hand
collected from Bloomberg. This is an equally weighted 5 year senior unse-
cured credit quality CDS midpoint for 125 investment grade firms which is
calculated daily and may be observed at Markit’s website with index identi-
fier CDX.NA.IG.46 This is a series that rolls over every 6 months and is then
re-versioned in response to default events. As the rollover point frequently
results in one or more days without data reported on Bloomberg, or even
Markit’s own web site, deriving a consistent time series of daily index re-
turns is challenging. The return methodology reviewed in Appendix D was
implemented for each series subject to data availability.
The final combined return series was created from the most recent series
with available data and each successive next most recent series with what
appeared to be updated pricing on Bloomberg as needed.47 Daily 3 month
Eurodollar deposit rates, 3 month U.S. Treasury Bill rates and constant
46http://www.markit.com/en/products/data/indices/
credit-and-loan-indices/cdx/cdx-prices-iframe.page?
47For example, Series 10 for investment grade firms rolled over to Series 11 on October
1st, 2008 and Markit first provided data the following day, October 2nd. Thus, the first
index return measure is not available until October 3rd.
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maturity U.S. Treasury (CMT) rates at tenors of 2, 5 and 10 years were
collected from the Federal Reserve H.15 statistical release website.48 Similar
to the equity return model, two fitting exercises are performed across the
firms in question. First, the return generating model is fit across the entire
period under consideration (from the start of the observation period for the
first event through the last day of the final event) on a pooled basis for all
firms (with clustered standard errors). Second, each of the event observation
periods were fit separately on a firm by firm basis consistent with the mod-
eling approach used in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and
described in their footnote 12. The pooled model and average firm model
fits for each event are collected in Table 2.4. Note the much weaker reported
R2 values than in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001). While the
inclusion of systematic debt return factors improves explanatory power, the
financial firm focus and event study restriction to debt market explanatory
factors in this study offer an explanation.
2.3 Results and Discussion
Several support tables are provided to aid in understanding the results.
Tables 2.5-2.6 provide a list of alternative explanatory headlines for each
event. These headlines were collected from the front page of the Wall Street
Journal and the Financial Times for each event day. Tables 2.7-2.8 provide
the cumulative returns or changes for each market factor used in the eq-
uity and debt models, respectively, for each event and its observation period.
These are provided to supplement the primary market returns reported in
the actual event results presented in Tables 2.9-2.18.49 Each event result
48While the technical definition of the TED spread is the difference between the 3
month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the 3 month Treasury bill rate, the
Eurodollar deposit series on the Federal Reserve abstract is not LIBOR. It is a market
snapshot collected at approximately 9:30 AM EST by large broker ICAP’s Eurodollar
deposit desk among actual transactions by counterparties of A1/P1 commercial paper
ratings or better. As there were repeated allegations of LIBOR panel members reporting
below market estimates of their expected funding costs, the ICAP derived measure should
be more responsive, particularly during extreme liquidity shortages. All data is found at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H.15.
49Unusual firm event abnormal returns may result from extreme differences in factor
behavior between observation and event period accompanied by large loadings on the
factor in question.
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table displays firms in order using the industry breakout introduced in Table
2.1. Both equity and debt returns, in basis points, beginning with the ac-
tual market returns of the Fama-French equity market index and the Markit
CDX debt index are presented.50 Firms are displayed including their actual
equity and debt returns only if they had an abnormal return with a statisti-
cal significance (p-value) less than 10% in either the equity or debt abnormal
return measures. Each event indicates the observation period and whether
it was entirely before the event window or else if it included observations
before and after. Robustness testing included performing all ten events with
an extra 152 trading days prior to the 100 day based observation period (for
a full year in total) and performing all ten events with single explanatory
factor models for returns (the Fama French market index return for equity
and the Markit CDX Index return for debt). All results were consistent with
those presented here. A general discussion and firm specific highlights are
next presented prior to detailed event by event specific results.
2.3.1 General Discussion
From the beginning of event 1 through the end of event 10, a period of just
over a year (July 27, 2007 through September 17, 2008), there was a 22%
decline in the principal equity market factor, a 121% widening of the CDX
index spread and a 60% tightening in the five year constant maturity U.S.
Treasury rate. It is difficult to find investor ’Too Big To Fail’ premiums
appearing via positive abnormal returns during the crisis save for the debt
holders of both the largest banks during the initial event of the crisis and the
two GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during the rescue of Bear Stearns.51
It never appeared in the broker dealers, the largest insurers, the surety firms
or even Washington Mutual, the sixth largest bank by asset size.52 While it
is clear in retrospect that the very arguments made in Stern and Feldman
(2004) proved prescient for determining which firms would be considered for
potential ’Too Big To Fail’ treatment by government agents, investor reaction
50While all econometric models of return are implemented with continuously com-
pounded one day returns, the tables present results in simple period returns.
51Wachovia also displayed a positive ’Too Big To Fail’ debt abnormal return at the 5%
level of significance during the Bear Stearns rescue.
52Although characterized here as a large bank, Washington Mutual was actually the
largest savings and loan institution.
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was confined to the debt of firms with already longstanding government sup-
port guarantees (large banks through FDIC insurance and the GSEs through
their longstanding credit lines from the U.S. Treasury). Investor reactions
also proved prescient in that they correctly anticipated later events via pre-
event changes to abnormal returns in nearly every case. While AIG was
rescued, there was sizable uncertainty around debt holder recovery in the
presence of such large derivative exposures and government proclivity to use
much of the bailout funding to assist other broker dealers and banks with
heavy derivative exposure to AIG. As derivative contracts and any posted
collateral are not subject to the automatic stay provision of bankruptcy, ab-
sent explicit guarantees for debt holders in AIG’s case government support
did not lead to an automatic make whole assumption for its debt. Thus, in
spite of its ’Too Big To Fail’ status in the minds of government agents there
were no premiums found in its debt returns.
Of the firms with demonstrated ’Too Big To Fail’ debt premiums, only
the equity of J.P. Morgan Chase showed a tendency for positive abnormal
returns, always in the presence of actual declines. Thus, it is hard to tie
government support decisions to expectations by management of ’Too Big To
Fail’ support, assuming significant equity compensation for senior managers.
Indeed, the actions of the government were also to remove the managers each
time they supported an institution during the events examined.53
’Too Big To Fail’ support seems a simple extension of pre-existing gov-
ernment guarantees. The extension of those guarantees to other non-bank
financial firms appears to be the biggest moral hazard created by the cri-
sis given the results presented here.54 Financial firm managers already have
enough perverse compensation incentives without ’Too Big To Fail’ insurance
to increase them. The government’s selective support of Bear and AIG while
letting Lehman fail does not give a clear indication of future support ex-
pectation worthy of extending ’Too Big To Fail’ premiums beyond the firms
already mentioned. Widespread condemnation of Lehman’s failure as the
cause of the worst of the crisis may change this in the future, however.
53In later rescues such as Citigroup and Bank of America, management remained in
place.
54For example, the granting of bank holding company status to the two remaining large
broker dealers Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley as well as the encouragement of funding
broker dealer activities of large banks through their banking operations via the waiver of
existing rules.
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Bear Stearns The support of Bear Stearns was the watershed event of
the crisis. In emphasizing the need for stockholders to “suffer” while still
supporting Federal Reserve financial help for J.P. Morgan’s purchase, Trea-
sury Secretary Paulson set expectations for the ensuing events that hurt the
Treasury’s efforts to encourage later private capital raising which hastened
the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It also ensured neither
Bank of America nor Barclay’s would purchase Lehman Brothers without
government support similar to that provided to J.P. Morgan to purchase
Bear. Rather than leading investors to conclude that investment banks were
protected as proposed in the Economist quote from Section 2.1.3, only the
debt holders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac experienced strongly positive
and statistically significant positive abnormal returns (Wachovia debt hold-
ers experienced a strong positive return but only at the 5% significance level).
This proved prescient as the ensuing event, the explicit U.S. Government sup-
port of the GSEs demonstrated. To the degree Bear was ’Too Big To Fail’
prior to the crisis in the mind of its debt holders, they were fully supported
by the J.P. Morgan purchase. Yet there was no abnormal positive return for
any other investment bank debt holders in response.
Lehman Brothers It was widely surmised that Lehman was permitted to
fail because it was not a surprise event like Bear and investors had plenty of
time to plan for it. Yet it was this failure that was blamed for the worst of the
crisis that ensued. Lehman’s debt and equity actual and abnormal returns
were large, negative and strongly statistically significant in response to both
the Bear Stearns rescue and the explicit support for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. These results are consistent with the reasoning used by government
decision makers in electing not to bail it out. While it was the proximate
reason for the Reserve Primary money market fund breaking the buck, it is
not clear that another large failure such as Merrill Lynch or AIG would not
have had similar results.55 Lehman’s failure seems more likely part of a signal
change to investors just how bad things were in the economy leading them
to dramatically reduce asset prices and increase asset volatility without a
companion increase in support expectations. Contradictory to Bear Stearns,
55As presented in the results for event 10 in section 2.3.2, AIG, Merrill Lynch and other
firms exhibited large, parallel equity declines as the week progressed prior to Lehman’s
failure.
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to the degree Lehman was accorded ’Too Big To Fail’ status prior to the crisis
and debt holders held on, they were proved wrong and suffered dramatic
losses. Management and shareholders were completely wiped out.
American International Group As of August 8th, 2008 AIG had re-
ported in excess of $18 billion in losses during the prior three fiscal quarters
primarily stemming from repeated mark to market losses on its credit de-
fault swap portfolio. $62 billion notional of this portfolio focused upon sub
prime mortgage collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).56 In spite of this it
appears to have been a complete surprise as a ’Too Big To Fail’ firm to all
involved, both government agents and investors. Save for a Federal Reserve
liquidity action detailed in event number 2, that lifted AIG’s stock with the
rest of the market, all of its abnormal debt and equity returns, when they
are statistically significant, are negative. They grow increasingly worse be-
fore plummeting in the final event. Even with the bailout and the resulting
50% one day actual positive debt return, it still suffered a 43% cumulative
actual debt decline over the course of the final event ending with its rescue.
It appears investors fully captured its embedded risk over the course of the
crisis and severely punished its equity and debt securities. AIG perfectly fit
the description of a ’Too Big To Fail’ firm as espoused in Stern and Feldman
(2004) yet there is nothing in its event reactions to indicate investors treated
it as such. Should they have done so pre-crisis, the jury is still out for its debt
holders even with the government rescue. Derivative exposures, which AIG
has in abundance, receive special treatment in bankruptcy and are not sub-
ject to automatic stay provisions putting them in front of debt holders during
a potential future bankruptcy filing. This makes AIG a murky midpoint be-
tween Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers from the debt holder perspective.
Management was removed and with the U.S. Government strongly diluting
shareholders, their future recovery is highly uncertain.
56Reilly (2007) noted AIG statements that it had written $465 billion notional in CDS
since 1998 of which $64 billion were subprime related CDO guarantees as of August 13,
2007. Pleven and Reilly (2008) note the subprime based CDO CDS notional as $62.4
billion on February 13, 2008. Pleven (2008) notes on August 8, 2008, the total loss over
three quarters of $18.5 billion. He reports the chance of a further Standard & Poors rating
downgrade and the $10 billion collateral call that would accompany it. This would have
been on top of $6.8 billion that had already been posted in the months of May through
July.
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Large Banks Large bank debt CARs were positive with strong statistical
significance in the face of moderate market declines duing the bailout of
IKB Deutschebank, consistent with an increase in investor ’Too Big To Fail’
premiums for the very largest banks as Washington Mutual and Westpac did
not participate in the increase. There were no statistically significant results
in reaction to the Northern Rock bailout, but market debt returns during
this period were positive at 65 bp, which corresponded with Federal Reserve
interest rate easing. Only J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank of America displayed
statistically significant positive equity CARs in the face of small actual losses
in response to the IKB bailout.
While Wachovia debt holders appeared ’Too Big To Fail’ in both the IKB
and Bear Stearns bailouts, they soon approached that of Washington Mutual
debt holders as the final three events unfolded. Ultimately Washington Mu-
tual was not ’Too Big To Fail’ while the debt holders of Wachovia were. The
big four banks rarely appeared in later events in a statistically significant
fashion.57Thus, the early ’Too Big To Fail’ premiums did not carry over to
the more extreme later events.
Federal Reserve Intervention in Markets Federal Reserve intervention
in supplying liquidity to banks and later, broker dealers, did not lead to an
increase in ’Too Big To Fail’ premiums for financial firms. The programs
examined in events 2 and 4 as well as the TSLF and PDCF introductions in
event 7 and the weakening of broker dealer collateral requirements in event
10 were increasingly directed lending to potentially or obviously insolvent
counterparties. This was in contradiction to traditional exhortations from
long time “Fed watchers” to focus upon open market operations and avoid
directed lending to specific institutions. Yet it did not lead investors to infer
that the historical contagion fear “card” had been played by government
agents via directed lending.
57The big three banks, Bank of America, Citigroup, and J.P. Morgan Chase would soon
be joined by Wells Fargo after its acquisition of Wachovia in late September, 2008 to
become the big four.
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2.3.2 Event Specific Results
Event 1, IKB: The trouble and bailout of IKB Deutsche Industriebank
(Friday, July 27, 2007 thru Friday, August 3, 2007.) This event, depicted in
Table 2.9, is one of the richest for statistically significant results. We observe
that the broad market index returns experienced declines of 3% for equity and
50 bp for debt. Excluding Westpac from the description “major”, all of the
major banks save for Washington Mutual displayed actual spread tightening
during the event. This led to positive CARs of 60 to 112 bp all of which
were strongly statistically significant at the 0.1% level. Most financial firms
displayed large negative actual and abnormal equity returns, particularly
surety and GSEs, most insurers and both Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns,
all with significant exposure to mortgage investments. Alternative headlines
in Table 2.5 negatively mentioning MGIC, Radian and Bear Stearns support
this conclusion. This may be interpreted as an international rescue that
positively helped the debt holders of commercial banks, consistent with the
application of a crisis ’Too Big To Fail’ premium. For equity investors in
firms exposed to mortgage investments this appeared to be a signal of losses
to come. Among bank equity holders, only Bank of America and J.P. Morgan
had large statistically significant positive CARs, but on small actual losses
of 60 and 109 bps, respectively.
Event 2, Fed Discount Window: The reduction in discount rate, the
extension of term, and the unprecedented encouragement of discount window
borrowing by the Federal Reserve (Friday, August 17th, 2007 thru Friday,
August 24th, 2007.) As seen at the top of Table 2.10, this period was very
positive for the markets as a whole with a 5% equity index return and a nearly
1% debt index return. This event was only directly applicable to the banks.
Yet only Westpac showed a statistically strong gain and only in its equity
return (15% actual and 7% CAR at the 1% significance level). Thus, there
is little to conclude regarding the remaining non-bank financial firms. For
the finance firms, CIT and Istar displayed strongly significant positive actual
and CAR debt returns. Finally, the most dramatic positive returns were
reserved for the debt of the non-GSE surety firms MBIA, MGIC, PMI and
Radian. The principal non-event news from Table 2.5 was the Countrywide
drawdown of its credit lines and then support by Bank of America with
a $2 billion investment. This investment should have allayed fears, at least
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temporarily, of the failure of Countrywide as the largest mortgage lender and
servicer. Thus it is a very convincing explanation for why all of the surety
firms, particularly on the mortgage insurance side (PMI and Radian) would
have strong positive reactions to this news. Whether this extended to finance
firms such as CIT and Istar is unclear. It is difficult to draw ’Too Big To Fail’
premium conclusions from this event unless one infers government action or
encouragement of the Countrywide investment by Bank of America. The
market-wide spread tightening is consistent with a successful intervention by
the Fed to improve liquidity without a bank specific conclusion. This was
the first move by the Fed to pursue an unconventional (non-open market
operations) means of increasing market liquidity and it appears through this
lens to have been successful and not indicative of prompting investors to
increase ’Too Big To Fail’ premiums for specific financial firms.
Event 3, Northern Rock: The run on and bailout of The Northern
Rock, one of the U.K.’s largest mortgage lenders (Thursday, September 13th,
2007 through Wednesday, September 19th, 2007.) Ex-ante this event appears
similar to Event 1, an international bank bailout but in this case the crisis
portion was observable via a public bank run while the crisis leading to the
IKB bailout was publicly learned after the fact. This event is one of two
for which there is enough time between it and the ensuing event to split the
observation period into equal pre- and post-event portions. While no event is
defined in the time period immediately following this one, there are a series
of large quarterly loss announcements for banks and broker dealer in the
ensuing weeks. In any case, as seen in the top row of Table 2.11, both equity
and debt markets increased in value over the course of this event with a nearly
4% equity index return and a 65 bp debt index return. There are few results
in terms of abnormal return in the debt and equity of the financial firms
examined. Only Metlife has a strongly significant positive abnormal return
to its debt of 63 bp on an 88 bp actual increase. The primary non-event
related news in Table 2.5 focused on expected and actual Federal Reserve
interest rate cuts. There are no ’Too Big To Fail’ conclusions and the market
debt and equity increases could just as easily be in anticipation of interest
rate cuts as in responses to an international bank bailout.
Event 4, TAF: The introduction of the Term Auction Facility (TAF)
by the Federal Reserve to include the implementation and results of its first
auction (Wednesday, December 12, 2007 through Thursday, December 20,
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2007). This is the second of the events to focus on non-traditional (non-
open market operations) means of increasing market liquidity by making
the equivalent of discount window loans to banks with the anonymity of an
auction mechanism. Presumably, this was an acknowledgment of the failure
of event 2 to spur more frequent discount window borrowing. As seen in the
top of Table 2.12, the equity index return was a 1% decline while the debt
market displayed no change. The only strongly significant results on the debt
side were losses by reinsurer XL Capital and bond insurer MBIA. All of the
remaining results are from the equity side where the only large and strongly
significant gain was for Morgan Stanley, which appeared in the other news
headlines of Table 2.5 for a large writedown and the receipt of a significant
foreign investment. This is consistent with a stock price recovery in relief of
a smaller reported loss than expected or else a positive surprise that external
investment funds would be provided. While Lehman displayed a positive
abnormal equity return at the 5% level of significance, this was probably
related to the Morgan Stanley news. Sallie Mae displayed strong negative
results but this was also paired with non-event news regarding its funding
problems resulting from the credit squeeze. Reinsurer Berkshire Hathaway
and bond insurer MBIA also displayed strongly significant equity declines.
There is no evidence of ’Too Big To Fail’ premiums given that this event only
applied to banks and they do not display statistically significant reults. It
is difficult to conclude that the TAF announcement led to improved market
liquidity, either, from the lack of a positive debt index return.
Event 5, Countrywide: The takeover of Countrywide Financial by Bank
of America following several days of bankruptcy rumors (Monday, January
7, 2008 through Friday, January 11, 2008). This event was accompanied by
small declines of 130 bp and 40 bp in the equity and debt markets, respec-
tively, as demonstrated in the top line of Table 2.13. Few abnormal returns
with strong statistical significance were observed. Bank of America expe-
rienced moderate 5% and 1% CAR declines on the equity and debt sides,
respectively, understandable given its acquisition of Countrywide. Washing-
ton Mutual was the only other bank which displayed large moves. Its 11%
and 6% increases in equity and debt CAR more likely reflect its prospects as
a merger candidate, perhaps at government suggestion to another large bank,
than as an indication of a ’Too Big To Fail’ premium. On the broker dealer
side, only Merrill Lynch displayed a large abnormal return. Its 9% equity
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CAR increase is presumably for the same reason as Washington Mutual’s, its
potential as a merger candidate. The non-event news in Table 2.6 regarding
Merrill seeking more foreign capital is consistent with this merger candidate
explanation. Health insurer Aetna also has a large 6% positive equity CAR
at the 5% significance level with no obvious explanation while American Ex-
press experienced large, strongly significant equity and debt CARs of 10%
and 134 bp, respectively. Finally, mortgage insurer PMI had a 20% equity
CAR decline at the 5% level of significance, perhaps in response to the alter-
native event news regarding fellow surety firms AMBAC and MBIA losing
their AAA status as reported in Table 2.6. There is no clear ’Too Big To
Fail’ conclusion from the event even if the government did encourage Bank
of America’s purchase as was repeatedly suggested in the press.
Event 6, Monoline Downgrades: The downgrade fears surrounding
the two largest monoline insurers Ambac Financial Group and MBIA Inc
as well as large quarterly losses announced by Citigroup and Merrill Lynch
(Tuesday, January 15, 2008 through Friday, January 18, 2008). As observable
in Table 2.14, the market returns were declines of 6% for equity and 60
bp for debt. Among the banks, Citigroup and Wachovia displayed strongly
significant negative equity CARs of 8% while JP Morgan Chase and Westpac
experienced positive equity CARs of 5% and 10%, respectively on actual
declines, all significant at the 1% level. Only Wachovia had a statistically
significant debt CAR decline of 140 bp. Citi and Merrill appeared both in the
event description, courtesy of their nearly identical $10 billion in quarterly
losses, as well as in the non-event news listed in Table 2.6. As Citi’s debt
decline of only 30 bp was less than that of the market, this seemed to be more
a reaction to the scope of its losses and the dilutive need for further equity
capital than a change in ’Too Big To Fail’ expectations. The P&C insurers
AIG, Chubb, CNA, and XL Capital all displayed equity declines of varying
significance presumably from concerns over mortgage investments at risk to
AMBAC/MBIA downgrade fears. AIG also exhibited a strongly significant
debt CAR decline of 108 bp, inconsistent with it beging ’Too Big To Fail’.
XL Capital and health insurer Genworth also displayed debt CAR declines
of 3% and 1%. The remaining surety firms all displayed very large equity
and debt declines in sympathy with AMBAC and MBIA. It is difficult to
argue that this systemic event led to changes in investor perceptions of ’Too
Big To Fail’ other than to the downside and the increased likelihood of firm
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problems to come.
Event 7, Bear Stearns: The liquidity squeeze and bailout of Bear
Stearns by the Federal Reserve both in its opening for business on March
14, 2008 as well as its supported purchase by J.P. Morgan; the introduction
of liquidity facilities and support for non-bank primary dealers of the Fed
(Monday, March 10, 2008 through Monday, March 17, 2008). This, the wa-
tershed event of the crisis, was accompanied by small market declines of 187
bp for equity and 38 bp for debt as displayed in Table 2.15. It is also only
the second event permitting a split of the observation period between a 50
day pre- and a 50 day post-event observation period given the time until the
next event. Bear Stearns’ equity holders suffered dramatic declines while its
debt holders saw a small 57 bp positive actual return. The Fed’s assistance
in purchasing Bear via its $30 billion guarantee to JP Morgan was clearly
a form of ’Too Big To Fail’ support for Bear’s debt holders. JP Morgan
experienced a 14% increase in equity CAR on a 7% actual increase consis-
tent with market consensus it was getting the assets of Bear Stearns for a
low price. To attribute it to a ’Too Big To Fail’ premium afforded by J.P.
Morgan investors is difficult given that its debt holders experienced a 121 bp
decline (93 bp CAR decline but only at 10% significance level). Wells Fargo
also displayed a strong positive equity CAR of nearly 10% on 2% actual in-
crease at the 2% level of significance in the face of a small actual debt decline.
Wachovia, however, experienced a 211 bp positive debt CAR on an 152 bp
actual increase alongside an actual 6% equity decline, consistent with a ’Too
Big To Fail’ premium. Lehman Brothers exhibited a 23% abnormal decline
in equity and a 357 bp CAR decline on a 455 bp actual decline in its debt.
This is inconsistent with any ’Too Big To Fail’ argument on Lehman’s part.
Although Bear’s debtholders were made whole by the Fed intervention and
JP Morgan purchase, Lehman’s debt holders did not impute any heightened
rescue expectation into its debt spreads. It is not possible to ascribe any
abnormal benefit among broker dealers by the Fed’s twin introductions of
the TSLF and PDCF during the course of the event. A number of the life
and health insurers experienced significant abnormal declines in debt returns,
particularly Wellpoint which also has a 28% equity decline. Sallie Mae saw
a strongly significant abnormal decline in its debt via a 13% CAR with no
accompanying abnormal equity move (actual was a 10% decline).
The most interesting result was the behavior of GSE’s Fannie Mae and
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Freddie Mac. Each experienced strongly statistically significant increases in
debt CAR of 100 bp and 114 bp, respectively on 79 bp and 89 bp actual
increases. On the equity side Freddie had a 6% actual return (19% positive
CAR but only at the 10% level of significance) while Fannie had a 250 bp
actual equity decline. This seems to be a pretty clear case of a ’Too Big To
Fail’ premium in the debt of the two GSEs and Wachovia as debt investors
concluded that Bear’s debt rescue implied a future rescue for them as well.
There was little else in the alternative headlines from Table 2.6. In con-
clusion, government intervention in firm determination played a much more
measurable role than government intervention in markets via its new lending
lines to non-bank broker dealers.
Event 8, GSEs I: The formalization of explicit government support for
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; the failure of IndyMac Bank (Wednesday,
July 9, 2008 through Monday, July 14, 2008.) As displayed in Table 2.16,
the market movements were a 3% equity decline and a nearly flat, positive 10
bp debt return. The government support did little to help the shareholders
of the GSEs as both had actual declines during the event of approximately
45%. Their debt displayed strongly statistically significant positive results of
approximately 135 bp each consistent with the firm promise of government
support. While Radian debtholders saw a sympathetic, nearly 14% increase
in debt CAR, their shareholders also suffered a decline of the same magnitude
of the GSEs. On the broker dealer side, Lehman and Merrill Lynch saw large
negative debt CARs of 478 bp and 248 bp, respectively on similar actual
declines, inconsistent with any ’Too Big To Fail’ status. Among the banks,
Wachovia and Washington Mutual debt holders saw negative debt CARs of
3% and 6%, respectively on similar actual declines. Wachovia also had the
primary alternative event news in Table 2.6 as it fired its CEO. Bank of
America debt holders suffered a 123 bp CAR loss. These were in concert
with very large actual equity declines among most financial firms.58 Bank
of America, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual saw actual equity declines
of 14%, 37%, and 46%, respectively. Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch
saw 44% and 21% declines, respectively, and AMBAC, MBIA and Radian
58We focus upon actual equity performance as most firms loaded on the HML factor
which saw a pretty dramatic decline (as depicted in Table 2.7) in the event compared to
the observation period leading to questionable positive equity CARs among a number of
firms.
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equity declines were 25%, 16%, and 47%, respectively. While one may opine
that Radian debt holders hoped that administration support for homeowners
might extend to them, the remaining results indicate a reduction in investor
expectations for financial firms, particularly for firms with large mortgage
exposure. Although Wachovia replaced its CEO, there is no clear ’Too Big
To Fail’ expectation present in any of the debt premiums assigned to troubled
firms, even those later proved to be ’Too Big To Fail’ such as Bank of America
or Wachovia.
Event 9, GSEs II: The conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(Monday, August 18, 2008 through Monday, September 8, 2008). This event,
the longest at 15 trading days, exhibited equity and debt market declines of
273 bp and 19 bp, respectively as depicted in Table 2.17. The GSE share-
holders saw equity declines on the order of 90% each, consistent with the
government taking an 80% ownership stake. The firms’s debt returns were
actual returns of 40 bp with no statistically significant CAR results. The only
other significant result was for AIG, which displayed a strongly significant
debt CAR decline of 405 bp while it’s actual equity return was a decline of
13 bp with no statistically significant result. Several life and health insurers
exhibited large actual and abnormal equity returns, positive CARs of 9%
and 14% for Metlife and Prudential, respectively, and a 15% CAR decline for
Wellpoint all at the 5% significance level. There were numerous alternative
headlines in Table 2.6 during the three weeks of the event for banks and
broker dealers, primarily concerned with losses, management changes and
refinancing challenges. However, as none of them led to significant debt or
equity CARs, there is little to review. In sum, the only ’Too Big To Fail’
message in these results is that AIG’s debt holders behaved as if it were not.
Event 10 Lehman, Merrill & AIG: The failure of Lehman Brothers,
the purchase of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, the Reserve Prime money
market fund “breaks the buck,” and the rescue of AIG (Tuesday, September
9, 2008 through Wednesday, September 17, 2008). The final event examined
and the start of the worst of the crisis, this event had the largest market
declines. As shown in Table 2.18, the equity market index return declined
nearly 9% while the debt market index decline was nearly 3%. Lehman
Brothers’ equity was wiped out and its debt return on the week was a 5%
CAR decline on a 15% actual decline. Merrill Lynch exhibited an actual
equity decline of 30% and a debt CAR decline of over 2% on an actual de-
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cline of nearly 10%. AIG suffered an 87% equity CAR decline and a 40%
debt CAR decline in spite of a positive 50% actual debt return on the last
day of the event. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the sole surviving
broker dealers, saw 14% and 24% debt CAR declines (on larger actual debt
declines) along with 21% and 38% equity CAR declines, respectively. Bank
of America, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo, the soon to be
big four, saw debt CAR declines of 1-5% while their actual equity declines
varied from nearly no change for Wells Fargo to 31% for Citigroup. Wachovia
and Washington Mutual, whose fates would be sealed in the ensuing weeks
displayed large debt and equity declines. The debt CARs were negative 11%
and 23%, respectively, while the equity CARs were negative 29% and 31%,
respectively. The insurance firms, both life and health as well as property
and casualty saw mostly large declines save for Berkshire Hathaway which
exhibited a 9% positive equity CAR on an actual increase of 4% and a 90
bp positive debt CAR on an actual decline of 146 bp. The alternative head-
lines in Table 2.6 were primarily negative news for Washington Mutual and
Wachovia and a Fed announcement further weakening required collateral on
loans to security firms. Once again, the ’Too Big To Fail’ indication is miss-
ing from investor actions whether it be in the debt of banks or remaining
brokers. Berkshire Hathaway’s strong equity showing along with that of fel-
low P & C firms Chubb and ACE is probably more indicative of the benefits
of AIG’s potential decline as a competitor.
2.4 Conclusion
The government support of financial firms through direct assistance and
programs to improve market liquidity during the worldwide credit crisis of
2007-2008 is unprecedented since the Great Depression. Whether a given
firm is ex-ante ’Too Big To Fail’ in the mind of government agents is not
the principal issue for moral hazard, however, as investor perception of ’Too
Big To Fail’ is what drives the economically inefficient reduced funding cost
for the risk taken by the firm. The recent crisis presents a laboratory to
explore changes in such investor perceptions via a series of event studies.
While the event studies cannot measure baseline premiums in the capital
market securities of such firms, the economic and statistical significance of
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the changes is enlightening regarding the potential degree of moral hazard
imputed during the crisis. A model of the stochastic guarantee that is ’Too
Big To Fail’ support is examined to assess government agent action and its
interpretation by investors. Government agent action does not always lead to
predictable conclusions in the minds of investors, particularly in the event of
crisis decision making with little public information. Such action may play a
greater role in changing investor perception of the state of the economy than
in the improved prospects for a firm in question. Repeated quotes from the
financial press as well as the primarily negative event returns reported here
are consistent with this inference.
The crisis definitively proved the arguments of Stern and Feldman (2004)
that large and complex financial firms with concentrations in critical markets
were ’Too Big To Fail’. The results of this study, however, demonstrate that
the returns to firm securities were inconsistent with a broad ’Too Big To Fail’
premium for all of these institutions, as imputed by investors. Evidence for
such premiums was only found in the debt securities of the largest banks in
the initial crisis event and the GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in reaction
to the rescue of Bear Stearns. Federal Reserve liquidity programs created to
lend to both banks and broker dealers led to no appreciable positive change
in ’Too Big To Fail’ expectations via either debt or equity returns. There was
no evidence of investor perceptions changing for AIG, which was rescued, or
Merrill Lynch which was purchased with government encouragement. Both
behaved very similarly to Lehman, which was permitted to fail, displaying
repeated negative abnormal equity and debt returns in the events leading
to its ultimate failure. Savings & loan Washington Mutual faired the worst
of the banks while Wachovia’s results were typically positive until the last
three events. There was no evidence that manager expectations for govern-
ment support, should they have existed, were achieved via positive abnormal
equity returns and the managers of rescued firms were removed in the events
considered. ’Too Big To Fail’, in the perception of investors, appears to sim-
ply be an extension of pre-existing explicit government guarantees in place
for the largest banks or implicitly assumed in the case of the GSEs. How-
ever, both the general perception that a Lehman Brothers rescue would have
prevented the worst of the crisis and the move to broadly grant bank holding
company status to numerous non-bank financial firms such as broker deal-
ers, finance companies and insurers does not bode well for future investor
41
expectations of ’Too Big To Fail’.
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2.5 Tables and Figures
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Table 2.1: Financial Firm List by sub-Industry
Sub-Industry Firm
Banks Bank of America
Citigroup
JP Morgan Chase
Wachovia
Washington Mutual
Wells Fargo
Westpac
Broker Dealers Bear Stearns
Goldman Sachs
Lehman Brothers
Merrill Lynch
Morgan Stanley
Property & Casualty Insurers ACE
AllState
AIG
Berkshire Hathaway
Chubb
CNA
Hartford
Safeco
XL Capital
Life & Health Insurers Aetna
Cigna
Genworth
Lincoln National
Metlife
Prudential
Unum
Wellpoint
Misc Finance American Express
Block
Capital One
CIT
Istar
SLM
Surety & GSE AMBAC
Fannie Mae
Freddie Mac
MBIA
MGIC Investment
PMI
Radian
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Table 2.5: Alternative Headlines During Event Periods 1-4
In order to ascertain other explanations for movements in firm security prices, the cover
pages of the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times were reviewed for alternative
explanatory news stories or tangential reports (excluding event specific statements) for
each event day in question. Abbreviated descriptions and the event day on which they
appeared follow where WSJ = Wall Street Journal and FT = Financial Times. Monday
event days include news reports, if any, released on Saturday and Sunday.
Event Day News Description and Source
1a 1 Stock tumble attributed to subprime mortgage meltdown(WSJ)
LBO boom end hurts stocks; Banks take unsold high-yield debt on balance sheet(FT)
3 iTraxx crossover indexb hits a new high above 500bp(FT)
4 Mortgage sector investments hurt insurers(MGIC & Radian) & lenders(Bear Stearns)(WSJ)
5 End to hope for quick end to credit woes with Bear Stearns fund problems reviewed(FT)
2c 1 Contagion effect of US credit market mess could trigger worldwide growth hit(WSJ)
Countrywide airs plan to weather credit squeeze(WSJ)
Lenders with capital market financing focus hit on Countrywide news(FT)
3 Flight to safety from money funds to US Treasury Bills(FT)
4 TD Ameritrade in Merger Talks with E*Trade(WSJ)
4 HBOSd supports one of its specialist finance units(FT)
5 Bank of America invests $2Billion in Countrywide(WSJ)
6 Countrywide and Bank of America Courted for Years(WSJ)
3e 1 Bank of England Governor King warns of moral hazard in market bailouts(FT)
2 Signs of stability relieve credit and money markets(FT)
3 Fed Likely to Cut Rates; Greenspan admits bubble in US Home prices(FT)
3 Too much hope pinned on expected Fed rate cut(WSJ)
5 Fed slashes rates to deal with slowdown(FT);Stocks soar with half point move(WSJ)
4f 1 Fed rate cut fails to cheer market(WSJ)
3 Citigroup bails out 7 SIVsg brings $49 Billion on balance sheet(WSJ)
3 Goldman made $Billions with bearish bets on mortgage markets(WSJ)
4 Lehman faces threat of legal action on sales of CDOs to Australian municipalities(FT)
Money funds feel credit squeeze(WSJ)
6 ECB’s €350 Billion market injection stuns investors(FT)
Goldman warns its record string of profitable quarters might be coming to an end(FT)
Fed’s new rules restricting high-risk mortgages draw hostility as not enough(WSJ)
7 Morgan Stanley takes $9.4 Billion mortgage write down & $5 Billion Chinese investment(WSJ)
Sallie Mae shares fall 21% due to credit squeeze effect on funding; may cut dividend(FT)
aThe Rescue of IKB DeutscheBank (July 27 - August 3, 2007)
bA credit default swap(CDS) index for firms at the investment grade/non investment
grade boundary.
cFederal Reserve Encourages Discount Window Borrowing (August 17-24, 2007)
dUK’s largest mortgage lender
eThe Bailout of Northern Rock (September 13-19, 2007)
fIntroduction of Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility (December 12-20, 2007)
gStructured Investment Vehicle, an affiliated investment entity typically holds mortgage
debt and self-finances via commercial paper.
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Table 2.6: Alternative Headlines During Event Periods 5-10
In order to ascertain other explanations for movements in firm security prices, the cover
pages of the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times were reviewed for alternative
explanatory news stories or tangential reports (excluding event specific statements) for
each event day in question. Abbreviated descriptions and the event day on which they
appeared follow where WSJ = Wall Street Journal and FT = Financial Times. Monday
event days include news reports, if any, released on Saturday and Sunday.
Event Day News Description and Source
5a 2 Cayne to step down as CEO, remain chairman of Bear Stearns(FT & WSJ)
3 Berkshire monoline plan from NY fears AMBAC & MBIA losses might cost AAA ratings(FT)
4 Citigroup, Merrill seek more foreign capital; Foreshadows more mortgage write-downs(WSJ)
4 Bear held merger talks with Fortress Investments weeks prior to Cayne stepping down(FT)
5 Fed ready for aggressive cut in interest rates to prevent recession(FT & WSJ)
6b 1 Moody’s to toughen ratings on companies owned by aggressive private equity groups(FT)
2 Citigroup, Merrill to raise $21 Billion in foreign capital(FT & WSJ)
3 Default of Las Vegas developer highlights commercial-property crunch(WSJ)
7c 3 Fed introduces TSLFd offering to lend Treasury securities for mortgage debt(WSJ & FT)
4 Mounting fears of Japan-style recession in US(FT)
US to revamp regulatory rules to prevent future credit crunch(WSJ)
8e 1 Fed moves to extend investment bank lending program into 2009(WSJ & FT)
2 Wachovia names new CEO and surprise 2Q loss of up to $2.8 Billion(FT)
9f 1 Goldman Sachs/Morgan Stanley link hedge fund financing to own CDS levels(FT)
4 Lehman secret early August talks with South Korea/Chinese parties to sell 50% stake stall(FT)
6 Pvt. eq. inv. in Lehman asset mgmt. units doubt value of its minority stakes in hedge funds(FT)
Wells Fargo dispels rumors it may bid on WAMU or Wachovia(FT)
7 Citigroup scraps Rubin’s old role to simplify structure(FT)
8 U.S. Investment and Commercial banks face large refinancing hurdles in coming months(WSJ)
10 Merril’s last 6 quarterly losses exceed 25% of profits reported over 36 year public life(FT)
13 Korea Development Bank in talks regarding large Lehman investment(FT)
15 Lehman launches senior management shake-up(FT)
Washington Mutual forces out CEO (WSJ)
10g 4 WAMU previews 3Q details to avert 34% slide in stock over the week(WSJ)
5 Fed widens acceptable collateral for loans to security firms to include common stock(WSJ)
6 Shares of WAMU and Wachovia decline 25%(WSJ)
aThe Purchase of Countrywide by Bank of America (January 7-11, 2008)
bThe Monoline Insurance Crisis (January 15-18, 2008)
cFederal Reserve Support of Bear Stearns (March 10-17, 2008)
dTerm Securities Lending Facility
eExplicit US Support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (July 9-14, 2008)
fConservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (August 18-September 8, 2008)
gLehman, Merrill, Reserve MMF, AIG (September 9-17, 2008)
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Table 2.7: Cumulative Equity Factor Returns (bp) for Observation and
Event Periods
Cumulative returns in basis points for each factor used in equity return modeling
during both event and observation periods. Observation periods may precede,
follow or straddle event periods as described in the table below. The factors are
the 4 Fama-French factors for equity returns, equation 2.10 in the text:
(Excess Stock Return)i,t = αi+βi1(Rm - Rf)t+βi2(SMB)t+βi3(HML)t+βi4(UMD)t+µi,t
Period Obs Split Fama-French Factors
Event Type Length Pre Post Rm-Rf SMB HML UMD
1 Obs 100 100 0 691.9 -330.0 -506.4 589.9
Event 6 -325.4 -106.9 -108.7 104.0
2 Obs 100 100 0 -358.8 -309.8 -615.0 -56.0
Event 6 516.4 -124.8 -5.1 338.2
3 Obs 100 50 50 -574.5 -868.0 -984.3 1774.3
Event 5 372.0 37.4 40.0 7.0
4 Obs 100 100 0 -342.7 -666.5 -781.7 1633.5
Event 7 -133.9 114.6 -90.8 394.9
5 Obs 100 100 0 -112.6 -727.8 -372.1 2909.2
Event 5 -131.4 -135.4 -34.4 -151.9
6 Obs 100 100 0 -29.0 -853.7 -631.6 2908.1
Event 4 -638.2 160.6 9.3 -149.8
7 Obs 100 50 50 -370.9 -134.3 359.9 220.4
Event 6 -186.9 14.1 24.5 333.7
8 Obs 100 100 0 -598.7 104.6 -75.9 2655.3
Event 4 -285.7 33.9 -449.6 1014.9
9 Obs 100 100 0 -240.5 1076.5 408.2 584.0
Event 15 -273.0 -86.1 697.8 -327.1
10 Obs 100 100 0 -734.1 1094.0 954.3 -236.6
Event 7 -854.4 190.8 -359.6 990.7
Event 1: Rescue of IKB DeutscheBank (July 27 - August 3, 2007)
Event 2: Federal Reserve Encourages Discount Window Borrowing (August 17-24, 2007)
Event 3: The Bailout of Northern Rock (September 13-19, 2007)
Event 4: Introduction of Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility (December 12-20, 2007)
Event 5: The Purchase of Countrywide by Bank of America (January 7-11, 2008)
Event 6: The Monoline Insurance Crisis (January 15-18, 2008)
Event 7: Federal Reserve Support of Bear Stearns (March 10-17, 2008)
Event 8: Explicit US Support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (July 9-14, 2008)
Event 9: Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (August 18-September 8, 2008)
Event 10: Lehman, Merrill, Reserve MMF, AIG (September 9-17, 2008)
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Table 2.8: Cumulative CDS Factor Returns (bp) for Observation and Event
Periods
Cumulative returns in basis points for each factor used in CDS return modeling during
both event and observation periods. Observation periods may precede, follow or straddle
event periods as described in the table below. The factors are those of the proxy CDS
return model, equation 2.11 in the text utilizing the CDX index, absolute differences in
each of three factors level, slope and curvature of the constant maturity US Treasury
curve and a liquidity proxy, the the absolute change in the spread (TED) between the
three month LIBOR rate and the three month US Treasury bill rate:
(CDS return)i,t = αi+βi1(CDX Index return)t+βi2(CDX Index return)t−1+βi3(∆CMT Level)t
+ βi4(∆CMT Slope)t + βi5(∆CMT Curvature)t + βi6(∆TED Spread)t + µi,t
Period Split CDX Returns CMT & Liquidity Differences
Event Type Length Pre Post Cur Lag ∆Level ∆Slope ∆Curv ∆TED
1 Obs 100 100 0 -127.2 -78.7 16.0 25.0 1.0 21.0
Event 6 -50.9 -75.5 -9.0 2.0 0.0 5.0
2 Obs 100 100 0 -199.3 -195.5 -22.0 48.1 4.0 143.0
Event 6 94.1 78.2 16.0 -19.0 7.0 -38.9
3 Obs 100 50 50 -258.6 -249.5 -169.5 78.3 -18.0 226.5
Event 5 65.0 66.1 9.0 7.0 1.0 -47.9
4 Obs 100 100 0 -162.5 -148.3 -157.7 86.4 -24.0 185.7
Event 7 0.3 -19.5 13.0 -9.0 5.0 -3.0
5 Obs 100 100 0 -127.7 -133.4 -139.0 84.4 -14.0 85.4
Event 5 -40.2 -43.1 -12.0 9.0 -3.0 -39.9
6 Obs 100 100 0 -143.0 -107.7 -126.2 73.3 -7.0 -92.6
Event 4 -60.3 -49.3 -22.0 7.0 -7.0 17.0
7 Obs 100 50 50 -110.7 -118.0 -7.0 46.1 28.0 -77.7
Event 6 -37.6 -37.6 -22.0 -4.0 -4.0 -12.0
8 Obs 100 100 0 -44.3 -40.2 48.1 -34.9 19.0 32.1
Event 4 9.8 38.7 1.0 -1.0 3.0 33.1
9 Obs 100 100 0 5.7 -26.5 56.2 -35.9 10.0 -38.9
Event 15 -18.8 -48.5 -15.0 -8.0 -2.0 17.0
10 Obs 100 100 0 -107.5 -92.6 14.0 -37.9 2.0 -52.9
Event 7 -274.2 -245.0 -43.9 41.1 3.0 243.9
Event 1: Rescue of IKB DeutscheBank (July 27 - August 3, 2007)
Event 2: Federal Reserve Encourages Discount Window Borrowing (August 17-24, 2007)
Event 3: The Bailout of Northern Rock (September 13-19, 2007)
Event 4: Introduction of Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility (December 12-20, 2007)
Event 5: The Purchase of Countrywide by Bank of America (January 7-11, 2008)
Event 6: The Monoline Insurance Crisis (January 15-18, 2008)
Event 7: Federal Reserve Support of Bear Stearns (March 10-17, 2008)
Event 8: Explicit US Support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (July 9-14, 2008)
Event 9: Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (August 18-September 8, 2008)
Event 10: Lehman, Merrill, Reserve MMF, AIG (September 9-17, 2008)
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Table 2.9: Event 1, The Rescue of IKB DeutscheBank (July 27 - August 3,
2007)
Event period actual and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for equity and debt, respectively, in basis
points. Only p-values less than 10% are reported for a listed firm. CAR utlizes an observation period of
100 trading days prior and 0 trading days immediately after the event. CAR is defined as
CARi =
event length∑
t=1
Returni,t − E(Returni,t)
where return is either the excess equity return or proxy 5 year CDS return and the expectation is simply
the fit of either equation 2.10 for equity or equation 2.11 for debt as fit over the observation period. The
market return is the return on the Fama-French market index for equity and the CDX index for debt.
Equity Returns (bp) Debt Returns (bp)
Industry/Firm Actual CAR p-val Actual CAR p-val
Market Return -325.4 -50.9
Banks
Bank of America -59.7 384.8 0.007 19.6 74.2 0.000
Citigroup -338.6 33.0 99.1 0.000
JP Morgan Chase -108.5 547.9 0.002 39.1 111.7 0.000
Wachovia -659.7 34.7 97.9 0.000
Wells Fargo -260.5 275.5 0.055 11.9 60.2 0.000
Westpac -380.8 -27.3 -10.4 0.021
Broker Dealers
Bear Stearns -1289.6 -470.9 0.061 -245.6 -184.4 0.000
Lehman Brothers -1361.8 -553.8 0.043 -123.8 -49.4 0.019
P & C Insurers
Allstate -642.2 -61.1 -35.3 0.000
AIG -757.9 -469.7 0.000 -126.1 -93.2 0.000
Berkshire Hathaway -6.5 -15.5 -5.6 0.084
Chubb -532.6 -66.7 -46.3 0.000
CNA -1036.9 -563.8 0.019 -46.3
Hartford -784.0 -414.3 0.012 -51.2 -22.0 0.000
Safeco 30.7 466.3 0.009 -47.7 -30.7 0.000
XL Capital -842.4 -83.5 -32.4 0.017
L & H Insurers
Aetna -119.3 -46.1 -25.3 0.002
Cigna -740.5 -608.1 0.008 -36.9
Genworth -1084.0 -693.5 0.001 -16.9 56.0 0.002
Lincoln National -852.6 -344.0 0.028 -62.9 -42.4 0.000
Metlife -61.6 378.5 0.025 -46.0 -13.1 0.027
Prudential -712.3 -362.8 0.017 -56.4 -25.4 0.000
Finance
American Express -470.3 -14.6 31.7 0.005
Block -496.2 -60.5 122.2 0.005
Capital One -889.3 -76.1 65.2 0.013
CIT -1571.6 -778.9 0.040 -237.9 -124.2 0.000
Istar -906.5 -264.1 -150.9 0.000
Surety & GSE
AMBAC -1748.5 -1095.6 0.000 -45.2 150.2 0.000
Fannie Mae -664.0 -43.4 -19.3 0.015
Freddie Mac -631.9 -44.7 -24.3 0.000
MBIA -1217.4 -480.8 0.063 -229.5 -64.2 0.053
MGIC Investment -2956.2 -2206.4 0.000 -410.4 -224.9 0.000
PMI -1778.5 -1026.5 0.000 -251.1 -160.9 0.000
Radian -4695.9 -4037.7 0.000 -826.1 -659.3 0.000
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Table 2.10: Event 2, Federal Reserve Encourages Discount Window
Borrowing (August 17-24, 2007)
Event period actual and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for equity and debt, respec-
tively, in basis points. Only p-values less than 10% are reported for a listed firm. CAR
utlizes an observation period of 100 trading days prior and 0 trading days immediately
after the event. CAR is defined as
CARi =
event length∑
t=1
Returni,t − E(Returni,t)
where return is either the excess equity return or proxy 5 year CDS return and the expec-
tation is simply the fit of either equation 2.10 for equity or equation 2.11 for debt as fit
over the observation period. The market return is the return on the Fama-French market
index for equity and the CDX index for debt.
Equity Returns (bp) Debt Returns (bp)
Industry/Firm Actual CAR p-val Actual CAR p-val
Market Return 516.4 94.1
Banks
Washington Mutual 562.0 505.6 0.096 387.9
Westpac 1446.5 668.9 0.013 35.3
Broker Dealers
Lehman Brothers 1014.8 263.7 110.3 0.008
Merrill Lynch 697.1 67.5 -46.3 0.042
Morgan Stanley 932.9 483.0 0.043 100.8
P & C Insurers
Allstate 351.5 8.4 -26.2 0.002
AIG 559.5 274.2 0.032 94.1
Berkshire Hathaway 525.0 549.7 0.000 34.5 22.8 0.001
Chubb 292.7 14.1 -23.0 0.099
Hartford 469.9 7.1 -27.7 0.048
L & H Insurers
Genworth 407.5 129.9 79.6 0.002
Lincoln National 1063.0 8.1 -33.0 0.017
Metlife 929.0 -21.9 -46.6 0.000
Prudential 708.4 -9.2 -45.4 0.000
Unum 552.6 202.6 114.5 0.000
Finance
American Express 456.4 38.8 -37.3 0.068
Capital One 214.1 311.3 89.0 0.096
CIT 1361.2 1169.3 660.9 0.000
Istar 909.5 691.4 0.097 537.8 157.1 0.002
Surety & GSE
AMBAC 744.6 615.5 379.6 0.000
MBIA 310.8 563.5 350.5 0.000
MGIC Investment 399.5 1192.5 742.1 0.000
PMI 1278.7 1065.2 0.016 691.4 387.3 0.000
Radian 2852.2 2801.8 0.003 2479.5 2255.2 0.000
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Table 2.11: Event 3, The Bailout of Northern Rock (September 13-19, 2007)
Event period actual and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for equity and debt, respec-
tively, in basis points. Only p-values less than 10% are reported for a listed firm. CAR
utlizes an observation period of 50 trading days prior and 50 trading days immediately
after the event. CAR is defined as
CARi =
event length∑
t=1
Returni,t − E(Returni,t)
where return is either the excess equity return or proxy 5 year CDS return and the expec-
tation is simply the fit of either equation 2.10 for equity or equation 2.11 for debt as fit
over the observation period. The market return is the return on the Fama-French market
index for equity and the CDX index for debt.
Equity Returns (bp) Debt Returns (bp)
Industry/Firm Actual CAR p-val Actual CAR p-val
Market Return 372.0 65.0
P & C Insurers
Allstate 343.8 67.4 42.0 0.053
Chubb 471.6 67.9 43.1 0.088
Hartford 521.9 73.6 44.4 0.069
XL Capital 782.6 127.3 92.2 0.065
L & H Insurers
Metlife 933.0 88.2 63.1 0.001
Prudential 767.1 72.2 52.9 0.056
Finance
CIT 1479.8 728.3 402.5 0.048
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Table 2.12: Event 4, Introduction of Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility
(December 12-20, 2007)
Event period actual and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for equity and debt, respec-
tively, in basis points. Only p-values less than 10% are reported for a listed firm. CAR
utlizes an observation period of 100 trading days prior and 0 trading days immediately
after the event. CAR is defined as
CARi =
event length∑
t=1
Returni,t − E(Returni,t)
where return is either the excess equity return or proxy 5 year CDS return and the expec-
tation is simply the fit of either equation 2.10 for equity or equation 2.11 for debt as fit
over the observation period. The market return is the return on the Fama-French market
index for equity and the CDX index for debt.
Equity Returns (bp) Debt Returns (bp)
Industry/Firm Actual CAR p-val Actual CAR p-val
Market Return -133.9 0.3
Banks
Wachovia -792.8 -81.6 -85.0 0.056
Wells Fargo -139.0 578.3 0.077 -54.5 -69.4 0.079
Broker Dealers
Lehman Brothers 185.4 1004.7 0.037 40.8
Morgan Stanley 275.0 1297.0 0.004 -30.0
P & C Insurers
Berkshire Hathaway -1009.0 -1097.8 0.000 -12.1
XL Capital -1459.6 -197.2 -194.3 0.002
Finance
SLM -3578.6 -3129.8 0.000 168.5
Surety & GSE
AMBAC 253.7 2537.2 0.073 -176.7
Fannie Mae 387.2 2091.4 0.053 16.0
Freddie Mac 122.5 1945.6 0.095 15.6
MBIA -3884.5 -2743.1 0.007 -685.1 -662.4 0.009
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Table 2.13: Event 5, The Purchase of Countrywide by Bank of America
(January 7-11, 2008)
Event period actual and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for equity and debt, respec-
tively, in basis points. Only p-values less than 10% are reported for a listed firm. CAR
utlizes an observation period of 100 trading days prior and 0 trading days immediately
after the event. CAR is defined as
CARi =
event length∑
t=1
Returni,t − E(Returni,t)
where return is either the excess equity return or proxy 5 year CDS return and the expec-
tation is simply the fit of either equation 2.10 for equity or equation 2.11 for debt as fit
over the observation period. The market return is the return on the Fama-French market
index for equity and the CDX index for debt.
Equity Returns (bp) Debt Returns (bp)
Industry/Firm Actual CAR p-val Actual CAR p-val
Market Return -131.4 -40.2
Banks
Bank of America -343.6 -450.4 0.009 -125.9 -96.3 0.001
Washington Mutual 1234.0 1170.1 0.055 322.1 561.8 0.000
Broker Dealers
Merrill Lynch 869.6 923.1 0.020 -2.7
L & H Insurers
Aetna 430.8 570.5 0.040 17.5 32.5 0.056
Lincoln National 276.8 11.5 31.4 0.098
Finance
American Express -1050.6 -1019.8 0.000 -174.4 -133.6 0.000
Block 518.7 735.9 0.059 -166.4
SLM 2099.7 2129.2 0.024 -42.6
Surety & GSE
MBIA -557.2 -749.2 -418.3 0.069
PMI -1762.6 -2030.5 0.047 -439.5
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Table 2.14: Event 6, The Monoline Insurance Crisis (January 15-18, 2008)
Event period actual and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for equity and debt, respec-
tively, in basis points. Only p-values less than 10% are reported for a listed firm. CAR
utlizes an observation period of 100 trading days prior and 0 trading days immediately
after the event. CAR is defined as
CARi =
event length∑
t=1
Returni,t − E(Returni,t)
where return is either the excess equity return or proxy 5 year CDS return and the expec-
tation is simply the fit of either equation 2.10 for equity or equation 2.11 for debt as fit
over the observation period. The market return is the return on the Fama-French market
index for equity and the CDX index for debt.
Equity Returns (bp) Debt Returns (bp)
Industry/Firm Actual CAR p-val Actual CAR p-val
Market Return -638.2 -60.3
Banks
Citigroup -1589.9 -750.7 0.001 -30.5
JP Morgan Chase -431.8 508.3 0.009 -45.6
Wachovia -1516.3 -801.8 0.000 -213.9 -140.2 0.000
Westpac -28.2 972.8 0.003 -30.2
P & C Insurers
ACE -682.0 -89.3 -70.1 0.000
Allstate -720.3 -56.1 -37.5 0.053
AIG -1229.2 -541.2 0.037 -163.8 -108.3 0.002
Chubb -992.6 -484.4 0.013 -42.2
CNA -1120.2 -571.5 0.055 -35.9
XL Capital -2248.2 -1518.8 0.001 -388.5 -297.0 0.000
L & H Insurers
Genworth -1149.9 -184.8 -123.0 0.008
Metlife -448.1 350.7 0.100 -61.5 -36.7 0.028
Prudential -1232.6 -515.3 0.025 -72.3 -45.4 0.082
Finance
American Express -203.9 1035.5 0.001 -208.5 -156.5 0.000
Surety & GSE
AMBAC -7208.8 -7015.1 0.000 -2206.6 -1828.4 0.000
MBIA -4987.7 -4342.6 0.000 -1624.5 -1250.4 0.000
MGIC Investment -2120.7 -1038.7 -632.3 0.001
PMI -2692.4 -2034.5 0.032 -958.6 -578.3 0.001
Radian -3619.9 -2917.6 0.005 -586.4
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Table 2.15: Event 7, Federal Reserve Support of Bear Stearns (March
10-17, 2008)
Event period actual and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for equity and debt, respec-
tively, in basis points. Only p-values less than 10% are reported for a listed firm. CAR
utlizes an observation period of 50 trading days prior and 50 trading days immediately
after the event. CAR is defined as
CARi =
event length∑
t=1
Returni,t − E(Returni,t)
where return is either the excess equity return or proxy 5 year CDS return and the expec-
tation is simply the fit of either equation 2.10 for equity or equation 2.11 for debt as fit
over the observation period. The market return is the return on the Fama-French market
index for equity and the CDX index for debt.
Equity Returns (bp) Debt Returns (bp)
Industry/Firm Actual CAR p-val Actual CAR p-val
Market Return -186.9 -37.6
Banks
Bank of America -217.0 444.8 0.092 -83.4
JP Morgan Chase 727.1 1439.1 0.000 -121.0 -93.0 0.074
Wachovia -599.7 152.0 211.8 0.048
Wells Fargo 233.5 951.1 0.017 -51.8
Broker Dealers
Bear Stearns -9314.3 -9269.6 0.000 56.5
Lehman Brothers -3154.9 -2307.0 0.003 -455.5 -357.0 0.018
P & C Insurers
AIG -722.8 -223.0 -165.5 0.068
Berkshire Hathaway -438.5 -88.2 -73.2 0.048
L & H Insurers
Aetna -882.2 -221.4 -199.5 0.000
Cigna -811.2 -187.4 -165.8 0.002
Prudential -66.9 -211.9 -167.6 0.023
Wellpoint -2803.1 -2688.2 0.000 -385.1 -388.7 0.000
Finance
American Express 38.5 -182.4 -147.7 0.046
Capital One 940.4 1706.9 0.002 67.2
CIT -3484.5 -2687.7 0.026 -337.2
SLM -1029.9 -1321.0 -1344.6 0.000
Surety & GSE
Fannie Mae -250.6 78.5 100.1 0.001
Freddie Mac 611.7 1895.9 0.076 88.3 113.5 0.000
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Table 2.16: Event 8, Explicit US Support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(July 9-14, 2008)
Event period actual and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for equity and debt, respec-
tively, in basis points. Only p-values less than 10% are reported for a listed firm. CAR
utlizes an observation period of 100 trading days prior and 0 trading days immediately
after the event. CAR is defined as
CARi =
event length∑
t=1
Returni,t − E(Returni,t)
where return is either the excess equity return or proxy 5 year CDS return and the expec-
tation is simply the fit of either equation 2.10 for equity or equation 2.11 for debt as fit
over the observation period. The market return is the return on the Fama-French market
index for equity and the CDX index for debt.
Equity Returns (bp) Debt Returns (bp)
Industry/Firm Actual CAR p-val Actual CAR p-val
Market Return -285.7 9.8
Banks
Bank of America -1442.6 502.1 0.038 -97.3 -123.1 0.006
Wachovia -3670.0 -1652.3 0.000 -269.3 -298.1 0.001
Washington Mutual -4609.5 -1697.4 0.052 -529.1 -605.0 0.000
Wells Fargo -1259.1 -68.3 -87.0 0.065
Broker Dealers
Lehman Brothers -4433.8 -3029.2 0.000 -401.2 -477.8 0.001
Merrill Lynch -2104.9 -224.6 -248.4 0.011
P & C Insurers
Chubb -509.4 315.9 0.088 18.0
Hartford -1434.5 -477.2 0.057 45.4
Safeco -794.6 -1503.8 0.041 15.7
L & H Insurers
Genworth -950.2 548.0 0.045 24.5
Lincoln National -779.6 571.9 0.005 66.8
Finance
American Express -933.3 -62.4 -104.4 0.073
Capital One -1307.9 733.9 0.079 -16.7
Surety & GSE
AMBAC -2502.3 8436.0 0.001 92.9
Fannie Mae -4479.7 -2070.3 0.007 147.3 133.6 0.000
Freddie Mac -4719.4 -2446.8 0.002 153.1 138.8 0.000
MBIA -1620.1 5180.5 0.000 485.5
Radian -4738.6 1399.9 1400.4 0.008
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Table 2.17: Event 9, Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(August 18-September 8, 2008)
Event period actual and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for equity and debt, respec-
tively, in basis points. Only p-values less than 10% are reported for a listed firm. CAR
utlizes an observation period of 100 trading days prior and 0 trading days immediately
after the event. CAR is defined as
CARi =
event length∑
t=1
Returni,t − E(Returni,t)
where return is either the excess equity return or proxy 5 year CDS return and the expec-
tation is simply the fit of either equation 2.10 for equity or equation 2.11 for debt as fit
over the observation period. The market return is the return on the Fama-French market
index for equity and the CDX index for debt.
Equity Returns (bp) Debt Returns (bp)
Industry/Firm Actual CAR p-val Actual CAR p-val
Market Return -273.0 -18.8
P & C Insurers
AIG -13.1 -534.4 -405.2 0.002
Hartford 365.0 -131.8 -140.5 0.070
L & H Insurers
Metlife 733.3 893.0 0.038 -94.1
Prudential 1503.8 1426.3 0.012 -70.1
Wellpoint -1160.1 -1501.8 0.055 -46.2
Finance
American Express 361.3 115.6 189.4 0.096
SLM 547.3 -350.1 -554.2 0.061
Surety & GSE
Fannie Mae -9078.6 -9149.3 0.000 43.7
Freddie Mac -8497.7 -8483.0 0.000 40.1
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Table 2.18: Event 10, Lehman, Merrill, Reserve MMF, AIG (September
9-17, 2008)
Event period actual and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for equity and debt, respectively, in basis
points. Only p-values less than 10% are reported for a listed firm. CAR utlizes an observation period of
100 trading days prior and 0 trading days immediately after the event. CAR is defined as
CARi =
event length∑
t=1
Returni,t − E(Returni,t)
where return is either the excess equity return or proxy 5 year CDS return and the expectation is simply
the fit of either equation 2.10 for equity or equation 2.11 for debt as fit over the observation period. The
market return is the return on the Fama-French market index for equity and the CDX index for debt.
Equity Returns (bp) Debt Returns (bp)
Industry/Firm Actual CAR p-val Actual CAR p-val
Market Return -854.4 -274.2
Banks
Bank of America -2172.1 -429.0 -164.6 0.001
Citigroup -3099.0 -1006.0 0.012 -785.7 -493.5 0.000
JP Morgan Chase -1395.4 797.8 0.099 -467.3 -201.7 0.000
Wachovia -5200.1 -2880.3 0.000 -1722.0 -1088.7 0.000
Washington Mutual -5124.1 -3091.8 0.047 -3103.3 -2325.0 0.000
Wells Fargo -43.6 2457.3 0.001 -428.1 -148.0 0.009
Westpac -1443.8 -327.7 -71.3 0.057
Broker Dealers
Goldman Sachs -3257.5 -2091.4 0.000 -1759.3 -1406.2 0.000
Lehman Brothers -9908.3 -9853.7 0.000 -1438.4 -499.2 0.003
Merrill Lynch -2986.6 -944.9 -237.3 0.061
Morgan Stanley -4976.2 -3781.6 0.000 -2700.7 -2355.6 0.000
P & C Insurers
ACE 337.5 1688.8 0.000 -155.0 -94.1 0.001
AIG -9100.0 -8746.9 0.000 -4310.9 -3954.9 0.000
Berkshire Hathaway 425.3 879.6 0.010 -145.8 89.2 0.007
Chubb 554.0 1653.5 0.000 -82.4
Hartford -2240.3 -706.8 0.056 -627.0 -336.7 0.000
Safeco -606.6 -90.2 73.8 0.009
L & H Insurers
Aetna -1251.8 -64.9 56.0 0.032
Cigna -1336.2 -55.9 67.5 0.013
Genworth -4272.1 -2912.1 0.000 -1097.8 -717.6 0.000
Lincoln National -2026.5 -546.7 0.054 -515.3 -341.2 0.000
Metlife -1039.1 -758.8 -569.3 0.000
Prudential -1295.0 -571.3 -299.0 0.000
Unum -1159.7 -204.4 115.5 0.009
Wellpoint -640.7 -25.6 220.1 0.000
Finance
Block -817.3 -179.8 80.9 0.084
Capital One -495.2 2420.4 0.000 -385.7 327.6 0.020
CIT -3802.1 -1296.7 -622.8 0.005
Istar -4397.9 -3073.4 -2287.3 0.000
SLM -3287.9 -1681.7 0.053 -1322.8 -806.6 0.000
Surety & GSE
MBIA -4009.3 -1339.7 4646.1 0.000
MGIC Investment -3821.4 -872.8 1034.8 0.000
PMI -5096.1 -2814.3 0.088 -936.3 1733.6 0.000
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CHAPTER 3
LIMITS TO ARBITRAGE IN THE U.S.
MARKETS FOR INFLATION
This study investigates the pricing relationship between U.S. Treasury In-
flation Protected Securities (TIPS), nominal U.S. Treasury securities, and
the most popular inflation-indexed derivatives known as zero-coupon infla-
tion swaps. We investigate the deviations from a no-arbitrage relationship
that would hold if markets for these three securities were frictionless. These
deviations were typically small prior to 2008 but grew tremendously during
the most recent financial crisis. To better understand the source of these
deviations, we relate them to other indicators of financial market stress.
TIPS are coupon bonds that have been issued by the U.S. government
since 1997. They are currently auctioned at 5-, 10-, and 30-year maturities.
Unlike standard Treasury notes and bonds whose coupon and principal are
fixed dollar payments, TIPS make payments proportional to the Consumer
Price Index (CPI). Because TIPS payments are uncertain in nominal (dollar)
terms but are approximately fixed in real (purchasing power) terms, a yield-
to-maturity on TIPS is quoted as a real yield. The difference between
the nominal yield on a standard Treasury security and the real yield on an
equivalent maturity TIPS is referred to as the break-even inflation rate (BEI).
This BEI rate reflects expected inflation over the bonds’ time to maturity as
well as the magnitude of an inflation risk premium, and a minor convexity
adjustment. For this reason, the BEI rate is taken as a measure of inflation
compensation that investors require over the bonds’ times until maturity and
has been used by policymakers and central bankers as a guide for monetary
policy. However, as we will document, this BEI rate is often distorted by
financial market frictions.
An alternative indicator of inflation compensation is the zero coupon infla-
tion swap rate. Zero coupon inflation swaps have traded in the U.S. over-the-
counter (OTC) market since 2003 and have maturities from 1 to 50 years.1
1Markets for zero coupon inflation swaps tied to U.K. pound sterling inflation and Euro
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A zero coupon inflation swap is a contract whereby the inflation buyer pays
a predetermined fixed nominal rate and in return receives from the seller an
inflation linked payment. Specifically, suppose that a zero coupon inflation
swap is initiated at date 0 and matures at date T > 0. At date T the
inflation buyer pays to the inflation seller the fixed amount of [1 + za (0, T )]
T
per dollar of notional principal, where za (0, T ) is the annually-compounded
inflation swap rate for a contract initiated at date 0 and maturing at date
T . In return, at date T the inflation seller pays to the inflation buyer an
inflation-linked payment. Define It as the non-seasonally adjusted CPI in-
dex at date t. Then the inflation seller’s date T payment to the buyer is
IT− 1
4
/I− 1
4
per dollar of notional principal. In words, the inflation payment
equals T years of inflation with an indexation lag of 3 months (one-quarter
year). One reason for this indexation lag is that the CPI index is not re-
vealed immediately at the date for which it is recorded, but is reported with
a lag.
Therefore, the date T net swap payment per dollar notional principal from
inflation buyer to the inflation seller is [1 + za (0, T )]
T − IT− 1
4
/I− 1
4
. One can
determine the initial value of this swap by valuing each leg (payment). At
date 0, the value of the fixed (nominal) leg is simply
Pn(0, T ) [1 + za (0, T )]
T (3.1)
where Pn (0, T ) is the date 0 price of a nominal zero-coupon bond that pays
$1 at date T . In a frictionless market, this would equal the date 0 price of a
nominal U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bond (STRIP) that pays $1 at date T .2
For the inflation (real) leg, we need to value the date T cashflow of IT− 1
4
/I− 1
4
.
This cashflow equals the value of a zero-coupon inflation indexed bond issued
at date 0 that has the same one-quarter-year indexation lag. Indeed, TIPS
follow the same convention of making inflation-linked coupon and principal
payments with a one-quarter-year indexation lag. Thus, if Pr (0, T ) is the
date 0 price of a TIPS coupon STRIP that pays IT− 1
4
/I− 1
4
at date T , then
in a frictionless market the inflation leg exactly equals Pr (0, T ).
At the swap’s initiation date, the fair inflation swap rate is the value
inflation have a longer history and even greater trading volume.
2STRIPS stands for Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securi-
ties. For more detail refer to http://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/marketables/
strips/strips.htm.
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za (0, T ) that equates the values of the fixed and floating legs:
Pn(0, T ) [1 + za (0, T )]
T = Pr (0, T ) (3.2)
or
za (0, T ) =
(
Pr (0, T )
Pn(0, T )
)1/T
− 1 (3.3)
While inflation swap rates are typically quoted as annually-compounded,
equation (3.3) can be simplified by converting to continuous-compounding.
Defining the continously-compounded inflation swap rate as z (0, T ) = ln[1+
za (0, T )], then equation (3.3) becomes
z (0, T ) = ln
[(
Pr (0, T )
Pn(0, T )
)1/T]
= − 1
T
lnPn (0, T ) +
1
T
lnPr (0, T )
= yn (0, T )− yr (0, T ) (3.4)
where yn (0, T ) ≡ − (1/T ) lnPn (0, T ) and yr (0, T ) ≡ − (1/T ) lnPr (0, T ) are
the date 0 continously-compounded yields on STRIPs maturing at date T
that make nominal and real payments, respectively. Thus, we see that when
markets are frictionless, the equilibrium inflation swap rate, z (0, T ), would
equal the BEI rate, yn (0, T )− yr (0, T ).
To gauge deviations from this frictionless, no-arbitrage relationship, we
define the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis (IIS Basis) as the difference between
the inflation swap rate and the equivalent tenor BEI rate:
IIS Basis ≡ z (0, T )− [yn (0, T )− yr (0, T )] (3.5)
We show that the IIS Basis is almost always positive at all tenors and posit
this is due to either supply limitations or hedging costs. We eliminate U.S.
Treasury cash market liquidity aspects of its measurement and examine it in
time series and cross-section to include the extreme movements during the
worst of the recent financial crisis. We also account for the presence of a
par principal floor at maturity in the TIPS that is not present in swap. As
this will add value to the TIPS in declining inflation environments, we will
show that via our methodology it should be harder to find a positive IIS
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Basis. We seek to explain the behavior of the IIS Basis from the aspects of
overall debt market liquidity, funding availability, and changes in expected
future movements in inflation as measured by future U.S. CPI, concluding
that all play a role. As the Lehman bankruptcy in September, 2008 is a
common explanation for the observed extremes in the IIS Basis during the
4th Quarter of 2008, we examine it in light of market conditions during the
Bear Stearns rescue and the very large deflation measures reported after the
Lehman bankruptcy and conclude that the deflation experience provides a
worthy competitor as an explanation for IIS Basis extremes.
This work is the first we are aware of to specifically examine the basis
between inflation cash and derivative markets, particularly during the finan-
cial crisis of 2007-2008. It is the first work to include TIPS bid ask spread
pricing data in its analysis.3 Further contributions are to show the IIS Basis
is materially positive after eliminating cash market Treasury liquidity expla-
nations and the existence of the floor in the TIPS and to posit its behavior
as a function of hedging costs. In the next section, an overview of inflation
markets is presented. The data and methodology are reviewed in the ensuing
section, followed by the results and a conclusion.
3.1 Inflation Markets
While western governments have begun providing inflation protection via
debt issuance in recent years, it is unclear that they are natural economic
3We are indebted to J.B. Wakefield at Tradeweb Markets LLC for making this available
to us.
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providers of inflation protection.4,5 In contrast, insurance companies and
pension funds, which enter into contractual agreements to provide inflation
indexed payments to policy holders, are natural buyers of inflation protection
as a hedging vehicle for these agreements. The lack of a natural inflation
protection provider may provide a supply based explanation for the positive
basis between dealer inflation indexed swap rates and similar break even rates
manufactured by comparing nominal and real rate securities. Dealers that
provide inflation protection to end users via the swap market will demand a
liquidity discount (higher cost) from buyers consistent with arguments made
in Deuskar, Gupta, and Subrahmanyam (2007) for dealers of over-the-counter
(OTC) interest rate derivative instruments.
Using our prior notation, at date 0 the end user purchasing inflation com-
pensation from a dealer will agree to pay exp [z (0, T )× T ] at date T in return
for receiving CPI inflation of IT− 1
4
/I− 1
4
. To the degree that this actual infla-
tion is greater than the compounded swap rate, the end user will receive a
payment from the dealer. As the dealer is taking this risk, there will be a risk
premium embedded in z (0, T ) in addition to the expected rate of inflation
between time 0 and time T .
To perfectly replicate this transaction in the U.S. Treasury security mar-
ket, one would have to buy a U.S. Treasury zero coupon inflation indexed
STRIPS with maturity T and fund it via a short position in an identical
tenor nominal STRIPS. Assuming the securities exist and trade with similar
4The United States first offered TIPS in 1997. There are a number of rationales for
their issuance. Market yields from real bonds can be used by central banks to extract
information for monetary policy when contrasted with market based nominal yields. Their
difference, break even inflation, may also be used as a measure of central bank credibility.
In addition to the value real rate securities provide to government monetary policy makers,
adding real rate securities to existing nominal issuances may also permit a reduction in
government financing costs. To the degree that inflation expectations embed large risk
premiums due to inflation uncertainty, governments can save money as the actual payouts
on the security will depend upon realized inflation as opposed to nominal bonds which
will embed this uncertainty in actual payments. See Dudley, Roush, and Ezer (2009) for
details. This source of savings must also reflect the value of the embedded floor option
the securities provide to holders and the efficiency with which the options are priced when
the bonds are sold at auction.
5The only obvious providers of inflation protection are those entities which embed an
inflation linkage to their revenues such as monopoly utilities or some real estate firms.
To the degree that U.S. income tax measures are not indexed to inflation (such as the
Alternative Minimum Tax) government revenue is indexed to inflation. The introduction
of links to the consumer price index for tax brackets and other measures in 1985 acted to
significantly reduce such inflation based revenue.
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time to maturity, T , to that referenced in the swap this could be done via a
series of successive matching repurchase agreements or a pair of asset swaps
for both the long and short positions to reflect that the inflation swap being
hedged is an off-balance sheet transaction.6 In reality, the typical hedging
process is to enter the cash market and buy a TIPS coupon instrument while
taking a short position in a nominal Treasury coupon instrument in such
fashion that some measure of price sensitivity to inflation such as a DV01
provides a hedge for the inflation swap sold to a third party.7 This will act
to lock in the IIS Basis for the dealer. Whether or not the dealer chooses to
reduce these balance sheet hedge positions via funding from the repurchase
agreement (repo) market or entering into offsetting asset swaps is a separate
decision on the part of a dealer. In either case, the zero coupon swap can-
not be perfectly hedged with a set of positions in coupon paying structures
without some kind of reinvestment assumption.8 Thus, the dealer will hedge
the trade at initiation and then selectively manage its entire book (portfolio)
with increasing frequency tied to market volatility and the hedging instru-
ments at his or her disposal.9 As the TIPS is a real rate security and the zero
coupon inflation swap rate is a position based upon an inflation change, it is
necessary to compare the TIPS to a similar maturity nominal Treasury bond
to reproduce the break even inflation compensation of the swap. Thus, the
short nominal Treasury position will initially create a net payment made by
the receiver of inflation compensation since the nominal Treasury coupons
6In fact, per email exchange with Michael Ashton, CFA, Managing Principal, Enduring
Investments LLC on April 20, 2010, only one TIPS STRIPS has ever been completed.
7DV01 is the dollar value of a 1 basis point move for a bond or fixed income position.
While typically applied to interest rates, these transactions are creating positions in in-
flation so it is the dollar value of a 1 basis point move in an inferred inflation measure
whether this be a flat inflation break even or a tenor based inflation curve.
8While the TIPS utilizes the same index with the same lag as the zero coupon swap, it
has some notable differences. A TIPS pays semiannual interest based upon the product of
its annual rate (fixed at issuance via auction) and the degree of change in the CPI index
between initial settlement and the interest payment date. While its principal index may
decline due to deflation affecting the level of its intermediate interest payments, it will not
pay out less than par when it matures. Thus, it embeds a floor at maturity unlike the
zero coupon inflation swap. TIPS were created based upon Canadian Real Return Bonds.
For a summary of their design and rules see http://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/
statreg/auctreg/auctreg_gsrlist.htm.
9Ashton (2006a) and Ashton (2006b) discuss the asset swap process and its implications
for inflation market evolution due to the influence of LIBOR rates on asset swap inferred
inflation rates. As an asset swap entails a LIBOR based flow, positions in inflation gen-
erated through asset swaps are subject to LIBOR based influence. This is not true of a
zero coupon inflation swap.
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will exceed the TIPS coupons. The larger yield of the nominal bond includes
the real rate of return in the TIPS, an expectation of inflation, and a risk
premium for inflation.10
The prices in the nominal and real markets will reflect their liquidity. It
is common for the most recent nominal issues at any time, the on-the-run
securities for each maturity, to embed a liquidity discount. The result is a
higher price for the nominal bond decreasing the inflation compensation de-
rived in the cash market.11 This may be seen as a smaller nominal yield term,
yn (0, T ), in equation (3.5) acting to increase the IIS Basis. On-the-run TIPS
very rarely go on special to experience this liquidity discount. Historically,
TIPS have experienced the opposite phenomena, excessive illiquidity leading
to a liquidity premium.12 TIPS illiquidity amounts to lower prices or higher
real yields. This may be seen by examining the real yield term, yr (0, T ), in
10The use of larger here assumes inflationary expectations in general. In a period of
chronic deflation, the nominal yield could be below the real one. Further, the real yield
also embeds its own risk premium beyond expected future real rates, but this is not
important for our purposes as it is removed by the differencing.
11Fisher (2002) describes the liquidity discount in on-the-run Treasuries as capitaliza-
tion of future expected premiums resulting from the securities trading “special” in the
repurchase (repo) market. As more entities demand the security than are willing to lend
it as the security for collateralized short term loans, the cash borrowing cost declines for
those willing and able to borrow cash using the security as collateral. Ashton (2009) states
that TIPS rarely trade special in the repo market.
12See Dudley, Roush, and Ezer (2009) for an overview. The unfavorable tax treatment
requiring owners to pay tax each year on their annual inflation linked principal accrual,
in addition to the annual income they provide, has meant they are more likely to be held
by individuals only in tax advantaged accounts. On October 31, 2008, the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Cleveland ceased reporting liquidity adjusted estimates of expected inflation
stating, “We have discontinued the liquidity-adjusted TIPS expected inflation estimates
for the time being. The adjustment was designed for more normal liquidity premiums.
We believe that the extreme rush to liquidity is affecting the accuracy of the estimates.”
(See http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/data/tips/index.cfm.) This is further
complicated by a reporting change elected by the U.S. Treasury on December 1, 2008
when it began to construct its TIPS curve from only on-the-run securities as opposed to
a mix of both on and off-the-run securities. It may be surmised that the existence of the
floor in principal return was the driver of this decision. As the expectation for deflation
grew during the fourth quarter of 2008 (the annualized mid month reported declines in
the CPI for the trailing month were 5%, 2%, 12%, and 22% between September 16 and
December 16, 2008), more recent issues traded at a premium to older ones as the older
issues had significant principal accrual to be forfeited with the CPI decline. Euromoney
(2009) states regarding this period, “as implied breakevens push lower and tend towards
zero and through zero, people are becoming longer inflation and needing to sell it. That
was the reason, in September, that one-year inflation in the US dropped 500 basis points
in two weeks. There are people who are short of, not just 0% floors, but -1% to -2% floors
... What commodity prices are doing is relevant. But curves have steepened at the front
more because of embedded option situations than commodity prices.”
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equation (3.5). The combination of the long position in the illiquid TIPS and
the short position in the highly liquid nominal Treasury under these condi-
tions will act to reduce the derived measure of inflation compensation, the
BEI, from the cash market and provide a positive basis in equation (3.5). A
further complication is the floor at maturity in the TIPS. Ideally, we would
have an option free TIPS for equation (3.5) which would have a lower price
(reduced by the option value) and yet a higher yield for lower BEI and higher
basis. However, to the degree the reported TIPS price is not adjusted for the
option, option value will be used to infer a lower TIPS yield, a higher BEI
and a lower IIS Basis. If the market price reacts to the option value in times
of low inflation or deflation, and the TIPS price is not properly adjusted, it
should be harder to find evidence of a positive IIS Basis.
As we will demonstrate in the ensuing section, the basis at all tenors has
almost always been positive. This is consistent with either the supply based
reasoning in the inflation swap market or hedging costs. These hedging costs
may arise from positioning in cash markets or attempts to reduce balance
sheet exposure resulting from these cash position via asset swaps or repo mar-
kets. A material negative basis would enable an end user to implement the
reverse series of transactions to that already mentioned to capture it.13 The
basis took on dramatically large positive values in the months following the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Campbell, Shiller, and Viciera (2009) describe
in some detail a series of technical factors around the Lehman Bankruptcy in
September of 2008, as provided to them by representatives of PIMCO, that
led to unusually low (high) prices (yields) for TIPS compared to nominal
Treasuries.14 The result of such an effect would be a large positive value to
the IIS Basis as defined in equation (3.5). The market narrative around the
Bear Stearns rescue in March of 2008 was very similar to that leading to the
Lehman bankruptcy entailing counterparty risk concerns and repo market
funding interruptions.15 In some contradiction to the Lehman explanation
13This would entail a long nominal Treasury bond position and short TIPS position.
One could then buy inflation swaps for both the coupons and the principal payment in
order to lock in a gain (save for the existence of the principal floor in the TIPS). This
assumes the end user finds enough liquidity to maintain the short position in the TIPS
for the terms of each of the inflation swap positions.
14Pacific Investment Management Company, LLC (PIMCO) is one of the world’s largest
asset managers and part of German insurer Allianz since its purchase in 2000.
15Ho¨rdahl and King (2008) note that the major U.S. investment banks relied on repo
for 50% of their total funding, much of which was in support of positions in structured
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is the fact that the basis reached its peaks in late November and Decem-
ber, 2008, two to three months following Lehman’s demise on September 15,
2008. Further, the basis remained stubbornly high well into the first quarter
of 2009. The 10 year TIPS bid ask spreads reviewed in the next section reach
their peak levels in the first weeks of January, 2009. Coincidentally, 4Q 2008
marked a significant month over month decline in the CPI and changes in
expectation to that of deflation as opposed to inflation in most financial mar-
ket commentaries. In the next section, we review the data and methodology
employed to calculate and explain the level of the basis.
3.2 Data and Methodology
In order to measure the IIS Basis, we first seek a means to eliminate
relative liquidity factors between nominal Treasuries and TIPS. Further, a
zero coupon measure of breakeven inflation on the cash market Treasury
side would be a more optimal match to the zero coupon inflation swap rate.
A zero coupon rate at constant tenors utilizing only off-the-run nominal
and real rates would enable us to create a zero coupon break even inflation
rate equivalent to their difference. Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007)
and Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010) provide a methodology to do just
this. Note, however, they do not adjust their TIPS derived real rates for the
option value of the embedded floor. Thus, in times where this option may
be assumed to take on value such as in the 4th quarter of 2008, TIPS price
increases resulting from the embedded floor will be reported as reductions
in real rates leading to an increase in BEI and a reduction in the IIS Basis.
Calculations for the IIS Basis as produced in our work therefore represent
lower limits for the IIS Basis after adjusting for the liquidity differences
inherent in the TIPS and nominal markets by using the data of Gu¨rkaynak,
Sack, and Wright (2007) and Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010).
We can summarize our data needs as a source of inflation swap prices as
well as the aforementioned nominal and TIPS zero rates. These measures
are collected for 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 year maturities from September 1, 2005
through May 25, 2010. The starting date and tenor span are selected due to
securities and non-government debt.
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data limitations.16
Figure 3.1 displays the value of the basis calculated as in equation (3.5) for
the 2, 5, and 10 year tenors over all trade dates. We suppress the 3 and 7 year
tenors to make it easier to see the differing behavior between the shortest and
longest tenors. Other than a few limited periods taking the two year measure
below zero, all other observations are positive. The majority of measures
prior to 2008 at the presented tenors remain below 50 bp. Other than a single
observation on September 2, 2008 for the two year tenor, the two and five year
measures cross and remain above 100 bp following the Lehman bankruptcy
and the resulting money market fund problems beginning September 15,
2008.17 It takes until November 14, 2008 for the ten year tenor to reach 100
bp and at this point the two and five year tenors have nearly eclipsed 200
bp. It takes until April, 2009 for all measures to recede to the 50 bp position,
but they continue to intermittently rise above it until the latter part of 2009.
They continue to recede into the first quarter of 2010 at which point the 2
year measure goes negative. However, the figure depicts a significant rise for
two and five year tenors above 50 bp near the end of May, 2010.
Figures 3.2 - 3.6 present each of the five tenors separately. The IIS Basis
and each of its components from Equation (3.5) including the cash market
BEI are displayed. In order to better observe the IIS Basis, each figure
has two vertical axes for units with the left most axis displaying the basis
and the rightmost axis used for the inflation swap rate, the nominal yield,
the real yield and their difference, the cash market BEI. All yields are zero
coupon with continuous compounding. The nominal and real yields are pro-
duced from the methodology of Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) and
Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010). The horizontal axis displays the time-
16Bloomberg is the source of the zero coupon inflation swap prices. While availability be-
gins July 21, 2004, the data is subject to frequent missing data points prior to September 1,
2005. Hurd and Relleen (2006) note that trading of Inflation Swaps within the U.S. is con-
centrated in tenors of 10 years or less. The nominal and real yields measured as described
in Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) and Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010) may
be found at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm. The
collected Treasury rates and resulting breakeven inflation measures are continuously com-
pounded zero rates. Changing TIPS issuance practices and the relatively short time since
issuance began in 1997 leads to a significant gap in availability beyond the 10 year matu-
rity point as observable in Figure 1 of Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010). They further
review the pricing issues that led them to exclude real yield measures shorter than two
years to maturity.
17While not obvious from Figure 3.1, the two year first crosses again (after the spike on
September 2) on September 17 and the five year on September 29.
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line to include the start and end dates, the first trading date of each year
and the dates of the Bear Stearns rescue (March 14, 2008) and the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy (September 15, 2008). It is difficult to tie the largest
IIS Basis observations for the ten year tenor to the Lehman bankruptcy and
there is little visible disturbance around the Bear Stearns rescue at any tenor.
The lowest real yields prior to the post-crisis period are observed immedi-
ately prior to the Bear Stearns rescue at all tenors. While inflation turned
negative around the Lehman bankruptcy (recording declines of 5% and 2%
at the midmonth releases of September and October, 2008), the most ex-
treme basis behavior appears coincident to the larger changes in the CPI.
The BLS reported annualized CPI declines of 12%, 22%, and 12% between
mid-November, 2008 and mid-January, 2009 for the months immediately pre-
ceding. Further, as already stated, the largest degree of illiquidity in the TIPS
market at the ten year tenor takes place in the first two weeks of January,
2009.
Panel A of Table 3.1 provides the summary statistics for the basis at all
tenors throughout the dataset. The median value is largest for the five year
tenor at 41 bp declining as we shorten or extend tenor with medians of
31 bp for the two year and 28 bp for the ten year. The mean displays
similar behavior and is larger consistent with the positive skewness at all
tenors. The standard deviations decline from 34 bp for the two and three
year tenors to 19 bp for the ten year measure. In addition to looking at
all data simultaneously, we consider three subsets in seeking an overriding
theme - the Bear Stearns rescue (March 10, 2008-April 14, 2008), the Lehman
bankruptcy (September 8, 2008-October 14, 2008), and the deflation scare
(November 12, 2008-February 27, 2009).18 Panels B-D of Table 3.1 display
the behavior of the IIS Basis for these periods. The Bear Stearns rescue
period data in Panel B shows little difference from the full sample results
in Panel A other than smaller values at the 10 year tenor. The Lehman
bankruptcy and the deflation scare provide much higher figures for the IIS
Basis and may serve as an explanation for its behavior into 4Q 2008.
In seeking to explain the level of the IIS Basis at each tenor we postulate
18The Bear Stearns and Lehman events are measured from one week prior through four
weeks after the rescue/bankruptcy date: March 14, 2008 for Bear Stearns and September
15, 2008 for Lehman. The deflation period is defined from one week prior to the first large
(two digit) price decline reported November 19 until one week after the first positive rise
reported February 20, 2009.
76
it may be the result of changes in market liquidity, funding, or changes in
inflation expectations.19 We propose a set of proxy variables for the Liq-
uidity category (to include funding) and successively test a series of forecast
measures for our Inflation category.
To the degree that the basis is a function of reduced market liquidity or
funding pressure, we would expect a positive relationship between measures
of (il)liquidity and the level of the basis. Our Liquidity variables follow:
1. The 10 Year Treasury On/Off-The-Run Spread measures the
specialness of the ten year on-the-run Treasury bond by taking the
difference between an off-the-run constant maturity 10 year Treasury
rate as measured by the methodology of Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright
(2007) and a constant maturity 10 year Treasury rate measured using
only on-the-run securities as reported by the U.S. Treasury.20
2. The 3 Month General Collateral Reverse Repo Treasury Bill
Spread reflects the willingness of holders of short term funds to lend
them for three months in the reverse repurchase market using U.S. Trea-
sury (General) Collateral as opposed to buying three month Treasury
Bills directly.21
19All dealer trades should be collateralized, eliminating counterparty credit risk as a
pricing concern for our data. While dealers may charge smaller counterparties for credit
risk when there is no posting of collateral, it should not influence the dealer prices we
have collected. During times of extreme crisis dealers may have their credit lines for other
dealers reduced or eliminated which will reduce off-balance sheet hedging opportunities
and act to reduce liquidity. However, given that the principle hedging vehicles for inflation
derivatives are cash market U.S. Treasury securities lacking credit risk, this opportunity
should not limit hedging of existing positions. We will include a dealer credit measure
but term it a liquidity variable. Although this may be confusing, there is no consensus on
the degree to which the subprime crisis beginning in the summer of 2007 was a reflection
of either liquidity or credit risk. For example, Taylor and Williams (2008a) and Taylor
and Williams (2008b) emphasize changes in LIBOR OIS spreads as counterparty credit
risk. Anderson and Gascon (2009) note the change in tenor for asset backed commercial
paper placement to overnight only as opposed to longer and conclude the crisis was one
of liquidity as opposed to credit. Sarkar (2009) divides the crisis into a liquidity stage
prior to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008 and a credit risk stage
immediately after.
20The U.S. Treasury reports these values daily at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-management/
interest-rate/yield.shtml
and the methodology relying upon on-the-run only securities is reported at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-management/
interest-rate/yieldmethod.html.
21All repo and reverse repo rates are collected from Bloomberg. The Treasury Bill yields
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3. The 10 Year TIPS Bid Ask Spread is calculated from data provided
by Tradeweb Markets LLC. It represents the difference between the ask
price and the bid price all divided by the mid price and is expressed
in percent so that 1.0 is 100 bp. It is a direct indicator of liquidity in
the TIPS market. Unlike the prior two measures which will capture
flight to quality that may not be transmitted to our off-the-run source
of nominal U.S. Treasury data, this measure should directly affect the
source prices of our 10 year off-the-run TIPS.22 To the degree that
shorter tenors of the IIS Basis lead or lag the 10 year IIS Basis mea-
sure we may or may not expect its sign to be positive at all tenors.23
Certainly for the 10 year IIS Basis measure we would expect a positive
relationship to illiquidity given an increasing liquidity premium. This
may be seen by examining real yield, yr (0, T ), in equation (3.5) which
should rise in periods of illiquidity.
4. The 5 Year Dealer CDS Index is an equal weighted index of 5
year credit default swap rates for the largest bank derivative dealers
Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Goldman
Sachs, and Morgan Stanley. Each bank’s CDS rate is collected from
Bloomberg, applying linear interpolation for missing values within a
given bank’s time series. We use this as a liquidity measure to attempt
to capture interdealer credit concerns leading to reduced liquidity due
to reductions in credit lines or simply restrictions from trading with
counterparties of concern. This variable is in the spirit of that used
in Taylor and Williams (2008a) and Taylor and Williams (2008b) as a
counterparty risk measure.
5. The BLS CPI release date and Auction dates for 5 and 10 year
TIPS24
are collected from the Federal Reserve’s daily H.15 release found here:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm
22Fleming and Krishnan (2009) report that there is little difference in bid-ask spread
behavior between the on-the-run and off-the-run TIPS.
23See Figures 3.1, 3.2, or 3.6 to see the leading behavior of the 2 year tenor compared
to the 10 year.
24The presidential election day, November 4, 2008, saw very large movements in the IIS
Basis at all tenors. The two year contracted by over 20 bp while the five year widened by
nearly 40 bp. Lacking a clear explanation we report here that exclusion of this day as an
indicator does not change our results in a material fashion.
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This set of indicator variables will only be used in daily studies. Flem-
ing and Krishnan (2009) find that both the monthly CPI report of the
BLS and auction days for TIPS spur significant trading activity in the
TIPS market. We would thus expect these variables to take on negative
signs in explaining the IIS Basis to the degree that trading is higher.
Using trading as a proxy for liquidity, we expect to find reduced real
market rates increasing the BEI and reducing the IIS Basis.
Our second set of variables seek to capture inflation expectations. They
can be divided between quarterly/monthly measures of inflation forecast and
daily commodity prices we will use as a bridge between the forecast data and
our daily observations of the IIS Basis. In predicting the relationship between
the inflation rate changes and the basis, we will simply adopt the view that
declining inflation is related to rising IIS Basis. This may be posited from a
naive examination of any of Figures 3.1-3.6. The inflation variables follow:
1. The SPF Current Quarter, 5 Year, and 10 Year CPI Forecast is
the quarterly reported consensus CPI forecast for the current quarter,
the next 5 years, and the next 10 years as captured in the Survey
of Professional Forecasters produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia. The forecast values are associated with their release date
for each quarter.25
2. The Blue Chip Current Quarter, Current Year and Next Year
CPI Forecast is the monthly consensus CPI forecast as published
in the Blue Chip Economic Indicators dated the tenth of each month.
The data was hand collected after review of the publication back to the
beginning of 2006. The forecast values are associated with the proxy
release date of the report.26
3. Commodity Index Values were collected daily in order to provide
a potential means of capturing changes in future inflation expectations
25SPF data may be found here:
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/
survey-of-professional-forecasters/
26Based upon discussions with the editor the following rule was adopted for establishing
public access to the forecast data. The 10th of the month if a weekday or the first trade
date following the tenth when it falls on a weekend or holiday. Blue Chip also publishes
longer range forecasts in their March and October issues but given only two observations
per year this data was not used.
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as embedded in the forecast measures already described. The New
York Harbor 87 Gasoline price per gallon, the West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) Crude Oil price per barrel, the price of the Rogers International
Commodity Index fund as well as its sub-portfolio Energy counterpart,
and the Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Fund were hand collected from
Bloomberg. Each of the forecast inflation measures and their changes
(quarterly SPF or monthly Blue Chip) will be regressed on the appro-
priate level or change in each of these indices to identify a daily proxy
for inflation expectations embedded in the IIS Basis.
The behavior of a subset of these variables, both their levels and daily
changes, over the course of the data between September 1, 2005 and May 25,
2010 is summarized in Panel A of Table 3.2. As may be seen, the variables
are the daily liquidity measures and the ultimate choice for a daily inflation
proxy (still to be discussed), the price of a gallon of gasoline. If we examine
the Bear Stearns rescue event in panel B we see higher values for all the
liquidity variables save for the 10 year TIPS bid ask spread data, which will
reach its peak during the deflation scare period. Although described in the
press as a time of greatly reduced liquidity, it is not present in the repo
market numbers (not shown) until the first few days following the weekend
Bear Stearns agreed to be purchased by J.P. Morgan (Monday was March 17,
2008). The values quickly returned to normal in the ensuing trading days. We
will next compare the Lehman bankruptcy results to the Bear Stearns rescue
event. Note that while 10 year nominal U.S. Treasury liquidity measure
remained the same during the Lehman bankruptcy event, the 3 month U.S.
Treasury Bill reverse repo spread doubled as did the dealer CDS measure and
the 10 year TIPS bid ask spread. From this perspective, it is unclear that we
will be able to use Bear Stearns as a liquidity market interruption control for
examining the Lehman bankruptcy and its effect on the IIS Basis. Finally,
the deflation scare period reflects increasing liquidity at short tenor via the
GC repo market U.S. Treasury Bill spread but rising illiquidity at the 10
year tenor for both the nominal market and the TIPS market, as measured
by its bid ask spread. Gasoline, the daily inflation proxy variable, depicts a
dramatic decline.
We will perform a three step process in seeking to explain the IIS Basis. In
the first step, depicted in Tables 3.3-3.8, we will regress the IIS Basis (both in
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level and in changes by panel with fixed effects by tenor as well as univariate
results by tenor) on the liquidity variables and one of each of the six inflation
forecast measures at either quarterly (SPF) or monthly (Blue Chip) intervals.
We will then perform a series of either quarterly or monthly regressions to
explain the level and changes of each of the inflation forecast variables with
each of our five daily commodity inflation proxies (in Table 3.9). Finally,
with a chosen daily commodity proxy, we will proceed to explain the IIS
Basis at daily frequency for all of our data and our three sub-periods, the
Bear Stearns rescue, the Lehman bankruptcy, and the deflation scare period
(Tables 3.10-3.13).
As our data is subject to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, straight
OLS is not appropriate as a measurement methodology. We thus employ the
method of Newey and West (1994) throughout all of our regressions, applying
their recommendation for the modeled number of lags. For panel data with
fixed effects by tenor we implement the methodology documented in Schaffer
(2010). For univariate regressions by tenor we implement the methodology
documented in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2010).
3.3 Results
We begin in Table 3.3 with a quarterly regression of the IIS Basis both
by level and change in panel with fixed effects and by individual tenor over
our liquidity variables and the SPF current quarter forecast CPI. All of our
variables are strongly statistically significant in panel (the Dealer 5YR CDS
at the 2% level) examined in levels, although the 10 year TIPS bid ask spread
exhibits a negative coefficient counter to our assumptions. The inflation
forecast measure has the predicted negative coefficient. The individual tenor
measures are similar, displaying strong results at all tenors for the 10 year
nominal Treasury liquidity measure. The GC Repo Treasury Bill spread
measure is statistically significant for all tenors at the 5% level. For the
remaining variables stronger statistical significance is found in the shorter
tenors for liquidity variables and the longer tenors for the SPF current quarter
inflation forecast. The regression of changes in the lower panel provices
similar, though statistically stronger, results both in panel and by individual
tenor for the liquidity variables but the change in the SPF current quarter
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forecast is positive and generally insignificant.
Table 3.4 repeats the analysis substituting the SPF 5 year inflation forecast
measure for that of the current quarter. The results are similar in panel
and by tenor for our first two Treasury market liquidity indicators (10 year
nominal and 3 month GC repo vs. Treasury Bill) but the 10 year TIPS bid
ask spread is statistically insignificant except in the case of the 10 year IIS
Basis measure where the coefficient is positive as we would expect but this
is only at the 7% level of significance. The Dealer 5 year CDS index is only
significant in explaining the 10 year IIS Basis as well, but its coefficient is
negative. The SPF 5 year forecast level is very significant in panel (at the
0.1% level) but its sign is now positive. It remains positive in individual
tenor regressions but is only significant at the longer tenors. Turning to the
regression of changes in the lower panel of Table 3.4, we find similar albeit
statistically stronger results for our first two Treasury liquidity measures in
panel and by individual tenor. The TIPS bid ask spread is negative again
and strongly statistically significant at all tenors save for the 10 year IIS
Basis, the opposite of our findings for level regressions. The change in SPF
5 year forecast maintains its positive sign but is only significant in panel and
at the 10% level for the 2 year individual regression.
Table 3.5 completes our analysis of quarterly inflation forecast measures.
We have similarly strong statistical findings in panel and by individual tenor
for the first two Treasury liquidity variables but the 10 year TIPS bid ask
spread is statistically insignificant both in panel and by individual tenor. The
Dealer 5 year CDS spread index is similar to the last table, only significant
for the 10 year IIS Basis but with a negative sign. The SPF 10 year forecast
variable is strongly significant in panel and at the 5% level for the 10 year
tenor, but its sign is positive. For the regression of changes in the lower
panel, the first three liquidity variables are generally strongly statistically
significant in panel and by tenor but, once again, the TIPS bid ask coefficient
is negative. The Dealer 5 year CDS measure is significant in panel and for 5
and 7 year tenors and is of the expected positive sign. Finally, the change in
the 10 year inflation forecast is statistically insignificant in panel and for all
tenors.
Table 3.6 introduces regressions at monthly intervals from the Blue Chip
Economic Indicators using the current quarter inflation forecast. Results
are not dissimilar from those of the SPF analysis. The first two liquidity
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indicators are positive, strongly statistically significant in panel and by tenor
for regressions using levels in the upper panel of the table. The 10 year TIPS
bid ask spread indicator is generally insignificant but is negative for the 2
year tenor, significant at the 2% level. The Dealer 5 year CDS measure is
insignificant by tenor and in panel. The current quarter forecast variable is
only significant for the 10 year tenor, where its sign is negative, with each
annual percentage point of inflation forecast acting to reduce the 10 year
basis level by 3 bp. The regression of changes displayed in the lower panel do
vary from the SPF results. The only strongly statistically significant results
are for changes in the 10 year nominal Treasury liquidity measure which is
true in panel and by tenor. The only remaining liquidity change measures
with any statistical significance are the 10 year TIPS bid ask spread measure
with a negative coefficient for the 10 year IIS Basis and the Dealer 5 year
CDS index measure which has a positive coefficient for the 2 year tenor IIS
Basis. The change in the Blue Chip current quarter forecast inflation measure
has a positive coefficient and is significant in panel at the 3% level and for
the 3 and 5 year IIS Basis change at the 10% level. Note also that while
the adjusted R2 values for all SPF regressions, whether by levels or changes,
vary from 70% to 80%, the regression of changes for the Blue Chip forecast
measures is much smaller at 20%-30%. The regression of levels for Blue Chip
is similar to those of SPF.
In Table 3.7 we substitute the Blue Chip current year forecast for the
current quarter (we use the 4th quarter to 4th quarter estimates.) Once
again, the first two liquidity measures, 10 year nominal Treasury specialness
and 3 month GC Collateral Treasury Bill spread are positive and generally
strongly statistically significant in panel and by tenor. The 10 year TIPS
bid ask spread measure is insignificant throughout. The Dealer 5 year CDS
spread measure is only significant at the 3 and 10 year tenors, with the
latter displaying a negative coefficient. The Blue Chip current year inflation
forecast measure is statistically significant in panel and for the 2, 3, and 5
year tenors but its sign is positive. Turning to the regression of changes
in the lower panel of the table, we find strong positive results for changes
in the nominal 10 year Treasury liquidity measure but the only remaining
significant results among the liquidity measures are found for the 10 year
TIPS bid ask spread measure in the 10 year IIS Basis change regression where
the coefficient is negative and the change in the Dealer 5 year CDS index for
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the 2 year IIS Basis change regression where the coefficient is positive.
Table 3.8 completes stage one of our analysis. It substitutes the next year
Blue Chip inflation forecast for the current year forecast level analyzed in the
last table. For the first two liquidity measures we find strongly statistically
significant and positive coefficients in panel and by tenor except for the 10
year IIS Basis level which is statistically insignificant for the 3 month GC
repo Treasury Bill spread. The 10 year TIPS bid ask spread level is only
significant for the 2 and 3 year IIS Basis tenors and its sign is negative.
The Blue Chip inflation forecast is not significant in panel or by tenor. In
the regression of changes displayed in the lower panel of the table, we find
strongly significant results only for the first liquidity measure in panel and at
all tenors. The change in the TIPS bid ask spread is significant and negative
only for the 3 and 10 year tenor IIS Basis changes. The change in Dealer
5 year CDS spread is positive and significant only at the 2 year tenor of
IIS Basis change. The change in the next year Blue Chip inflation forecast
is insignificant in panel, but is positive and significant for the 3 and 5 year
tenors and negative and significant at the 10 year tenor.
Some of the conclusions we draw from stage one are that our two nominal
Treasury liquidity measures are positive and strongly significant in nearly
all cases. Our TIPS liquidity measure is not consistently significant and
is negative more often than positive. It is only positive and statistically
significant for the 10 year tenor with the SPF 5 year inflation forecast. The
Dealer 5 year CDS measure is rarely statistically significant. When it is,
it is usually positive, except in the case of the 10 year tenor for the longer
SPF inflation forecasts. The inflation forecast measures, themselves, are
inconsistent with negative signs for the current quarter and positive signs for
the Blue Chip current year and both the SPF 5 and 10 year forecasts.
In stage two of our analysis, we regress the levels and changes in each
of our 6 inflation forecast measures on the level and changes in commodity
indices between the quarterly release dates of the SPF and the monthly
release dates of the Blue Chip Economic Indicators publication. The resulting
sixty single variable regressions are displayed in Table 3.9. In each case we
report the coefficient and its p-value calculated with Newey-West standard
errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity calculating lag values
as recommended in Newey and West (1994). The changes in the commodity
index values are simple period percentage changes whether by quarter or
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month. All commodity measures display strong explanatory power at shorter
forecast ranges but only the Rogers International Commodity index and its
energy sub-portfolio (columns 3 and 5, respectively) display similar strong
results at the SPF 5 and 10 year forecast intervals. Given the inconsistent
behavior of the inflation forecast measures in explaining the IIS Basis at
monthly and quarterly intervals and without a clear pattern to use in choosing
a single commodity, we rely upon Gasoline. It has the added benefit of being
a significant component of realized CPI. This completes stage two.
In the final stage of the analysis, we model the IIS Basis level at the daily
interval over four different periods. We also introduce the indicator variables
for BLS CPI reporting dates and both 5 year and 10 year auction dates for
TIPS securities. We begin our examination with Table 3.10 which examines
all of the data from September 1, 2005 through May 25, 2010. The first
observation to note is that the 10 year TIPS bid-ask spread measure is in-
significant in panel and at all tenors. Its variation from negative coeffient
at shorter tenor to positive at longer no doubt plays a part in its lack of
significance. Both the 10 year nominal Treasury liquidity indicator and the
3 month GC repo Treasury Bill spread are strongly significant in panel and
at all tenors. The Dealer 5 year CDS measure, like the 10 year TIPS bid
ask spread is statistically insignificant in panel and at all tenors. The BLS
CPI release indicator and the five year TIPS auction indicator are both sta-
tistically insignificant throughout, but the ten year TIPS auction indicator
is positive in contradiction to our expectation and statistically significant at
the 3% level in panel but insignificant by tenor. Our gasoline inflation proxy
is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in panel and for all
tenors of 5 years or greater. The coefficients correspond to a decrease in the
IIS Basis of 10 bp for every dollar increase in the price of a gallon of gasoline.
We present our sub-period studies in the final three tables. Table 3.11
examines the Bear Stearns rescue. The statistically significant explanatory
variables in panel are the 10 year nominal Treasury liquidity measure, which
is positive, the 10 year TIPS bid ask spread liquidity measure, which is
negative, and the Dealer 5 year CDS measure, which is positive. While
the ten year auction indicator is positive and the gasoline inflation proxy is
negative, both p-values are above 10%. For the individual tenors the best fits
are at the 7 and 10 year IIS Basis tenors by adjusted R2. For the seven year
tenor, nearly all variables are statistically significant but the 3 month GC
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repo Treasury Bill spread and the 10 year TIPS bid ask spread measure have
negative coefficients. Most of the remaining measures at the other tenors
are not significant. Table 3.12 presents the period surrounding the Lehman
bankruptcy. Notable results here are the positive and strongly statistically
significant coefficient on the 10 year TIPS bid ask spread measure in panel,
and with weaker but still statistically significant results at both the 2 and
10 year IIS Basis levels. The 10 year nominal Treasury liquidity measure is
still positive but statistically significant only at the 5% level in panel and
at the 5 year tenor. The remaining daily liquidity variables, the 3 month
GC repo Treasury Bill spread and the Dealer 5 year CDS index, are not
significant either in panel or by tenor. The ten year TIPS auction indicator
is only significant at the 7 year tenor, where it has the wrong sign, as it
is positive implying an increase in basis on the auction day. Finally, the
gasoline inflation proxy is not significant in panel or by tenor.
Table 3.13 completes our analysis by presenting the longer deflation scare
period from November 12, 2008 until February 27, 2009. The 10 year nominal
Treasury liquidity variable is negative during this period and displays strong
statistical significance in panel and for tenors of 5 years or more. The 3 month
GC repo Treasury Bill spread is positive and strongly statistically significant
in panel and at all tenors. The 10 year TIPS bid ask spread measure is
positive throughout but only strongly statistically significant in panel and at
the 2 year IIS Basis tenor. The only remaining statistically significant results
are a positive value for the 10 year TIPS auction indicator, the opposite of
what we would expect, and negative coefficients for the gasoline inflation
proxy at the 7 and 10 year tenors of the IIS Basis. This model fits large
constant values, all of which are strongly statistically significant.
It is primarily the first of these daily results, that for the entire period of
examination in Table 3.10, from which we may draw strong conclusions. The
IIS Basis is consistently positive throughout our measurement period, rising
with selected market liquidity variables as well as measures of declining infla-
tion. While the largest rise in the basis takes place after the Lehman default,
consistent with practitioner views, it seems more coincident with the rise in
deflation several months later and continues until the deflation is alleviated in
1Q 2009. The TIPS bid ask spread liquidity measure seems to be secondary
to our other Treasury based liquidity measures, often displaying the opposite
sign from what we would expect and frequently lacking in statistical signifi-
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cance. This is consistent with the 10 year IIS Basis lagging the shorter tenor
IIS Basis values if TIPS liquidity varies by tenor as well. Alternatively, TIPS
liquidity is not a driver of the IIS Basis compared to more macro liquidity
measures such as the nominal Treasury measures we have implemented which
capture funding aspects of the repo markets. The maximum spread values
for the 10 year TIPS bid ask spread in January of 2009 are also inconsistent
with the Lehman bankruptcy as a driver of peak IIS Basis values in the lat-
ter half of 4Q 2008. However, note that in the regressions for the Lehman
bankruptcy and deflation scare periods the TIPS bid ask spread coefficient is
positive and strongly statistically significant in panel. Our inflation results
are also inconclusive as they imply that below expectation inflation in the
very short term shrinks the IIS Basis but above expectation inflation in the
long term of one year or more increases the IIS Basis. As both liquidity and
changing market expectations for inflation can drive hedging costs of buying
and selling cash market nominal and real Treasuries, we are still unable to
declare the principal driver of the IIS Basis. Supply constraints within the
Inflation Swap market also remains a valid alternative.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis (IIS Basis)
as defined in equation (3.5) and seek to explain it via variables reflecting
market liquidity and inflation expectations. Practitioner explanations for a
positive basis typically rely upon liquidity differences in the cash markets
for the U.S. Treasury securities needed to hedge over-the-counter inflation
swap positions. We use Treasury measures specifically designed to avoid
liquidity issues and provide zero coupon rates for direct comparison. As
these measures incorporate market valuation of the embedded TIPS floor as
reduced real rates, our approach is biased against the existence of a positive
IIS Basis. We still find this positive basis and determine that it averages
approximately 40 basis points during the nearly five years we examine. It
reaches heights in excess of 200 basis points for 5 year and shorter tenors in 4Q
2008. We find this basis is positively related to measures of nominal Treasury
market illiquidity but negatively related to measures of real Treasury market
illiquidity. We further find the IIS Basis is negatively related to short term
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measures of forecast inflation and daily proxies we substitute for short term
inflation expectations. We argue that this must either reflect liquidity or
inflation related hedging costs in the cash markets. Lacking the existence
of inflation protected zero coupon bonds, the existence of the positive IIS
Basis leaves the market directionally one way, sell inflation swaps and buy
TIPS/sell nominals to construct a cash market long BEI hedge position.
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Table 3.1: Inflation Indexed Swap Basis Summary Statistics.
Inflation indexed swap vs. off-the-run U.S. Treasury derived measures of breakeven
inflation expressed in basis points for varying time periods between September 1,
2005 and May 25, 2010. Basis defined as in equation (3.5) in the text:
IIS Basis = Inflation Indexed Swap Rate−(Nominal Treasury Yield−TIPS Yield)
where all source rates are zero coupon and continuously compounded. Treasury
breakeven values calculated as in Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010) and pro-
vided at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm.
Tenor Min Max Median Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
(Yrs) (bp) (bp) (bp) (bp) (bp)
Panel A: All Data(September 1, 2005 - May 25, 2010)
All -12 240 33 41 29 2.14 9.16
2 -12 240 31 39 34 1.84 7.62
3 -3 223 38 46 33 1.84 7.21
5 11 210 41 49 31 2.32 9.50
7 11 154 34 42 24 2.18 7.61
10 1 124 28 32 19 2.33 8.72
Panel B: Bear Stearns Rescue(March 10, 2008 - April 14, 2008)
All 10 64 39 38 13 -0.18 2.17
2 15 45 31 31 8 0.10 2.39
3 27 61 46 46 7 -0.28 4.44
5 42 64 50 51 5 0.51 2.70
7 28 64 38 40 7 1.21 5.26
10 10 32 19 21 6 0.45 2.34
Panel C: Lehman Bankruptcy(September 8, 2008 - October 14, 2008)
All 16 161 76 76 34 -0.01 2.09
2 71 161 109 106 25 0.22 2.28
3 68 135 104 101 17 -0.15 2.01
5 55 123 86 87 21 0.06 1.56
7 40 94 62 60 14 0.41 2.51
10 16 46 26 27 8 0.59 2.78
Panel D: Deflation Scare(November 12, 2008 - February 27, 2009)
All 19 240 102 107 36 0.93 4.24
2 19 240 102 108 44 0.68 3.43
3 78 223 114 124 34 0.97 3.32
5 65 210 108 121 35 1.24 3.76
7 59 154 103 103 23 0.16 2.45
10 42 124 80 82 20 0.28 2.20
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Table 3.2: Explanatory Variable Summary Statistics.
IIS basis explanatory variables and their summary statistics in both level and changes.
Liquidity variables expressed in basis points and gasoline in $ per gallon for varying time
periods between September 1, 2005 and May 25, 2010. Variable definitions provided in
text.
Variable Obs Min Max Median Mean Std Dev Skew Kurt
Panel A: All Data(September 1, 2005 - May 25, 2010)
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 1182 4 61 14 18 13 1.41 4.25
∆ 10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 1181 -9 5 0 0 1 -0.18 10.88
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 1179 6 190 28 34 23 1.93 8.91
∆ 3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 1175 -121 57 0 0 9 -2.05 45.05
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd 1182 0 115 6 17 18 1.81 7.12
∆ 10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd 1181 -70 69 0 0 5 -0.64 72.40
Bank 5 Yr CDS 1182 12 433 82 99 91 1.09 3.61
∆ Bank 5 Yr CDS 1181 -222 73 0 0 10 -9.57 215.41
NY Harbor 87 Gasoline 1175 $0.79 $3.42 $1.99 $1.99 $0.50 0.54 3.43
∆ NY Harbor 87 Gasoline 1167 $-0.75 $0.42 $0.00 $0.00 $0.06 -1.40 22.69
Panel B: Bear Stearns Rescue(March 10, 2008 - April 14, 2008)
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 25 19 24 22 22 1 -0.71 3.00
∆ 10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 25 -5 2 0 0 1 -0.96 6.01
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 25 17 90 51 54 16 0.38 3.14
∆ 3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 25 -61 42 4 1 20 -1.12 5.62
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd 25 1 8 5 5 2 -0.02 2.91
∆ 10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd 25 -4 6 -1 0 3 0.50 2.51
Bank 5 Yr CDS 25 109 205 137 147 31 0.58 1.89
∆ Bank 5 Yr CDS 25 -20 14 -2 -2 8 -0.16 2.76
NY Harbor 87 Gasoline 25 $2.30 $2.72 $2.55 $2.55 $0.12 -0.43 2.27
∆ NY Harbor 87 Gasoline 25 $-0.20 $0.20 $0.01 $0.01 $0.09 0.05 3.69
Panel C: Lehman Bankruptcy(September 8, 2008 - October 14, 2008)
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 26 17 38 24 25 6 0.75 2.43
∆ 10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 26 -2 4 1 1 2 -0.07 2.14
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 24 41 172 101 99 39 0.38 2.37
∆ 3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 22 -55 44 1 3 25 -0.23 3.09
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd 26 10 21 12 15 5 0.26 1.25
∆ 10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd 26 -8 10 0 0 4 0.42 4.09
Bank 5 Yr CDS 26 152 433 325 296 93 -0.28 1.65
∆ Bank 5 Yr CDS 26 -222 73 12 2 59 -2.50 9.88
NY Harbor 87 Gasoline 26 $1.92 $3.25 $2.64 $2.57 $0.36 -0.07 2.26
∆ NY Harbor 87 Gasoline 26 $-0.29 $0.42 $-0.02 $-0.03 $0.15 0.73 4.31
Panel D: Deflation Scare(November 12, 2008 - February 27, 2009)
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 73 44 60 52 52 4 -0.08 2.94
∆ 10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 73 -4 4 0 0 2 0.09 2.93
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 73 8 79 24 35 22 0.77 2.17
∆ 3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 73 -14 17 1 -1 6 -0.07 3.80
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd 73 29 115 60 58 23 0.64 2.98
∆ 10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd 73 -70 69 0 0 19 -0.32 7.64
Bank 5 Yr CDS 73 189 311 241 241 27 0.58 3.28
∆ Bank 5 Yr CDS 73 -29 35 0 1 12 0.44 4.34
NY Harbor 87 Gasoline 72 $0.79 $1.33 $1.14 $1.12 $0.13 -0.48 2.56
∆ NY Harbor 87 Gasoline 71 $-0.14 $0.13 $0.00 $0.00 $0.06 0.03 2.67
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Table 3.3: Explaining the Basis: SPF Current Quarter Forecast by
Quarters (September 1, 2005 through May 25, 2010)
Time series explanation of the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis both in panel and individually
by tenor. These results examine both the level and the change in forecast of a selected
interval from the quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) on its release date.
The upper panel dependent variable is the level of the IIS Basis while the lower panel
dependent variable is the change in the IIS Basis. Explanatory liquidity variables as
described in the text along with the target inflation forecast measure are reported. Level
and change regressions use Newey-West standard errors robust to autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. The number of lags is calculated as suggested in Newey and West
(1994). Panel implementation with fixed effects as documented in Schaffer (2010) does
not report a constant term. Individual tenor regressions implemented as documented
in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2010). The p-values for each coefficient are reported in
parenthesis in both panels. All explanatory variables are measured in similar units (annual
percentage) so coefficient magnitudes are comparable for a similar level of each variable.
Panel Individual Tenors (Yrs)
Variable Fix Eff 2 3 5 7 10
Regression of IIS Basis Level on
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 1.821 2.126 2.348 1.830 1.511 1.288
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 0.582 0.591 0.590 0.769 0.536 0.424
(0.000) (0.021) (0.044) (0.022) (0.019) (0.006)
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd -1.126 -1.495 -1.540 -1.376 -0.843 -0.377
(0.000) (0.043) (0.042) (0.074) (0.162) (0.381)
Dealer 5YR CDS 0.139 0.228 0.215 0.229 0.082 -0.061
(0.019) (0.094) (0.112) (0.116) (0.461) (0.427)
SPF Cur Quart Forecast -0.046 -0.015 -0.041 -0.074 -0.058 -0.043
(0.000) (0.487) (0.054) (0.011) (0.005) (0.023)
Constant N/A -0.123 -0.014 0.111 0.176 0.169
N/A (0.296) (0.861) (0.185) (0.016) (0.030)
Adjusted R2 0.774 0.783 0.807 0.842 0.819 0.762
Observations 95 19 19 19 19 19
Regression of ∆ IIS Basis on
∆ 10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 2.985 2.900 4.197 3.364 2.449 2.014
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
∆ 3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 0.730 0.647 0.747 1.045 0.730 0.480
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
∆ 10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd -1.551 -1.540 -2.221 -2.107 -1.387 -0.502
(0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.121)
∆ Dealer 5YR CDS 0.209 0.230 0.201 0.357 0.210 0.045
(0.002) (0.087) (0.165) (0.005) (0.017) (0.612)
∆ SPF Cur Quart Forecast 0.012 0.052 0.032 -0.013 -0.015 0.003
(0.354) (0.078) (0.250) (0.618) (0.482) (0.848)
Constant N/A 0.006 0.018 0.003 -0.001 0.001
N/A (0.894) (0.727) (0.953) (0.982) (0.976)
Adjusted R2 0.768 0.773 0.809 0.843 0.827 0.741
Observations 90 18 18 18 18 18
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Table 3.4: Explaining the Basis: SPF 5 Year Forecast by Quarters
(September 1, 2005 through May 25, 2010)
Time series explanation of the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis both in panel and individually
by tenor. These results examine both the level and the change in forecast of a selected
interval from the quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) on its release date.
The upper panel dependent variable is the level of the IIS Basis while the lower panel
dependent variable is the change in the IIS Basis. Explanatory liquidity variables as
described in the text along with the target inflation forecast measure are reported. Level
and change regressions use Newey-West standard errors robust to autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. The number of lags is calculated as suggested in Newey and West
(1994). Panel implementation with fixed effects as documented in Schaffer (2010) does
not report a constant term. Individual tenor regressions implemented as documented
in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2010). The p-values for each coefficient are reported in
parenthesis in both panels. All explanatory variables are measured in similar units (annual
percentage) so coefficient magnitudes are comparable for a similar level of each variable.
Panel Individual Tenors (Yrs)
Variable Fix Eff 2 3 5 7 10
Regression of IIS Basis Level on
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 1.829 1.891 2.425 2.008 1.584 1.239
(0.000) (0.025) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 0.654 0.582 0.664 0.907 0.635 0.484
(0.000) (0.011) (0.063) (0.053) (0.053) (0.020)
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd -0.068 -0.775 -0.703 0.057 0.385 0.696
(0.812) (0.351) (0.406) (0.932) (0.510) (0.063)
Dealer 5YR CDS 0.068 0.211 0.150 0.112 -0.008 -0.125
(0.178) (0.095) (0.176) (0.268) (0.920) (0.031)
SPF 5 Year Forecast 0.417 0.414 0.293 0.476 0.450 0.454
(0.001) (0.269) (0.403) (0.099) (0.037) (0.003)
Constant N/A -1.203 -0.916 -1.387 -1.188 -1.136
N/A (0.195) (0.294) (0.059) (0.032) (0.003)
Adjusted R2 0.766 0.816 0.792 0.794 0.779 0.774
Observations 95 19 19 19 19 19
Regression of ∆ IIS Basis on
∆ 10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 3.013 2.708 4.115 3.487 2.623 2.131
(0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ 3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 0.707 0.613 0.718 1.038 0.714 0.450
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
∆ 10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd -1.539 -1.775 -2.332 -1.979 -1.211 -0.399
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.016) (0.244)
∆ Dealer 5YR CDS 0.173 0.180 0.158 0.345 0.184 -0.003
(0.017) (0.380) (0.422) (0.003) (0.052) (0.971)
∆ SPF 5 Year Forecast 0.212 0.349 0.281 0.048 0.121 0.263
(0.008) (0.082) (0.122) (0.842) (0.545) (0.170)
Constant N/A 0.014 0.025 0.006 0.005 0.010
N/A (0.694) (0.593) (0.914) (0.911) (0.742)
Adjusted R2 0.773 0.722 0.802 0.841 0.824 0.772
Observations 90 18 18 18 18 18
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Table 3.5: Explaining the Basis: SPF 10 Year Forecast by Quarters
(September 1, 2005 through May 25, 2010)
Time series explanation of the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis both in panel and individually
by tenor. These results examine both the level and the change in forecast of a selected
interval from the quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) on its release date.
The upper panel dependent variable is the level of the IIS Basis while the lower panel
dependent variable is the change in the IIS Basis. Explanatory liquidity variables as
described in the text along with the target inflation forecast measure are reported. Level
and change regressions use Newey-West standard errors robust to autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. The number of lags is calculated as suggested in Newey and West
(1994). Panel implementation with fixed effects as documented in Schaffer (2010) does
not report a constant term. Individual tenor regressions implemented as documented
in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2010). The p-values for each coefficient are reported in
parenthesis in both panels. All explanatory variables are measured in similar units (annual
percentage) so coefficient magnitudes are comparable for a similar level of each variable.
Panel Individual Tenors (Yrs)
Variable Fix Eff 2 3 5 7 10
Regression of IIS Basis Level on
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 1.916 1.991 2.485 2.116 1.659 1.330
(0.000) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.015)
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 0.781 0.703 0.753 1.048 0.777 0.622
(0.000) (0.004) (0.033) (0.023) (0.018) (0.004)
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd -0.233 -0.960 -0.816 -0.144 0.235 0.521
(0.418) (0.217) (0.309) (0.829) (0.666) (0.165)
Dealer 5YR CDS 0.023 0.168 0.119 0.062 -0.059 -0.174
(0.653) (0.196) (0.298) (0.539) (0.449) (0.015)
SPF 10 Year Forecast 0.750 0.703 0.530 0.830 0.861 0.825
(0.003) (0.236) (0.455) (0.269) (0.097) (0.034)
Constant N/A -1.912 -1.498 -2.254 -2.193 -2.043
N/A (0.189) (0.391) (0.230) (0.095) (0.036)
Adjusted R2 0.755 0.800 0.787 0.781 0.763 0.733
Observations 95 19 19 19 19 19
Regression of ∆ IIS Basis on
∆ 10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 2.898 2.520 3.964 3.458 2.557 1.990
(0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
∆ 3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 0.732 0.664 0.765 1.012 0.722 0.497
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
∆ 10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd -1.637 -1.873 -2.380 -2.200 -1.311 -0.422
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.021) (0.338)
∆ Dealer 5YR CDS 0.210 0.219 0.179 0.420 0.220 0.009
(0.015) (0.359) (0.395) (0.004) (0.045) (0.928)
∆ SPF 10 Year Forecast 0.013 0.136 0.166 -0.357 -0.073 0.194
(0.937) (0.741) (0.601) (0.403) (0.768) (0.602)
Constant N/A 0.003 0.018 0.000 -0.001 0.003
N/A (0.931) (0.707) (0.995) (0.988) (0.922)
Adjusted R2 0.766 0.695 0.791 0.845 0.821 0.745
Observations 90 18 18 18 18 18
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Table 3.6: Explaining the Basis: Blue Chip Current Quarter Forecast by
Months (September 1, 2005 through May 25, 2010)
Time series explanation of the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis both in panel and individually
by tenor. These results examine both the level and the change in forecast of a selected
interval from the monthly Blue Chip Economic Indicators publication on its release date.
The upper panel dependent variable is the level of the IIS Basis while the lower panel
dependent variable is the change in the IIS Basis. Explanatory liquidity variables as
described in the text along with the target inflation forecast measure are reported. Level
and change regressions use Newey-West standard errors robust to autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. The number of lags is calculated as suggested in Newey and West
(1994). Panel implementation with fixed effects as documented in Schaffer (2010) does
not report a constant term. Individual tenor regressions implemented as documented
in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2010). The p-values for each coefficient are reported in
parenthesis in both panels. All explanatory variables are measured in similar units (annual
percentage) so coefficient magnitudes are comparable for a similar level of each variable.
Panel Individual Tenors (Yrs)
Variable Fix Eff 2 3 5 7 10
Regression of IIS Basis Level on
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 1.850 2.701 2.507 1.913 1.264 0.868
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015)
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 0.330 0.487 0.389 0.396 0.256 0.120
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057)
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd -0.114 -0.489 -0.353 0.043 0.226 0.001
(0.481) (0.012) (0.092) (0.852) (0.394) (0.997)
Dealer 5YR CDS 0.010 0.020 0.036 0.023 -0.001 -0.030
(0.677) (0.644) (0.136) (0.559) (0.978) (0.571)
Blue Chip Cur Qrt Fcast -0.006 0.009 0.008 -0.005 -0.017 -0.027
(0.196) (0.486) (0.338) (0.441) (0.046) (0.051)
Constant N/A -0.215 -0.119 0.003 0.110 0.220
N/A (0.017) (0.035) (0.959) (0.009) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.710 0.781 0.837 0.806 0.806 0.593
Observations 260 52 52 52 52 52
Regression of ∆ IIS Basis on
∆ 10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 1.999 2.257 2.398 2.548 1.113 1.677
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.026) (0.002)
∆ 3M GC Repo TBill Sprd -0.031 -0.073 0.006 0.052 -0.010 -0.130
(0.556) (0.617) (0.954) (0.678) (0.896) (0.271)
∆ 10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd -0.161 -0.303 -0.440 0.113 0.277 -0.452
(0.348) (0.201) (0.060) (0.733) (0.151) (0.019)
∆ Dealer 5YR CDS -0.002 0.117 -0.022 -0.055 -0.005 -0.045
(0.948) (0.005) (0.498) (0.240) (0.863) (0.241)
∆ Blue Chip Cur Qrt Fcast 0.035 0.035 0.059 0.072 0.013 -0.003
(0.025) (0.190) (0.062) (0.075) (0.149) (0.712)
Constant N/A -0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.000
N/A (0.496) (0.854) (0.736) (0.533) (0.960)
Adjusted R2 0.201 0.317 0.226 0.248 0.159 0.208
Observations 255 51 51 51 51 51
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Table 3.7: Explaining the Basis: Blue Chip Current Year Forecast by
Months (September 1, 2005 through May 25, 2010)
Time series explanation of the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis both in panel and individually
by tenor. These results examine both the level and the change in forecast of a selected
interval from the monthly Blue Chip Economic Indicators publication on its release date.
The upper panel dependent variable is the level of the IIS Basis while the lower panel
dependent variable is the change in the IIS Basis. Explanatory liquidity variables as
described in the text along with the target inflation forecast measure are reported. Level
and change regressions use Newey-West standard errors robust to autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. The number of lags is calculated as suggested in Newey and West
(1994). Panel implementation with fixed effects as documented in Schaffer (2010) does
not report a constant term. Individual tenor regressions implemented as documented
in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2010). The p-values for each coefficient are reported in
parenthesis in both panels. All explanatory variables are measured in similar units (annual
percentage) so coefficient magnitudes are comparable for a similar level of each variable.
Panel Individual Tenors (Yrs)
Variable Fix Eff 2 3 5 7 10
Regression of IIS Basis Level on
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 1.915 2.368 2.207 1.960 1.587 1.451
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 0.157 0.176 0.108 0.229 0.163 0.110
(0.001) (0.027) (0.044) (0.000) (0.005) (0.062)
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd 0.172 0.038 0.122 0.320 0.374 0.005
(0.340) (0.903) (0.700) (0.393) (0.368) (0.991)
Dealer 5YR CDS 0.003 0.046 0.059 0.018 -0.029 -0.080
(0.926) (0.230) (0.010) (0.639) (0.362) (0.062)
Blue Chip Cur Yr Fcast 0.067 0.135 0.122 0.065 0.027 -0.015
(0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.278) (0.582)
Constant N/A -0.462 -0.342 -0.156 -0.014 0.141
N/A (0.000) (0.000) (0.087) (0.846) (0.054)
Adjusted R2 0.726 0.831 0.882 0.820 0.792 0.509
Observations 260 52 52 52 52 52
Regression of ∆ IIS Basis on
∆ 10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 2.017 2.285 2.410 2.537 1.138 1.714
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.027) (0.002)
∆ 3M GC Repo TBill Sprd -0.025 -0.069 0.022 0.078 -0.013 -0.141
(0.631) (0.626) (0.818) (0.443) (0.867) (0.237)
∆ 10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd -0.144 -0.284 -0.418 0.132 0.289 -0.441
(0.393) (0.193) (0.059) (0.686) (0.127) (0.025)
∆ Dealer 5YR CDS 0.008 0.127 -0.005 -0.035 -0.001 -0.046
(0.802) (0.005) (0.841) (0.366) (0.970) (0.235)
∆ Blue Chip Cur Yr Fcast 0.115 0.121 0.182 0.205 0.054 0.014
(0.007) (0.234) (0.048) (0.058) (0.065) (0.593)
Constant N/A -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 0.000
N/A (0.411) (0.571) (0.550) (0.413) (0.974)
Adjusted R2 0.201 0.320 0.218 0.228 0.164 0.208
Observations 255 51 51 51 51 51
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Table 3.8: Explaining the Basis: Blue Chip Next Year Forecast by Months
(September 1, 2005 through May 25, 2010)
Time series explanation of the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis both in panel and individually
by tenor. These results examine both the level and the change in forecast of a selected
interval from the monthly Blue Chip Economic Indicators publication on its release date.
The upper panel dependent variable is the level of the IIS Basis while the lower panel
dependent variable is the change in the IIS Basis. Explanatory liquidity variables as
described in the text along with the target inflation forecast measure are reported. Level
and change regressions use Newey-West standard errors robust to autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. The number of lags is calculated as suggested in Newey and West
(1994). Panel implementation with fixed effects as documented in Schaffer (2010) does
not report a constant term. Individual tenor regressions implemented as documented
in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2010). The p-values for each coefficient are reported in
parenthesis in both panels. All explanatory variables are measured in similar units (annual
percentage) so coefficient magnitudes are comparable for a similar level of each variable.
Panel Individual Tenors (Yrs)
Variable Fix Eff 2 3 5 7 10
Regression of IIS Basis Level on
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 2.026 2.496 2.343 2.085 1.709 1.495
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 0.312 0.504 0.401 0.377 0.213 0.065
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.582)
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd -0.058 -0.520 -0.361 0.113 0.357 0.122
(0.743) (0.002) (0.060) (0.619) (0.181) (0.727)
Dealer 5YR CDS 0.000 0.037 0.052 0.016 -0.027 -0.077
(0.993) (0.415) (0.001) (0.627) (0.383) (0.123)
Blue Chip Next Yr Fcast 0.062 -0.013 0.018 0.085 0.137 0.085
(0.103) (0.812) (0.762) (0.139) (0.182) (0.552)
Constant N/A -0.145 -0.128 -0.225 -0.293 -0.098
N/A (0.307) (0.387) (0.071) (0.245) (0.776)
Adjusted R2 0.710 0.778 0.835 0.807 0.797 0.513
Observations 260 52 52 52 52 52
Regression of ∆ IIS Basis on
∆ 10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 1.992 2.333 2.499 2.528 0.991 1.610
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.037) (0.003)
∆ 3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 0.034 -0.004 0.121 0.184 0.007 -0.140
(0.557) (0.976) (0.260) (0.158) (0.924) (0.277)
∆ 10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd -0.267 -0.444 -0.667 -0.102 0.289 -0.413
(0.150) (0.150) (0.008) (0.739) (0.125) (0.028)
∆ Dealer 5YR CDS 0.001 0.118 -0.020 -0.049 -0.001 -0.044
(0.981) (0.011) (0.535) (0.298) (0.966) (0.260)
∆ Blue Chip Next Yr Fcast 0.117 0.177 0.279 0.234 -0.046 -0.061
(0.120) (0.159) (0.023) (0.051) (0.248) (0.039)
Constant N/A -0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.000
N/A (0.765) (0.673) (0.748) (0.563) (0.938)
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.317 0.217 0.197 0.155 0.213
Observations 255 51 51 51 51 51
97
Table 3.9: Explaining Inflation Forecast Measures with Daily Commodity
Price and Index Levels and Changes (September 1, 2005 through May 25,
2010)
Comparison of levels and changes in different commodity measures as explanatory variables
for various inflation forecast measure levels and changes as reported by the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF) and Blue Chip Economic Indicators. SPF measures are
produced quarterly while Blue Chip is published monthly. The commodity measures
are collected daily and their 1. absolute levels and 2. unadjusted actual percentage
change over either the quarterly SPF interval or the monthly Blue Chip interval serve
as explanatory variables for the forecast changes in the CPI as reported in the table
below. The Commodity abbreviations below are West Texas Intermediate (WTI), Rogers
International Commodity Index and Energy Subindex (Rog Intl Comm Ind and Rog Intl
Energy), and Dow Jones-UBS (DJ-UBS). All regressions performed with Newey-West
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation as implemented in Baum,
Schaffer, and Stillman (2010). Number of lags as as suggested in Newey and West (1994).
The coefficient and the p-values (in parenthesis) are reported for each regression in the
table below.
Inflation NY Harbor WTI Rog Intl DJ-UBS Rog Intl
Forecast 87 Gasoline Crude Oil Comm Ind Comm Ind Energy
Quarterly SPF
Cur Qrt Forecast 0.0302 0.0632 0.0019 0.0506 0.0042
(0.0131) (0.0175) (0.0125) (0.0056) (0.0057)
∆ Cur Qrt Forecast 0.0546 0.0577 0.1039 0.1191 0.0751
(0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001)
5 Year Forecast 0.0008 0.0024 0.0001 0.0049 0.0004
(0.3506) (0.1479) (0.0075) (0.0019) (0.0036)
∆ 5 Year Forecast 0.0015 0.0021 0.0022 0.0028 0.0029
(0.0665) (0.0804) (0.3047) (0.1975) (0.0150)
10 Year Forecast 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001
(0.9419) (0.4771) (0.0822) (0.1493) (0.0214)
∆ 10 Year Forecast 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
(0.5093) (0.5492) (0.7189) (0.7097) (0.4126)
Monthly Blue Chip
Cur Qrt Forecast 0.0382 0.0760 0.0021 0.0532 0.0047
(0.0000) (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
∆ Cur Qrt Forecast 0.0193 0.0356 0.0400 0.0325 0.0384
(0.0687) (0.0046) (0.0148) (0.0632) (0.0037)
Cur Yr Forecast 0.0121 0.0271 0.0010 0.0269 0.0024
(0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0001)
∆ Cur Yr Forecast 0.0064 0.0102 0.0141 0.0123 0.0128
(0.0615) (0.0135) (0.0175) (0.0566) (0.0039)
Next Yr Forecast 0.0024 0.0042 0.0002 0.0072 0.0005
(0.0389) (0.1236) (0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0004)
∆ Next Yr Forecast 0.0049 0.0029 0.0089 0.0100 0.0047
(0.0411) (0.1099) (0.0087) (0.0078) (0.0259)
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Table 3.10: Explaining the Basis: All Data by Trade Day (September 1,
2005 through May 25, 2010)
Time series explanation of the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis both in panel with
fixed effects and individually by tenor. These results include a daily inflation
forecast proxy. Remaining explanatory variables are Liquidity and/or Funding
as described in the text. All results employ Newey-West standard errors robust
to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The number of lags is calculated as
suggested in Newey and West (1994). Panel implementation with fixed effects as
documented in Schaffer (2010) does not report a constant term. Individual tenor
regressions implemented as documented in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2010).
The p-values for each coefficient are reported in parenthesis.
Panel Individual Tenors (Yrs)
Variable Fix Eff 2 3 5 7 10
Liquidity Variables
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 1.479 2.152 2.080 1.724 0.877 0.561
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.046)
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 0.352 0.519 0.443 0.368 0.248 0.180
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd -0.019 -0.096 -0.076 -0.124 0.050 0.149
(0.853) (0.717) (0.630) (0.388) (0.692) (0.323)
Dealer 5 Yr CDS 0.031 -0.002 0.025 0.058 0.065 0.009
(0.173) (0.953) (0.269) (0.098) (0.102) (0.849)
CPI Rel Ind -0.004 -0.011 0.004 -0.008 0.001 -0.004
(0.466) (0.390) (0.775) (0.363) (0.889) (0.599)
Five Yr TIPS Auc Ind -0.021 -0.027 -0.021 0.022 -0.032 -0.050
(0.294) (0.351) (0.379) (0.253) (0.488) (0.197)
Ten Yr TIPS Auc Ind 0.027 0.037 0.028 0.027 0.033 0.009
(0.030) (0.375) (0.212) (0.140) (0.079) (0.566)
Inflation Variable
NY Harbor 87 Gasoline -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.008) (0.498) (0.990) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant N/A -0.233 -0.090 0.185 0.347 0.410
N/A (0.023) (0.238) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.673 0.709 0.811 0.804 0.741 0.560
Observations 5860 1172 1172 1172 1172 1172
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Table 3.11: Explaining the Basis: Bear Stearns Rescue by Trade Day
(March 10, 2008 through April 14, 2008)
Time series explanation of the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis both in panel with
fixed effects and individually by tenor. These results include a daily inflation
forecast proxy. Remaining explanatory variables are Liquidity and/or Funding
as described in the text. All results employ Newey-West standard errors robust
to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The number of lags is calculated as
suggested in Newey and West (1994). Panel implementation with fixed effects as
documented in Schaffer (2010) does not report a constant term. Individual tenor
regressions implemented as documented in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2010).
No five year TIPS auction takes place during this event. The p-values for each
coefficient are reported in parenthesis.
Panel Individual Tenors (Yrs)
Variable Fix Eff 2 3 5 7 10
Liquidity Variables
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 1.083 2.183 1.525 1.242 1.159 -0.692
(0.024) (0.061) (0.224) (0.083) (0.025) (0.364)
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd -0.060 -0.109 -0.043 0.001 -0.110 -0.041
(0.109) (0.367) (0.543) (0.986) (0.023) (0.336)
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd -0.920 -0.530 -0.395 -0.689 -2.383 -0.601
(0.003) (0.545) (0.595) (0.248) (0.000) (0.208)
Dealer 5 Yr CDS 0.065 0.041 -0.100 0.122 0.080 0.182
(0.036) (0.549) (0.170) (0.013) (0.029) (0.000)
CPI Rel Ind 0.010 -0.021 0.071 0.008 0.047 -0.054
(0.714) (0.678) (0.207) (0.792) (0.066) (0.112)
Ten Yr TIPS Auc Ind 0.040 0.120 0.070 0.016 -0.017 0.012
(0.125) (0.001) (0.000) (0.165) (0.182) (0.429)
Inflation Variable
NY Harbor 87 Gasoline -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.000
(0.137) (0.331) (0.232) (0.580) (0.001) (0.544)
Constant N/A 0.280 0.715 -0.063 1.013 0.031
N/A (0.498) (0.111) (0.823) (0.001) (0.923)
Adjusted R2 0.188 0.127 -0.034 0.375 0.764 0.587
Observations 125 25 25 25 25 25
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Table 3.12: Explaining the Basis: Lehman Bankruptcy by Trade Day
(September 8, 2008 through October 14, 2008)
Time series explanation of the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis both in panel with
fixed effects and individually by tenor. These results include a daily inflation
forecast proxy. Remaining explanatory variables are Liquidity and/or Funding
as described in the text. All results employ Newey-West standard errors robust
to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The number of lags is calculated as
suggested in Newey and West (1994). Panel implementation with fixed effects as
documented in Schaffer (2010) does not report a constant term. Individual tenor
regressions implemented as documented in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2010).
No five year TIPS auction takes place during this event. No BLS CPI report
is released during this event. The p-values for each coefficient are reported in
parenthesis.
Panel Individual Tenors (Yrs)
Variable Fix Eff 2 3 5 7 10
Liquidity Variables
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run 1.013 0.855 1.116 1.971 0.682 0.442
(0.042) (0.556) (0.295) (0.024) (0.146) (0.574)
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 0.030 0.066 0.050 0.018 -0.001 0.016
(0.459) (0.479) (0.680) (0.817) (0.990) (0.771)
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd 1.324 2.637 1.073 1.437 0.496 0.980
(0.004) (0.025) (0.443) (0.105) (0.426) (0.033)
Dealer 5 Yr CDS 0.011 0.023 -0.024 0.023 0.039 -0.008
(0.675) (0.692) (0.764) (0.673) (0.358) (0.797)
Ten Yr TIPS Auc Ind -0.030 -0.179 -0.102 -0.115 0.171 0.073
(0.558) (0.136) (0.237) (0.107) (0.006) (0.225)
Inflation Variable
NY Harbor 87 Gasoline -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.571) (0.674) (0.459) (0.868) (0.460) (0.577)
Constant N/A 0.613 0.936 0.129 0.403 -0.181
N/A (0.564) (0.218) (0.810) (0.281) (0.746)
Adjusted R2 0.548 0.625 0.473 0.788 0.748 0.134
Observations 120 24 24 24 24 24
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Table 3.13: Explaining the Basis: Deflation Scare by Trade Day (November
12, 2008 through February 27, 2009)
Time series explanation of the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis both in panel with
fixed effects and individually by tenor. These results include a daily inflation
forecast proxy. Remaining explanatory variables are Liquidity and/or Funding
as described in the text. All results employ Newey-West standard errors robust
to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The number of lags is calculated as
suggested in Newey and West (1994). Panel implementation with fixed effects as
documented in Schaffer (2010) does not report a constant term. Individual tenor
regressions implemented as documented in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2010).
No five year TIPS auction takes place during this event. The p-values for each
coefficient are reported in parenthesis.
Panel Individual Tenors (Yrs)
Variable Fix Eff 2 3 5 7 10
Liquidity Variables
10 Yr Treas On/Off Run -2.692 -2.788 -1.934 -3.183 -3.063 -2.491
(0.000) (0.044) (0.073) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
3M GC Repo TBill Sprd 0.937 1.570 1.132 1.213 0.567 0.202
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022)
10 Yr TIPS Bid-Ask Sprd 0.180 0.572 0.097 0.164 0.052 0.016
(0.009) (0.000) (0.508) (0.129) (0.491) (0.867)
Dealer 5 Yr CDS -0.075 0.018 -0.124 -0.080 -0.056 -0.133
(0.269) (0.884) (0.268) (0.463) (0.341) (0.088)
CPI Rel Ind -0.015 -0.081 -0.017 0.031 0.022 -0.029
(0.671) (0.487) (0.741) (0.564) (0.390) (0.416)
Ten Yr TIPS Auc Ind 0.218 0.606 0.245 0.187 0.088 -0.034
(0.008) (0.000) (0.010) (0.008) (0.047) (0.534)
Inflation Variable
NY Harbor 87 Gasoline -0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.005 -0.004 -0.008
(0.170) (0.174) (0.865) (0.041) (0.025) (0.000)
Constant N/A 1.969 2.045 1.929 2.943 3.198
N/A (0.023) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.536 0.573 0.598 0.721 0.713 0.593
Observations 360 72 72 72 72 72
102
F
ig
u
re
3.
1:
In
fl
at
io
n
In
d
ex
ed
S
w
ap
B
as
is
II
S
B
as
is
fr
om
S
ep
te
m
b
er
1,
20
05
th
ro
u
gh
M
ay
25
,
2
0
1
0
fo
r
2
,
5
,
a
n
d
1
0
ye
a
r
te
n
o
rs
.
P
o
si
ti
ve
va
lu
es
re
p
re
se
n
t
In
fl
a
ti
o
n
In
d
ex
ed
S
w
a
p
ra
te
s
in
ex
ce
ss
of
d
er
iv
ed
ca
sh
m
ar
ke
t
b
re
ak
ev
en
in
fl
at
io
n
(B
E
I)
ra
te
a
s
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
in
G
u¨
rk
ay
n
a
k
,
S
a
ck
,
a
n
d
W
ri
g
h
t
(2
0
1
0
).
103
F
ig
u
re
3.
2:
In
fl
at
io
n
In
d
ex
ed
S
w
ap
B
as
is
2
Y
ea
r
T
en
or
In
fl
at
io
n
In
d
ex
ed
S
w
ap
R
at
e
an
d
b
re
ak
ev
en
U
.S
.
T
re
a
su
ry
in
fl
a
ti
o
n
(B
E
I)
co
m
p
en
sa
ti
o
n
va
lu
es
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
n
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
re
a
l
U
.S
.
T
re
a
su
ry
ra
te
co
m
p
on
en
ts
as
d
is
p
la
y
ed
in
eq
u
at
io
n
(3
.5
)
fr
om
th
e
te
x
t.
N
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
re
a
l
ra
te
m
ea
su
re
s
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
in
G
u¨
rk
ay
n
a
k
,
S
a
ck
,
a
n
d
W
ri
g
h
t
(2
0
0
7
)
a
n
d
G
u¨
rk
ay
n
ak
,
S
ac
k
,
an
d
W
ri
gh
t
(2
01
0)
an
d
p
re
se
n
te
d
fr
o
m
S
ep
te
m
b
er
1
,
2
0
0
5
th
ro
u
g
h
M
ay
2
5
,
2
0
1
0
.
R
es
u
lt
in
g
II
S
B
a
si
s
m
ea
su
re
d
a
g
a
in
st
le
ft
si
d
e
ax
is
w
h
il
e
al
l
co
m
p
on
en
ts
m
ea
su
re
d
ag
ai
n
st
ri
g
h
t
si
d
e
a
x
is
.
K
ey
d
a
te
s
a
lo
n
g
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l
a
x
is
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
B
ea
r
S
te
a
rn
s
re
sc
u
e
(M
a
rc
h
1
4
,
2
0
0
8
)
a
n
d
th
e
L
eh
m
an
B
ro
th
er
s
b
an
k
ru
p
tc
y
(S
ep
te
m
b
er
1
5
,
2
0
0
8
).
104
F
ig
u
re
3.
3:
In
fl
at
io
n
In
d
ex
ed
S
w
ap
B
as
is
3
Y
ea
r
T
en
or
In
fl
at
io
n
In
d
ex
ed
S
w
ap
R
at
e
an
d
b
re
ak
ev
en
U
.S
.
T
re
a
su
ry
in
fl
a
ti
o
n
(B
E
I)
co
m
p
en
sa
ti
o
n
va
lu
es
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
n
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
re
a
l
U
.S
.
T
re
a
su
ry
ra
te
co
m
p
on
en
ts
as
d
is
p
la
y
ed
in
eq
u
at
io
n
(3
.5
)
fr
om
th
e
te
x
t.
N
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
re
a
l
ra
te
m
ea
su
re
s
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
in
G
u¨
rk
ay
n
a
k
,
S
a
ck
,
a
n
d
W
ri
g
h
t
(2
0
0
7
)
a
n
d
G
u¨
rk
ay
n
ak
,
S
ac
k
,
an
d
W
ri
gh
t
(2
01
0)
an
d
p
re
se
n
te
d
fr
o
m
S
ep
te
m
b
er
1
,
2
0
0
5
th
ro
u
g
h
M
ay
2
5
,
2
0
1
0
.
R
es
u
lt
in
g
II
S
B
a
si
s
m
ea
su
re
d
a
g
a
in
st
le
ft
si
d
e
ax
is
w
h
il
e
al
l
co
m
p
on
en
ts
m
ea
su
re
d
ag
ai
n
st
ri
g
h
t
si
d
e
a
x
is
.
K
ey
d
a
te
s
a
lo
n
g
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l
a
x
is
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
B
ea
r
S
te
a
rn
s
re
sc
u
e
(M
a
rc
h
1
4
,
2
0
0
8
)
a
n
d
th
e
L
eh
m
an
B
ro
th
er
s
b
an
k
ru
p
tc
y
(S
ep
te
m
b
er
1
5
,
2
0
0
8
).
105
F
ig
u
re
3.
4:
In
fl
at
io
n
In
d
ex
ed
S
w
ap
B
as
is
5
Y
ea
r
T
en
or
In
fl
at
io
n
In
d
ex
ed
S
w
ap
R
at
e
an
d
b
re
ak
ev
en
U
.S
.
T
re
a
su
ry
in
fl
a
ti
o
n
(B
E
I)
co
m
p
en
sa
ti
o
n
va
lu
es
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
n
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
re
a
l
U
.S
.
T
re
a
su
ry
ra
te
co
m
p
on
en
ts
as
d
is
p
la
y
ed
in
eq
u
at
io
n
(3
.5
)
fr
om
th
e
te
x
t.
N
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
re
a
l
ra
te
m
ea
su
re
s
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
in
G
u¨
rk
ay
n
a
k
,
S
a
ck
,
a
n
d
W
ri
g
h
t
(2
0
0
7
)
a
n
d
G
u¨
rk
ay
n
ak
,
S
ac
k
,
an
d
W
ri
gh
t
(2
01
0)
an
d
p
re
se
n
te
d
fr
o
m
S
ep
te
m
b
er
1
,
2
0
0
5
th
ro
u
g
h
M
ay
2
5
,
2
0
1
0
.
R
es
u
lt
in
g
II
S
B
a
si
s
m
ea
su
re
d
a
g
a
in
st
le
ft
si
d
e
ax
is
w
h
il
e
al
l
co
m
p
on
en
ts
m
ea
su
re
d
ag
ai
n
st
ri
g
h
t
si
d
e
a
x
is
.
K
ey
d
a
te
s
a
lo
n
g
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l
a
x
is
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
B
ea
r
S
te
a
rn
s
re
sc
u
e
(M
a
rc
h
1
4
,
2
0
0
8
)
a
n
d
th
e
L
eh
m
an
B
ro
th
er
s
b
an
k
ru
p
tc
y
(S
ep
te
m
b
er
1
5
,
2
0
0
8
).
106
F
ig
u
re
3.
5:
In
fl
at
io
n
In
d
ex
ed
S
w
ap
B
as
is
7
Y
ea
r
T
en
or
In
fl
at
io
n
In
d
ex
ed
S
w
ap
R
at
e
an
d
b
re
ak
ev
en
U
.S
.
T
re
a
su
ry
in
fl
a
ti
o
n
(B
E
I)
co
m
p
en
sa
ti
o
n
va
lu
es
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
n
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
re
a
l
U
.S
.
T
re
a
su
ry
ra
te
co
m
p
on
en
ts
as
d
is
p
la
y
ed
in
eq
u
at
io
n
(3
.5
)
fr
om
th
e
te
x
t.
N
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
re
a
l
ra
te
m
ea
su
re
s
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
in
G
u¨
rk
ay
n
a
k
,
S
a
ck
,
a
n
d
W
ri
g
h
t
(2
0
0
7
)
a
n
d
G
u¨
rk
ay
n
ak
,
S
ac
k
,
an
d
W
ri
gh
t
(2
01
0)
an
d
p
re
se
n
te
d
fr
o
m
S
ep
te
m
b
er
1
,
2
0
0
5
th
ro
u
g
h
M
ay
2
5
,
2
0
1
0
.
R
es
u
lt
in
g
II
S
B
a
si
s
m
ea
su
re
d
a
g
a
in
st
le
ft
si
d
e
ax
is
w
h
il
e
al
l
co
m
p
on
en
ts
m
ea
su
re
d
ag
ai
n
st
ri
g
h
t
si
d
e
a
x
is
.
K
ey
d
a
te
s
a
lo
n
g
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l
a
x
is
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
B
ea
r
S
te
a
rn
s
re
sc
u
e
(M
a
rc
h
1
4
,
2
0
0
8
)
a
n
d
th
e
L
eh
m
an
B
ro
th
er
s
b
an
k
ru
p
tc
y
(S
ep
te
m
b
er
1
5
,
2
0
0
8
).
107
F
ig
u
re
3.
6:
In
fl
at
io
n
In
d
ex
ed
S
w
ap
B
as
is
10
Y
ea
r
T
en
or
In
fl
at
io
n
In
d
ex
ed
S
w
ap
R
at
e
an
d
b
re
ak
ev
en
U
.S
.
T
re
a
su
ry
in
fl
a
ti
o
n
(B
E
I)
co
m
p
en
sa
ti
o
n
va
lu
es
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
n
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
re
a
l
U
.S
.
T
re
a
su
ry
ra
te
co
m
p
on
en
ts
as
d
is
p
la
y
ed
in
eq
u
at
io
n
(3
.5
)
fr
om
th
e
te
x
t.
N
o
m
in
a
l
a
n
d
re
a
l
ra
te
m
ea
su
re
s
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
in
G
u¨
rk
ay
n
a
k
,
S
a
ck
,
a
n
d
W
ri
g
h
t
(2
0
0
7
)
a
n
d
G
u¨
rk
ay
n
ak
,
S
ac
k
,
an
d
W
ri
gh
t
(2
01
0)
an
d
p
re
se
n
te
d
fr
o
m
S
ep
te
m
b
er
1
,
2
0
0
5
th
ro
u
g
h
M
ay
2
5
,
2
0
1
0
.
R
es
u
lt
in
g
II
S
B
a
si
s
m
ea
su
re
d
a
g
a
in
st
le
ft
si
d
e
ax
is
w
h
il
e
al
l
co
m
p
on
en
ts
m
ea
su
re
d
ag
ai
n
st
ri
g
h
t
si
d
e
a
x
is
.
K
ey
d
a
te
s
a
lo
n
g
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l
a
x
is
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
B
ea
r
S
te
a
rn
s
re
sc
u
e
(M
a
rc
h
1
4
,
2
0
0
8
)
a
n
d
th
e
L
eh
m
an
B
ro
th
er
s
b
an
k
ru
p
tc
y
(S
ep
te
m
b
er
1
5
,
2
0
0
8
).
108
CHAPTER 4
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF EVENT STUDIES
There is a developing literature using CDS (Credit Default Swap) spreads
as alternatives to bond price driven measures to study the impact of various
corporate and other events on firms’ credit risk. For example, both Hull, Pre-
descu, and White (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004) examine the impact
of credit rating changes, Jorion and Zhang (2007) examine default driven
contagion within industries, and Greatrex (2009) examines the impact of
earnings announcements. The constant maturity and improved liquidity ad-
vantages of reported CDS spreads make them a natural alternative to bond
prices in the performance of event studies. Given the steadily increasing
availability of CDS spreads to researchers, this avenue of research is likely
to grow. However, it is unclear how best to specify such tests. Should the
measure of spread change be absolute or relative changes which are closer to
returns? Are derived sample mean adjusted spread change measures suitable
or should a market index spread be used to calculate firm adjusted spread
measures? Are sample adjusted approaches superior to market model mea-
sures or are they used simply because of a preference for cross-sectional event
analysis as opposed to the traditional observation and event period approach?
In this work we carry out Monte Carlo experiments to study the size of
tests and their power against reasonable alternatives. We find that relative
spread changes have better distributional behavior than absolute changes
for portfolio sample size of 200 firms or less. We also find that for a large
enough source dataset, sample based measures provide the best results for
event studies whether the number of available firms that meet the study’s
constraints for inclusion is large or small and whether the event period is
long or short. In circumstances where the researcher either lacks a large
dataset or wishes to simplify his or her problem by relying upon a market
index we recommend the spread between the Moody’s BAA index over the
ten year constant maturity “off-the-run” U.S. Treasury curve as calculated
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and produced in Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007). This is true whether
the firms under consideration are investment grade, non-investment grade or
a mix of both.
This work is the first we know of to evaluate event study methodologies
explicitly with CDS spreads at the daily time interval. Another contribution
is to evaluate various credit market index measures and their comparative
use in an event study setting. This is the first comparative study of different
measures of spread change and their distributional behavior. It provides
practical advice for implementing a CDS based event study in consideration
of the scope and size of the researcher’s source data as well as the number of
firms that meet his or her criteria for inclusion in the study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
and generalizes the methodologies employed in existing empirical work. Sec-
tion 3 provides a review of our data and describes the methodologies to be
tested with our Monte Carlo experiments. Section 4 reviews the results and
their implications for the performance of event studies and Section 5 con-
cludes.
4.1 Existing CDS Event Study Approaches
Brown and Warner (1980) and Brown and Warner (1985) examined event
study approaches for stock returns at monthly (1980) and daily (1985) time
intervals. Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) recently assessed
event study methodologies utilizing bond returns. While Bessembinder,
Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) focused upon the monthly time interval,
they include some results for daily bond returns using TRACE (Trade Re-
porting and Compliance Engine) data. Event studies employing CDS to date
have relied upon spread changes rather than returns. This is presumably due
to the difficulty of measuring CDS returns.1 Recent studies also employ a
methodology that relies upon cross-sectional evaluation of a given event ex-
amination window as opposed to the differing observation and event window
approach relied upon in Brown and Warner (1980) and Brown and Warner
1The measurement of CDS return from the perspective of the buyer or seller of protec-
tion depends upon the successive mark-to-market process for a CDS contract of a given
tenor over a period for which the CDS return is desired. The mark-to-market process is
complex. For a detailed overview please consult chapter 16 of Bomfim (2005).
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(1985). One of the benefits of the cross-sectional window evaluation is that
it permits event induced changes in firm variance processes to be accounted
for in any statistical tests of the window period spread changes. Ignorance
of such change is a drawback of relying upon the observation period driven
standard deviation of event period cumulative adjusted or abnormal spread
changes. However, the elimination of observation period data from consid-
eration should reduce statistical power, particularly for small sample sizes.
While market model approaches are not precluded in such a methodology,
most of the existing empirical studies have not used them.
In one CDS based event study examination of the effects of firm rating
changes, Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) create rating agency rating aver-
age spread indices for major investment grade ratings assigned by Moody’s.2
These rating based mean levels are used to adjust the level of the CDS spread
for each firm of similar rating. The resulting difference is called an “adjusted
spread observation.” Mean firm “adjusted spread changes” by rating cate-
gory over a series of windows adjacent to and including the event itself are
then examined cross-sectionally. Norden and Weber (2004) do something
very similar but expand their rating agency sources to include Fitch and
S&P (Standard & Poor’s) in addition to Moody’s. Jorion and Zhang (2007)
introduce cumulative spread changes (CSC) by industry using three digit
SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) code over a given event window. An
industry portfolio is an equally weighted index. They supplement these with
cumulative abnormal spread change (CASC) utilizing a similar procedure to
both Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004) at the
firm level using S&P ratings at both investment grade and non-investment
grade ratings.3 Both industry cumulative spread changes and industry cu-
mulative abnormal spread changes are examined cross-sectionally over all
industries for measurement of sample mean and standard deviation. Finally,
Greatrex (2009) builds on these efforts in a study of CDS reactions to firm
earnings announcements. She uses S&P data but collapses all non-investment
2They create the average daily index level by examining the firms in their sample. The
two highest Moody’s ratings Aaa and Aa are combined to make three different Moody’s
investment grade cohorts including the A and Baa ratings.
3While not called cumulative per se, the changes calculated in both Hull, Predescu, and
White (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004) are cumulative by definition. The inclusion
of non-investment grade firms by Jorion and Zhang (2007) results in 5 S&P based rating
categories: AAA/AA, A, BBB, BB, and B and below.
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grade ratings into a single category. Besides reporting results consistent with
the approaches in the previous three papers, she introduces the market model
approach as well as introducing several model variations we will return to
later in this section.
All four papers utilize absolute spread changes adjusted for an index mea-
sure generated from the sample data whether this be an equal weighted
change by rating agency rating, all firms in the sample or a sample industry
average.4 While the papers use “adjusted” and “abnormal” for resulting ab-
solute spread changes adjusted by a sample index spread change, the method-
ologies are quite similar. For the remainder of this paper we will reserve the
term “abnormal” for the difference between actual and market model pre-
dicted spread changes, whether absolute or relative. Thus, we term all of the
aforementioned approaches as adjusted spread change approaches. For any
defined sample derived or market observed index level and firm i’s CDS level
at times t1 and t2 we introduce a cumulative adjusted spread change for firm
i, (CAdjSCi,[t1,t2]):
CAdjSCi,[t1,t2] = [CDSi,t2 − CDSi,t1 ]− [Indext2 − Indext1 ] (4.1)
Greatrex (2009) next introduces market model approaches where the market
index is first, the mean daily change of all firms in her sample and second, the
mean daily for each of her four S&P rating levels. Thus, letting αi represent
the intercept term and βi represent the slope, her market model approach
for firm i at time t appears as:
∆CDSi,t = αi + βi∆Market Indext + it (4.2)
This is fit over her observation period of 250 trading days prior to the first of
her examination windows.5 She then produces what we will term cumulative
abnormal spread changes for firm i, (CAbnSCi,[t1,t2]) with the estimated OLS
4Greatrex (2009) mentions in a footnote that relative spread changes produce similar
results in her study.
5She utilizes an announcement window interval of [-1,+1] trading days around her event
date and both pre- and post-announcement windows of [-20,-2] and [+2,+20] trading days.
Thus her observation period is [-270,-21] days relative to the event day.
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coefficients for firm i between time t1 and t2 of
CAbnSCi,[t1,t2] = [CDSi,t2−CDSi,t1 ]−αˆi−βˆi[Market Indext2−Market Indext1 ]
(4.3)
As already mentioned, all four papers utilize absolute spread changes and
Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) emphasize the poor small sample proper-
ties of absolute spread changes in electing to use bootstrap approaches to
measure the statistical significance of event and other period mean cumula-
tive adjusted spread changes.6 We introduce continuously compounded rela-
tive spread changes by taking the natural logarithm of the firm CDS spread
before differencing similar to measuring a return with equity prices. While
these changes are not returns, the measure has been used in other empirical
work utilizing CDS spreads.7 Consistent with Brown and Warner (1985),
we utilize the observation and event period approach but in addition to the
variations in adjusted spread measures found in the preceding papers, we
implement market model alternatives similar to Greatrex (2009). We further
introduce investment grade market index spread measures to both adjusted
and market model performance measures. These and other parameter choices
are described in the next section.
4.2 Data and Methodology
As already mentioned, we subsume the existing approaches and expand to
consider other parameter choices in the use of CDS in event studies. We uti-
lize distinct observation and event periods as described in MacKinlay (1997)
in order to expand our available models to include market model approaches.
Further, we consider both absolute daily changes in spread as well as relative
changes in spread utilizing the daily difference in the natural logarithm of
spreads. For our base case performance measures, we examine four adjusted
spread and three market model approaches and include one market index,
6Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) emphasize the positive skewness and large kurtosis
measures consistent with the findings in this work.
7Note that a positive percentage change in the credit spread amounts to a price decline
in a fixed income security so a negative change is a positive return for a long position.
Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Anderson (2009) are examples of papers utilizing the
change in the natural logarithm of the spread over time periods as a measure of spread
change.
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the spread between Moody’s BAA seasoned investment grade bond index
and the 10 year LIBOR swap rate. We expand our market index choices
later in the paper. We vary the number of firms in our random samples from
20 to 50 to 200.
All of our firm CDS data is collected from Markit Partners utilizing the five
year tenor for $US senior unsecured reference obligations with the modified
restructuring contract form that is standard within North America. While
some of our firms are Canadian, the vast majority are U.S. based. This
provides us with approximately 800 firms with spread change data between
January 3, 2001 and April 16, 2007.8 This produces a total of 681,130 firm
trading day changes which is reported in Table 4.1 along with other summary
measures of the data. Along with each daily firm CDS level at the five
year tenor, Markit also reports the firm average rating of both Moody’s and
Standard and Poors adjusted by seniority and any notches. These average
ratings are used to divide the data into investment/non-investment grade
buckets as well as specific ratings from AAA down to D for default. These
divisions are reported in Table 4.1. While the top line breaks out the total
records, the ensuing four lines report statistics regarding distinct firms per
trading day over the life of the sample. The number of firms with reported
day over day changes grows from 41 at the start of the dataset on January 3,
2001 to a maximum of 681 on December 15, 2005 and then declines to a figure
of 582 by April 16, 2007. The ensuing columns break out the data by specific
rating grade buckets. In nearly all cases at least 3 firms are always present
in any rating category save for default, D. All of the measures in this column
represent observations of Delta Airlines, which is dropped from the data as its
spread values are very large and with only one firm its rating specific adjusted
and market model measures would be meaningless. The ensuing two sections
present the two spread change measures which are studied in the paper. The
first section depicts daily changes in natural logarithm of spread. Depicting
firm spread level at time, t, as st, the log spread differences section represents
8The exact number of firms varies with the required observation period length and the
population requirement in terms of minimum observed daily changes and minimum non-
zero changes for a given firm observation period. The actual data begin date is January
2, 2001, but a change measure (either absolute or relative) requires two successive trading
days.
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daily change measures calculated as follows:
∆sLn[t−1,t] = Ln(CDSt/CDSt−1) = Ln(CDSt)− Ln(CDSt−1) (4.4)
The values in this section are in percentage form. Thus a 0.01 measure
represents a 1% 1 day increase in spread calculated on a continuous basis.
While the median change in all categories is 0 or no change, the majority of
the mean changes are slightly negative indicating a slight spread tightening
on average. Note the growing kurtosis as one declines in rating agency rating.
The last section of Table 4.1 displays the daily differences on an absolute
basis. Using the same variable definitions from equation (4.4), this would be
represented as follows:
∆sAbs[t−1,t] = CDSt − CDSt−1 (4.5)
The results within this section are measured in absolute basis points where
0.01 is a 1 bp actual increase in spread. Thus, the mean one day absolute
change in spread for a noninvestment grade firm is a decline of 1/25 of a basis
point. Note the dramatic size of the kurtosis values for most rating agency
rating measures.
4.2.1 Base Case Performance Measures: Adjusted Spread
Methods
Given our spread change definitions, we move on to the base case performance
measures we will analyze in the initial results. They are a combination of
the measures introduced in existing empirical event studies and the method-
ology approach taken in Brown and Warner (1985). The four methods are
1. firm specific mean adjusted spread results, 2. spreads adjusted by the
mean change measure (absolute or relative) of all firms in our dataset for a
given trading day, 3. spreads adjusted by the rating agency rating specific
mean spread change measure in our dataset, and 4. spreads adjusted by the
change in the market index spread where we define the index as the spread
between the Moody’s BAA seasoned investment grade bond index and the
10 year LIBOR swap rate.
We begin with the firm mean adjusted measure. Define a spread change
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measure (either logarithmic or absolute) for a two day period ending in day t
for firm i as ∆si,t. Define an event period beginning on day T0 and lasting for
k trading days as [T0, Tk−1]. The observation period lasting j trading days
is defined as [T−j, T−1]. Given firm i of an n firm sample randomly selected
from a population of N firms, firm i has a mean observation period spread
change of ∆si,Obs:
9
∆si,Obs =
1
j
−j∑
t=−1
∆si,[t−1,t] (4.6)
This may then be used to measure the cumulative event period mean adjusted
spread change for firm i:
∆si,EvAdj =
k−1∑
t=0
∆si,[t−1,t] −∆si,Obs (4.7)
We can further combine the observation period spread changes from equation
(4.6) over all N firms as follows to create ∆sObs:
10
∆sObs =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∆si,Obs (4.9)
We can then employ this new mean measure by substituting into equation
(4.7) to produce a cumulative event period all firm mean adjusted spread
change for firm i:
∆sAlli,EvAdj =
k−1∑
t=0
∆si,[t−1,t] −∆sObs (4.10)
9We assume in the firm specific equations that the firm will not have missing spread
change observations to simplify the notation. In fact most firms will have one or more
missing observations in an observation period. We address this in footnotes to the portfolio
equations. One could consider that firm i has j spread change observations over a k
observation day window and equation (4.6) will be correct summing only over the observed
changes.
10It may not be the case that all firms will have observed changes over all trading days
of the observation period as will be discussed later in this section. In this case, N in
equation (4.9) will be the maximum of the Nt firms populated on each trading day t of
the observation period and equation (4.9) may be further specified as
∆sObs =
1
j
−j∑
t=−1
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
∆si,[t−1,t] (4.8)
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We can further this approach to create a rating agency rating mean adjusted
spread change. The first step is to calculate a rating specific mean spread
change over an observation period where there are NR firms for R rating
grades. Replacing the values in equation (4.9) as needed gives us:11
∆sRObs =
1
NR
NR∑
i=1
∆si,Obs (4.12)
and then, similar to equation (4.10), calculate the cumulative event period
rating adjusted spread change for firm i:
∆sRi,EvAdj =
k−1∑
t=0
∆si,[t−1,t] −∆sRObs (4.13)
Next, we substitute a market index measure for use in producing our firm
adjusted spread changes. The index we utilize is the spread between the
Moody’s BAA seasoned bond index yield and the 10 year LIBOR swap rate.12
If we designate the daily change on day t in this measure as ∆sBAALIBOR[t−1,t] ,
we may simply replace the daily mean observation period change in spread
for all firms in equation (4.10) to produce a similar cumulative event period
index adjusted spread change for firm i as:
∆sBAALIBORi,EvAdj =
k−1∑
t=0
∆si,[t−1,t] −∆sBAALIBOR[t−1,t] (4.14)
11Similar to the previous footnote, it may not be the case that all firms in a given rating
class will have observed changes over all trading days of the observation period. Thus, NR
in equation (4.12) will be the maximum of the NRt firms populated on each trading day
t of the observation period and equation (4.12) may be further specified as
∆sRObs =
1
j
−j∑
t=−1
1
NRt
NRt∑
i=1
∆si,[t−1,t] (4.11)
12We will supplement this measure with other indices later in this section. Both the
Moody’s measure and the LIBOR swap rate measure are reported on the daily H.15
Statistical release of the Federal Reserve Board. See http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/h15/update/
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4.2.2 Base Case Performance Measures: Market Model
Methods
We now consider market model approaches to these methods, excluding the
firm specific mean adjusted spread change in equation (4.7). In these methods
we perform an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of firm i’s raw spread
changes on the daily spread change of either a sample derived measure or the
market index over the observation period. Our target measures are 1. the
observation period daily mean spread change of all firms in our dataset, 2.
the rating agency rating mean daily spread change of all firms in our dataset
rated as the firm in question, and 3. the daily change in a market index,
the spread between the Moody’s BAA Seasoned Bond index and the 10 year
LIBOR swap rate.13 Let us designate the resulting market model parameters
as αˆ for the constant and βˆ for the slope term where we will define each
performance measure with a descriptive subscript on the two parameters.
Our resulting market model event period abnormal spread changes for firm i
are calculated as follows. For the all firm mean abnormal spread change, we
require the all firm mean spread change for each trading day t of the event
period, ∆sAllEvt , as follows:
14
∆sAllEvt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∆si,[t−1,t] (4.15)
With this measure we can then produce the all firm cumulative event abnor-
mal spread change for firm i, ∆sAlli,EvAbn:
∆sAlli,EvAbn =
k−1∑
t=0
∆si,[t−1,t] − αˆAll − βˆAll∆sAllEvt (4.16)
In a similar fashion we can repeat the calculations for all firms in each rating
agency rating class, R, in order to calculate the cumulative firm rating mean
13Recall that change may be either relative in the form of log spread differences or
absolute spread changes.
14Note that the same caveats for measuring such dataset wide measures in the presence
of missing data that were discussed in the last section apply to these event day measures as
calculated in equation (4.15) and equation (4.17). Further, as all of our observation period
measures were daily to include means over both time and firm dimensions and the majority
of our event measures will be cumulative to include means over the firm dimension, we
introduce a notation difference, Evt, to refer to a specific event day calculation.
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abnormal spread change for the event period. First calculate the rating
specific mean spread change of the NR firms of that rating over each trading
day t of the event period, ∆sREvt , as follows:
∆sREvt =
1
NR
NR∑
i=1
∆si,[t−1,t] (4.17)
With this measure we can then produce the firm rating cumulative event
abnormal spread change of firm i, ∆sRi,EvAbn:
∆sRi,EvAbn =
k−1∑
t=0
∆si,[t−1,t] − αˆR − βˆR∆sREvt (4.18)
Finally for the market model using the BAA LIBOR spread, we can proceed
directly to the resulting firm BAA LIBOR cumulative event abnormal spread
change for firm i, ∆sBAALIBORi,EvAbn :
∆sBAALIBORi,EvAbn =
k−1∑
t=0
∆si,[t−1,t] − αˆBAALIBOR − βˆBAALIBOR∆sBAALIBOR[t−1,t] (4.19)
4.2.3 Monte Carlo Experiments
With these seven base case measures defined, we review 1. the Monte Carlo
approach for their generation via random samples and 2. the statistical
evaluation of those sample results for assessing event study methods utilizing
CDS changes. Let n represent the number of firms in a sample portfolio
where we will use values of 20, 50 and 200 for n. The creation of a sample
entails generating a random set of n firm-event day pairs over the scope
of our dataset of firms between the dates January 3, 2001 and April 16,
2007. Both our selected observation period length and event period length
will act to restrict the random event day choice. For a given firm-event day
pair, we will examine the firm’s CDS changes for our event day ± an event
window width along with a trailing observation period immediately prior
to the start of the resulting event window. For example, given an event
day T0 and a window width of 5 trading days, our event period would be
[T−5, T+5]. For a 100 trading day observation period our observation window
would be [T−105, T−6]. As all of our firms are not fully populated with CDS
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data throughout all possible trading days, it is necessary to define minimum
population rules. We require that any event period be fully populated for a
randomly selected firm-event day pair and a target event window length. For
a 100 day observation period, we require at least 30 populated one day spread
changes and that at least 20 of these be non-zero changes.15 The resulting
process will be to randomly select a firm-event day pair and confirm the firm
has populated change measures for all of the event window surrounding the
randomly selected event day. Next the number of changes in the observation
period are counted and examined for size of change. If the event window is
fully populated, enough changes occur in the observation period and enough
of these are non-zero, the firm’s observation and event period raw spread
change measures are stored and the next random potential member of the
sample is chosen. If the firm-event day pair fails these tests it is returned and
another potential member of the sample is generated. Once n firm-event day
pairs are selected that meet all tests, the sample is complete and we begin
construction of the next sample. Once we have produced all 2,500 samples
statistical evaluation may begin.
Our statistical analysis assumes that adjusted or abnormal event spread
changes are IID normal. We combine them into portfolio mean measures
for n firms and evaluate the mean measures through evaluation of similar
portfolio mean measures collected over the observation period interval.16 As
noted in Brown and Warner (1985), the portfolio means accommodate cross-
sectional dependence in the firm-specific excess returns.17 Let us generalize
the results in the previous section and define a firm event period cumulative
change whether adjusted or abnormal as ∆si,Ev. We define the portfolio
15Brown and Warner (1985) require at least thirty equity return measures for their 252
day observation period. As our data is subject to infrequent updating for some firms in the
initial years of 2001 and 2002, we require at least 20 non-zero changes to prevent inclusion
of firms with nothing more than a lengthy repetition of the same reported CDS spread.
16As we will review shortly, we calculate the daily standard deviation of observation
period portfolio mean spread changes in order to form t-statistics.
17Brown and Warner (1985) examined portfolio mean equity excess returns while we ex-
amine portfolio mean adjusted or mean abnormal spread changes permitting those changes
to be absolute or logarithmic.
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cumulative event mean spread change for n firms as:18
∆sEv =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∆si,Ev (4.20)
To assess this measure, we need to calculate its standard deviation by
utilizing the observation period values for the n firms that compose this
sample portfolio. We begin with equation (4.6) for firm i’s mean observation
period spread change. We define the daily standard deviation for firm i over
a j trading day observation period as SDi,j and calculate it as follows:
19
SDi,j =
√√√√ 1
j − 1
−j∑
t=−1
(
∆si,[t−1,t] −∆si,Obs
)2
(4.21)
For the sample portfolio we require the standard deviation of the portfolio’s
daily mean change measure over the observation period of j trading days
which we define as SDj. We begin by calculating the mean change measure
over all firms and all observations days which we define as ∆sObs:
20
∆sObs =
1
jn
−j∑
t=−1
n∑
i=1
∆si,[t−1,t] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∆si,Obs (4.23)
We can now calculate SDj in an analogous fashion to equation (4.21) where
we designate the number of firms in sample size n that are populated on
18As we require all event periods to be fully populated for all randomly selected firms
in our samples there is no need to consider missing data in these calculations. Note that
mean results for event period measures are mean in the firm dimension as they are already
cumulative in the time dimension.
19Once again we note that this formula does not address missing values in the observation
period of firm i and note that if we consider j observed changes in an observation period
of length k, the formula is correct and the notation less complex.
20As in the previous footnote and those for equation (4.9) and equation (4.12) it may
be the case that we have missing information resulting in all firms not being populated on
a given trading day. To address this we designate the number of firms in sample size n
that are populated on trading day t as nt and specify equation (4.23) as
∆sObs =
1
j
−j∑
t=−1
1
nt
nt∑
i=1
∆si,[t−1,t] (4.22)
The rightmost equality term of equation (4.23) subsumes this issue in firm i’s mean ob-
servation spread change measure ∆si,Obs as noted in the footnote to equation (4.6).
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trading day t as nt:
SDj =
√√√√ 1
j − 1
−j∑
t=−1
(
1
nt
nt∑
i=1
∆si,[t−1,t] −∆sObs
)2
(4.24)
With this measure, we are able to form a t-statistic for the portfolio mean
cumulative spread change, whether adjusted or abnormal, calculated in equa-
tion (4.20) as follows where we adjust the standard deviation of the portfolio
mean daily observation period spread changes for the k trading day event
period:
∆sEv√
kSDj
∼ t(j − 1) (4.25)
We are able to repeatedly produce random n firm samples portfolios s times
to produce a collection of t-statistics for each choice of n. Examination of
these t-statistics will indicate the behavior of our event study under our cho-
sen parameter values. First we examine them under the null hypothesis that
there is no abnormal spread change when we have not introduced one. This
is also known as a size test. We use a 5% tail and separately examine both
the left and right sides of the distribution. Under a Bernoulli 5% population
measure, we can establish a confidence interval for both of these tails to indi-
cate whether our results are well specified under a size test. We designate the
standard deviation of a Bernoulli random variable with p% chance of success
and s trials as SDBernoulli:
SDBernoulli =
√
p(1− p)
s
(4.26)
and we can establish a 95% two tailed confidence interval under a normal
distribution by establishing±1.96 standard deviations around our population
measure of 5%. Thus, with a 5% tail measure for our size test and 2,500 trials,
our interval is (4.15%, 5.85%) and each of our experiments are well specified
if either the right or left tailed tests of the unadjusted performance measures
are within this interval.
We next examine the power of our tests by inducing abnormal spread
changes of varying size into our t-statistics and repeating our test of the
null that there is no abnormal spread change at the 5% level of significance.
We again examine both the left tail for spread declines and the right tail
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for spread increases. All other things being equal, the test with the larger
likelihood of rejection is more powerful and constitutes a better methodology
choice in an event study setting.
4.2.4 Extensions to the Base Case
Our base case parameters have consisted of 7 performance measures under
two types of daily spread change (logarithmic and absolute). Further, we have
considered 3 sample portfolio sizes of 20, 50, and 200 firms over a 100 day
observation period and a single event day. There are many other parameters
we may vary in our experiments. We begin by expanding the event period
from 1 trading day to 11 trading days, where the abnormal spread change is
introduced on a random day within the event interval.
We also extend our choices for the market index from the base case of
Moody’s BAA seasoned bond index spread over 10 year LIBOR swap rate
to its spread over the 10 year U.S. Treasury rate. We use the 10 year point
of an ’off-the-run’ U.S. Treasury curve as generated in Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and
Wright (2007).21 We also include a third index choice, the North American
Investment Grade CDX index, an equal weighted average of 125 firms’ senior
unsecured CDS spreads at the five year tenor reported by Markit Partners.22
As all three of these index measures are investment grade, we may further
break out our results to include all firms, investment grade only firms and
non-investment grade firms. This will permit us to examine the importance
of the rating agency rating and credit quality of the index constituents.
21This curve is free of the ’on-the-run’ excess liquidity phenomena in the U.S. Treasury
curve resulting from the tendency of the most recent issues to trade on “special” in the
repo market. It is calculated and provided by the Federal Reserve and is available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm
22Note that the availability for this data begins later than our remaining sources and is
only available beginning September 28, 2004. The tendency of the single firm CDS data
to increase in population by firm as we progress through the data alleviates the impact
of this restriction to some extent. For the CDX data see http://www.markit.com/en/
products/data/indices/credit-and-loan-indices/cdx/cdx-prices-iframe.page?
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4.3 Results
We begin our analysis of the results by reproducing the first 3 tables
of Brown and Warner (1985).23 Table 4.2 is an examination of the time
series behavior of the randomly selected sample firm-event day pairs during
their observation periods. The 100 trading day observation period daily
spread changes (both logarithmic and absolute) of 200 firms in each of 2,500
samples are examined statistically for minimum, maximum and other values
as reported in the table. The mean values of the 500,000 measures for each
statistic are reported. Both the raw unadjusted firm spread change measures
and each of the 7 base case performance measures are provided. The results
for the different spread change measures are not very dissimilar. Recall that
the units differ with 0.01 representing a 1% spread increase in the upper panel
and an absolute spread increase of 1 basis point in the lower panel. Most of
the measures display large kurtosis compared to the Gaussian distribution
value of 3. The performance measure closest to a Gaussian distribution in
either panel is the BAA LIBOR spread adjusted observation period change
measure.
In Table 4.3 the cross sectional behavior of the 1 event day portfolio mean
spread change is examined by portfolio size. These results comprised panel
B of Table 1 in Brown and Warner (1985). Whereas Table 4.2 reported the
mean values of the statistical measures for each observation period from all
randomly selected firm-event day pairs, in this table each sample portfolio
mean spread change is stored and all 2,500 means for each of the tested
sample sizes of 20, 50 and 200 firms are analyzed by spread change and
performance measure. By the central limit theorem, the behavior of the
sample portfolios will ultimately converge to Gaussian when enough firms are
included. As may be seen by examination of the table, the convergence rate
of relative changes (log differences) is much faster than absolute differences
for any of the 7 performance measures or the raw unadjusted changes. For
the 200 firm samples in particular, the relative changes in the upper panel
seem quite close to Gaussian behavior while the absolute changes in the lower
panel still display 2 digit kurtosis measures. The small sample results (20
firms) for relative changes are still far from normal, however, with positive
23We split the first table of Brown and Warner (1985) into two tables, one for each of
their panels for observation period time series and event period cross sectional behavior.
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skew and kurtosis values close to six for all performance measures save for
the BAA Libor Spread Adjusted portfolio mean changes.
Table 4.4 extends the results of Table 4.3 by taking the portfolio mean per-
formance measures and forming test statistics. These are comprised of the
ratio of the portfolio mean changes to their observation period driven stan-
dard deviations. A 100 trading day observation period and a single event
day are used. The purpose of this table is to provide further results regard-
ing the behavior of the test statistics. If the observation period portfolio
mean performance measure changes are IID normal, then the test statistic is
distributed Student-t. With 100 observations, the resulting Student-t distri-
bution with 99 degrees of freedom should begin to approach standard normal
behavior. Examining the upper panel as to whether the test statistics ap-
pear to be normally distributed, we see mean and standard deviations close
to (0,1) but the skew and kurtosis values are well away from (0,3) until we
get to the larger 200 firm samples. The reported p-value for the t-test of
the mean being zero is only rejected for the 200 firm samples of the Firm
Mean Adjusted and BAA Libor Spread Market Model performance measures.
These measures are biased towards widening spread. For the absolute spread
changes in the lower panel we find much more obvious non-normal behavior
to include positive skewness and very large kurtosis consistent with the prior
table and the statements favoring the bootstrapping methodology in Hull,
Predescu, and White (2004).
Our size and power test results begin with Table 4.5. Size of test measures
ascertain the likelihood of rejection at a given level of statistical significance,
5% in our case. As there is potential skewness, we test both tails of the
test statistic distribution similar to Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu
(2009). Note that for enough random samples without abnormal performance
and no assymetry in results we would expect to find a rejection rate consis-
tent with our significance level of 5%. Consistent with Brown and Warner
(1985) we calculate the standard deviation of a a Bernoulli variable as in
equation (4.26) to produce a two tail 95% level confidence interval for our
experiments utilizing a 5% population assumption for the Bernoulli likeli-
hood of rejection. This interval, also reported in all the size and power test
tables, is (4.15,5.85) and will guide our analysis of the size test results.24 Our
24Note that Brown and Warner (1985) use a 5% level in either tail for the Bernoulli
equivalent to a two tail 90% confidence interval. In essence, they use ±1.645 standard
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size test results are found in the center of the table under the two columns
lacking an introduction of abnormal performance (labeled 0 or zero). From
a right tail perspective nearly all of the performance measures at any sample
size are well specified for the size test. However, from the left tail perspective,
most are not rejected often enough with exceptions in the All Firm Mean
Market Model and the Firm Rating Mean Market Model performance mea-
sures for portfolio sample sizes of at least 50 firms. Proceeding to the power
tests with introduced abnormal relative changes of between 10 and 200 basis
points per day in either positive or negative change we find increasing power
with sample size and abnormal change magnitude just as we would expect.
Recall that statistical power represents a greater likelihood of rejecting the
null of no abnormal change when in fact abnormal change is present. There
is limited increased power for small positive changes of 10 or 25 basis points
compared to similar size declines. Across performance measure approaches,
the BAA Libor Spread Adjusted model performs much worse than the other
six measures for sample size of 20 to 50 firms for either spread increases or
decreases.
In Table 4.6 we modify the spread change measure of Table 4.5 by intro-
ducing absolute spread changes in place of relative. Beginning with the size
test, we see the same asymmetric behavior as in the prior table. However, in
this case, we begin to see too many rejections for sample sizes of 200 in three
of the performance measures from the right tail perspective. The BAA Li-
bor Spread Adjusted, All Firm Mean Market Model and Firm Rating Mean
Market Model all exceed the upper bound of 5.85% for our 95% confidence
interval. From the left tail perspective, the rejection measures are too low
in most cases for sample sizes of 50 or less. We introduce absolute spread
change abnormal performance ranging from 1 to 20 basis points in either
direction. These are not directly comparable to the previous table but we
see fairly significant power for the introduction of a 1 basis point abnormal
spread change in either direction. Just as in the last table, the BAA Li-
bor Spread Adjusted performance measure is demonstrably less powerful for
smaller moves, one or two basis points in either direction. For larger moves
there is no obvious favorite and power is comparable across both performance
measures and in either direction of spread change. Given the questionable
deviation in either direction while we use ±1.96.
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behavior of absolute spread change measures in the initial tables, we only
explore relative change measures in the ensuing results.
We return to log spread differences in Table 4.7 but introduce an 11 day
event window. In modeling the event on a cumulative basis, the abnormal
change is treated as if it occurred randomly on any one of the event days.
For the size test we note high rejection rates for the right tail of several
tests such as the BAA Libor Spread Market Model at any portfolio size.
In marked contrast the BAA Libor Spread Adjusted performance measure
displays rejection rates that are too low at any of the three tested portfolio
sizes. In seeking an explanation we turn back to Table 4.4 and examine
the mean values for the test statistics of the BAA Libor Spread Adjusted
and BAA Libor Spread Market Model. Note that the highest positive mean
value for the test statistics of any performance measure is the latter and the
most negative is the former. When we aggregate this measure over the event
window it is not surprising that we would get end up with an aggregated
positive value without the introduction of abnormal changes for the BAA
Libor Spread Market Model. Likewise, the BAA Libor Spread Adjusted
model with a tendency to negative measures would aggregate to a smaller
value leading to fewer right tail rejections. This is exactly what we find in
Table 4.7. The most well behaved performance measures for the longer event
window of 11 days are the All Firm Mean Adjusted and the Firm Rating
Mean Adjusted measures for 50 and 200 firm samples.
Beginning with Table 4.8 we examine different choices for the market in-
dex beyond the BAA Libor spread we have worked with to this point. We
introduce a BAA Treasury spread and the Markit Partners’ CDX index.25
In this table we examine portfolios comprised of all of our firms whether
investment grade or non-investment grade and model them by one of the
three investment grade index proxies in either adjusted or market model
form. Examining the size tests first we see only one incidence where both
the left and right tail fall within our 95% confidence interval for rejection,
the BAA Treasury Spread Adjusted measure for a portfolio of 200 firms. In
most cases our right tail has too many rejections and our left tail too few.
This asymmetry is further complicated by another observation. Both tail
rejection rates increase with portfolio size. Thus, larger samples are poorly
25Index measures were described in detail in Section 4.2.4.
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specified for the size test on the right tail while small size samples with low
rejection rates are poorly specified for the size test on the left side tail. This
leaves us with a difficult choice as regards sample size for the optimal test.
As regards tests of power between the performance measures, the market
models consistently outperform the adjusted measures for increasing spread.
For decreasing spread the BAA Treasury Spread Adjusted model is nearly as
good as the market models. To better understand these measures, we split
our data into investment grade and non-investment grade only sub-samples
and repeat our experiments. The results are presented in the ensuing two
tables.
In Table 4.9 we produce random sample portfolios from investment grade
firms only. We expect better results here given that our three market index
measures are entirely composed of investment grade firms as well. The BAA
Treasury Spread Adjusted measure provides the best results for the size test
with both tails falling within our 95% confidence interval for all three portfo-
lio sample sizes. Most of our remaining size test results suffer from the same
problem as the last table, too few rejections on the left tail and too many on
the right. One difference, however, is that the rejection problems increase on
both sides with portfolio size. Our worst case is the BAA Libor Spread Mar-
ket Model where we only reject 2.8% of the 2,500 samples on the left tail but
reject 8.36% of them on the right tail, both measures well outside our confi-
dence interval for a well specified model. As regards the tests for power, most
performance measures save for the BAA Treasury Spread Adjusted measure
are skewed to the right tail showing greater likelihood of rejection for positive
abnormal changes than negative ones, at least for changes in magnitude less
than 100 bp. The phenomena is more pronounced for larger portfolio sample
sizes. The CDX Adjusted measure is the most pronounced in this regard.
For large moves in either direction, the market model measures show the
most power, although the BAA Treasury Spread Adjusted measure achieves
similar power for abnormal spread declines, similar to its performance in the
previous table.
Table 4.10 complements the investment grade results in the prior table
through size and power test examination of randomly selected samples drawn
from non-investment grade firms. Performance is problematic for all mea-
sures from a left tail perspective of spread declines. Not a single size test
of any portfolio sample size is close to exceeding the left side confidence in-
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terval limit of 4.15% for a well specified model. For the right tail size test,
most of the measures produce acceptable rejection frequencies save for the
large portfolio sizes of the CDX Adjusted and BAA Libor Spread Market
Model performance measures. Power tests are skewed to the right consistent
with the size tests. Power is greater for all measures and all porfolio sizes
for spread increases compared to similar magnitude spread decreases. This
becomes less pronounced with larger magnitude changes.
To put all of these results into an integrated set of recommendations we
begin by favoring relative spread changes over absolute ones given the more
Gaussian behavior of relative changes at smaller sample size as typically as-
sumed in parametric statistical tests. In those cases where the source dataset
is large and the event study in question generates a test portfolio with a
large number of sample firms, we can recommend the All Firm Mean and
Rating Firm Mean Market Model approaches for short event windows. Over
longer event windows with small sample portfolio sizes as may be confronted
in the typical event study, adjusted performance measures calculated from
the source data such as the all firm mean adjusted spread change or rating
agency based mean rating adjusted spread changes perform better than mar-
ket model approaches recommended for short event windows. However, this
assumes that the researcher’s source dataset is as large in scope as that used
in this study. For small sample portfolio sizes where the dataset is limited to
the target sample firms alone, one is in a quandary and it is here that market
index measures would be most helpful in alleviating the limited source data.
From our results, the Moody’s BAA seasoned bond index spread to the off-
the-run U.S. Treasury curve ten year point provided the best performance.
For investment grade only or a mix of investment grade and non-investment
grade firms we recommend the market index adjusted measure. For non-
investment grade firms only, use the market model approach.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper we explore the implications of various choices in the con-
struction of event studies utilizing daily CDS spread changes. We review
the existing empirical approaches to date and construct Monte Carlo experi-
ments in the spirit of Brown and Warner (1985) for daily equity returns. We
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consider logarithmic and abnormal spread changes under a series of adjusted
and market model performance measures and vary both portfolio size and
event window length to explore optimal choices for performance under tests of
both size and power. We introduce three market index measures and explore
their behavior for investment grade and non-investment grade only firm pop-
ulations. We also provide a series of recommendations for implementation of
an event study under potential real world limitations such as narrow source
datasets in the firm dimension and/or events with a small number of firms
meeting the requirements for inclusion within the study. Future work could
expand upon our results through examination of non-parametric approaches
such as the bootstrapping methodology implemented Hull, Predescu, and
White (2004).
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Table 4.2: Mean Observation Period Performance Measures for 100 Trade
Days
Mean firm raw, adjusted and market model observation period performance mea-
sures. Similar to Brown and Warner (1985) Panel 1A, we examine the mean
behavior of the following measures for each of 500,000 firm 100 day observation
periods. Thus, for a random firm-event day pair, gather the populated observation
CDS change measures, whether absolute or Ln differences, and calculate the obser-
vation period minimum, maximum, etc. These are stored and their mean values
calculated over 2,500 simulation paths of 200 firms each to produce the results
below.
Performance Measure Obs Min Max Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Daily Ln Spread Differences
Raw 96.5 -0.1111 0.1257 -0.0007 0.0297 0.30 7.18
Firm Mean Adjusted 96.5 -0.1104 0.1264 0.0000 0.0297 0.30 7.18
All Firm Mean Adjusted 96.5 -0.1072 0.1210 0.0000 0.0287 0.25 6.86
Firm Rating Mean Adjusted 96.5 -0.1059 0.1193 0.0000 0.0285 0.24 6.66
BAA Libor Sprd Adjusted 96.5 -0.1287 0.1463 -0.0001 0.0413 0.21 3.84
All Firm Mean Mkt Model 96.5 -0.1051 0.1177 0.0000 0.0280 0.22 6.88
Firm Rating Mean Mkt Model 96.5 -0.1028 0.1149 0.0000 0.0277 0.21 6.68
BAA Libor Sprd Mkt Model 96.5 -0.1093 0.1248 0.0000 0.0295 0.29 7.03
Daily Absolute Spread Differences
Raw 96.5 -0.2027 0.2171 -0.0004 0.0502 0.30 7.32
Firm Mean Adjusted 96.5 -0.2023 0.2176 0.0000 0.0502 0.30 7.32
All Firm Mean Adjusted 96.5 -0.2117 0.2221 -0.0003 0.0534 0.09 5.09
Firm Rating Mean Adjusted 96.5 -0.2064 0.2160 -0.0001 0.0519 0.19 6.25
BAA Libor Sprd Adjusted 96.5 -0.2603 0.2824 0.0006 0.0780 0.15 3.05
All Firm Mean Mkt Model 96.5 -0.1895 0.2016 0.0000 0.0475 0.24 7.01
Firm Rating Mean Mkt Model 96.5 -0.1754 0.1845 0.0000 0.0449 0.21 6.75
BAA Libor Sprd Mkt Model 96.5 -0.2000 0.2150 0.0000 0.0498 0.29 7.16
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Table 4.3: Cross Sectional Event Period Statistics of Mean Portfolio
Performance Measures for 100 Observation Days and 1 Event Days
Distributional behavior of firm raw, adjusted and market model event period portfolio mean changes, both
Ln spread difference and absolute spread difference, over 2,500 simulation paths of varying sample size
per trial as noted below. Similar to Brown and Warner (1985) Panel 1B, we examine the cross-sectional
portfolio behavior of increasing sample size, given that the distribution should converge to normal as the
number of firms approaches infinity per the Central Limit Theorem.
Perf Measure Samp Min Max Median Mean Std Dev Skew Kur
Daily Ln Spread Differences
Raw 20 -0.0390 0.0465 -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0077 0.370 5.820
50 -0.0338 0.0219 -0.0008 -0.0006 0.0049 0.110 4.860
200 -0.0103 0.0102 -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0025 0.170 3.830
Frm Mn Adj 20 -0.0403 0.0474 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0078 0.360 5.770
50 -0.0329 0.0231 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0049 0.110 4.770
200 -0.0099 0.0113 0.0001 0.0001 0.0025 0.140 3.820
All Frm Mn Adj 20 -0.0371 0.0452 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0075 0.350 5.980
50 -0.0323 0.0226 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0047 0.100 4.890
200 -0.0095 0.0100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0024 0.140 3.830
Frm Rat Mn Adj 20 -0.0372 0.0432 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0074 0.310 5.850
50 -0.0328 0.0220 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0047 0.050 4.930
200 -0.0090 0.0095 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023 0.110 3.790
BAALIB Sprd Adj 20 -0.0383 0.0455 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0098 0.200 3.870
50 -0.0339 0.0243 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0061 0.090 3.730
200 -0.0123 0.0138 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0031 0.010 3.430
All Frm Mn Mkt Mod 20 -0.0352 0.0456 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0075 0.380 5.820
50 -0.0325 0.0219 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0048 0.100 4.840
200 -0.0097 0.0103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0024 0.120 3.820
Frm Rat Mn Mkt Mod 20 -0.0459 0.0420 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0075 0.230 5.990
50 -0.0329 0.0221 0.0000 0.0000 0.0047 0.000 4.960
200 -0.0087 0.0096 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023 0.080 3.650
BAALIB Sprd Mkt Mod 20 -0.0415 0.0472 0.0000 0.0002 0.0078 0.330 5.740
50 -0.0332 0.0230 0.0000 0.0001 0.0050 0.100 4.830
200 -0.0095 0.0111 0.0002 0.0002 0.0025 0.140 3.770
Daily Absolute Spread Differences
Raw 20 -0.5585 0.9187 -0.0011 -0.0003 0.0413 1.220 151.670
50 -0.2698 0.3677 -0.0009 0.0000 0.0256 1.490 54.890
200 -0.1676 0.1473 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0137 -0.220 32.100
Frm Mn Adj 20 -0.5739 0.9194 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0417 0.750 151.660
50 -0.2783 0.3686 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0258 1.190 54.530
200 -0.1678 0.1483 0.0001 0.0004 0.0138 -0.340 32.350
All Frm Mn Adj 20 -0.5557 0.9125 -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0410 1.250 151.880
50 -0.2686 0.3650 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0254 1.550 54.700
200 -0.1670 0.1487 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0137 -0.160 32.240
Frm Rat Mn Adj 20 -0.5326 0.8594 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0387 1.700 140.380
50 -0.2668 0.3442 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0241 1.570 48.150
200 -0.1523 0.1260 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0129 -0.300 28.090
BAALIB Sprd Adj 20 -0.5640 0.9147 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0426 1.140 132.620
50 -0.2652 0.3749 0.0001 0.0009 0.0262 1.560 49.250
200 -0.1682 0.1543 0.0004 0.0009 0.0141 -0.120 30.030
All Frm Mn Mkt Mod 20 -0.5454 0.8267 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0390 0.260 134.330
50 -0.2748 0.3311 0.0000 0.0005 0.0252 0.750 42.850
200 -0.1121 0.1304 0.0002 0.0004 0.0132 0.440 17.580
Frm Rat Mn Mkt Mod 20 -0.5271 0.8335 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0403 -0.180 125.770
50 -0.2132 0.3335 0.0000 0.0003 0.0229 0.320 44.090
200 -0.0761 0.0932 0.0000 0.0003 0.0116 0.300 13.410
BAALIB Sprd Mkt Mod 20 -0.5718 0.9207 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0420 0.580 148.450
50 -0.2986 0.3691 0.0000 0.0003 0.0259 1.000 54.420
200 -0.1699 0.1473 0.0001 0.0005 0.0139 -0.310 31.410
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Table 4.4: Event Period Test Statistic Behavior for 100 Observation Days
and 1 Event Days
Examination of event period test statistics for portfolio mean performance measures examined in Table
4.3. Similar to Table 2 of Brown and Warner (1985) this table presents results from 2,500 simulation paths
of sample size as reported below. Test statistic specified as t ratio of mean cumulative portfolio event
period change measure to standard deviation of daily observation period mean portfolio change measure
adjusted as needed for event period length. No abnormal performance is introduced and reported p-value
is for two sided t test of mean with null that mean is zero.
Perf Measure Samp Min Max Median Mean StdDev p-val Skew Kur
Daily Ln Spread Differences
Frm Mn Adj 20 -5.8213 5.7935 -0.0085 0.0303 1.0257 0.1395 0.36 5.76
50 -6.6917 5.5165 -0.0194 0.0226 1.0183 0.2680 0.14 5.24
200 -3.9181 4.2728 0.0484 0.0538 1.0006 0.0072 0.11 3.86
All Frm Mn Adj 20 -5.7093 5.8877 -0.0222 0.0037 1.0170 0.8553 0.33 6.12
50 -6.6275 5.3127 -0.0354 -0.0040 1.0087 0.8435 0.11 5.34
200 -3.8265 4.1650 -0.0160 -0.0006 0.9832 0.9759 0.11 3.91
Frm Rat Mn Adj 20 -5.7858 5.7801 -0.0313 0.0013 1.0159 0.9500 0.29 6.13
50 -6.6407 5.1720 -0.0515 -0.0093 0.9979 0.6419 0.06 5.32
200 -3.7055 3.9948 -0.0052 -0.0026 0.9724 0.8946 0.07 3.83
BAALIB Sprd Adj 20 -4.1017 5.0489 -0.0162 0.0127 1.0018 0.5262 0.21 3.90
50 -5.4672 4.2697 -0.0231 -0.0141 0.9777 0.4710 0.12 3.90
200 -4.1210 4.2407 -0.0296 -0.0297 0.9831 0.1308 0.00 3.46
All Frm Mn Mkt Mod 20 -5.4850 6.1051 -0.0118 0.0136 1.0464 0.5159 0.40 6.16
50 -6.7740 5.3077 -0.0269 0.0065 1.0346 0.7539 0.12 5.26
200 -4.1553 4.2332 0.0060 0.0137 1.0156 0.5012 0.09 3.91
Frm Rat Mn Mkt Mod 20 -5.8041 6.0770 -0.0186 0.0113 1.0533 0.5912 0.34 6.10
50 -6.9266 5.3927 -0.0063 0.0015 1.0391 0.9439 0.03 5.23
200 -4.0466 4.0483 0.0107 0.0044 1.0094 0.8292 0.05 3.69
BAALIB Sprd Mkt Mod 20 -6.0836 5.8485 0.0042 0.0355 1.0383 0.0872 0.33 5.76
50 -6.8407 5.6165 -0.0089 0.0282 1.0304 0.1712 0.14 5.35
200 -3.8299 4.2446 0.0660 0.0677 1.0124 0.0008 0.10 3.81
Daily Absolute Spread Differences
Frm Mn Adj 20 -9.8222 24.5610 -0.0161 0.0415 1.2304 0.0920 3.58 77.51
50 -10.0056 15.8923 -0.0090 0.0293 1.2188 0.2300 1.55 32.60
200 -6.9884 10.2473 0.0107 0.0559 1.1780 0.0176 0.88 14.70
All Frm Mn Adj 20 -9.8647 24.2636 -0.0399 -0.0213 1.2202 0.3826 3.66 77.36
50 -10.4347 15.7336 -0.0634 -0.0227 1.2095 0.3472 1.67 34.66
200 -6.6241 10.3448 -0.0366 0.0019 1.1733 0.9362 0.97 15.10
Frm Rat Mn Adj 20 -9.3891 23.9547 -0.0275 0.0064 1.1902 0.7883 3.60 78.05
50 -7.6428 16.3746 -0.0328 -0.0038 1.1829 0.8733 1.80 31.80
200 -6.7387 8.9461 -0.0169 0.0153 1.1238 0.4973 0.79 13.09
BAALIB Sprd Adj 20 -9.4392 18.0166 -0.0077 0.0426 1.1639 0.0676 1.84 35.80
50 -8.4763 13.3426 0.0090 0.0340 1.1563 0.1419 1.37 24.28
200 -6.7177 9.3532 0.0366 0.0826 1.1348 0.0003 0.79 12.77
All Frm Mn Mkt Mod 20 -9.8062 25.0010 -0.0050 0.0298 1.2509 0.2341 3.56 76.81
50 -10.0572 16.5671 -0.0009 0.0277 1.2435 0.2662 1.40 31.49
200 -8.0375 10.3209 0.0290 0.0450 1.2228 0.0661 0.74 13.31
Frm Rat Mn Mkt Mod 20 -9.6635 25.8523 -0.0105 0.0223 1.2679 0.3792 3.55 80.19
50 -10.1790 17.2839 0.0032 0.0179 1.2408 0.4710 1.33 30.26
200 -6.6251 10.3926 -0.0011 0.0379 1.2323 0.1242 0.64 11.10
BAALIB Sprd Mkt Mod 20 -9.9126 24.5132 -0.0147 0.0426 1.2398 0.0863 3.49 75.17
50 -10.0523 16.0895 0.0003 0.0317 1.2310 0.1985 1.50 32.38
200 -7.1074 10.2221 0.0125 0.0567 1.1892 0.0172 0.83 14.43
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This work has been an exploration of the implications of the financial crisis of
2007-2008 for investor behavior. The government support of financial firms
through direct assistance and programs to improve market liquidity during
the worldwide credit crisis of 2007-2008 is unprecedented since the Great
Depression. Whether a given firm is ex-ante ’Too Big To Fail’ in the mind
of government agents is not the principal issue for moral hazard, however,
as investor perception of ’Too Big To Fail’ is what drives the economically
inefficient reduced funding cost for the risk taken by the firm. The recent
crisis presents a laboratory to explore changes in such investor perceptions
via a series of event studies. While the event studies cannot measure baseline
premiums in the capital market securities of such firms, the economic and
statistical significance of the changes is enlightening regarding the potential
degree of moral hazard imputed during the crisis. A model of the stochastic
guarantee that is ’Too Big To Fail’ support is examined to assess government
agent action and its interpretation by investors. Government agent action
does not always lead to predictable conclusions in the minds of investors, par-
ticularly in the event of crisis decision making with little public information.
Such action may play a greater role in changing investor perception of the
state of the economy than in the improved prospects for a firm in question.
Repeated quotes from the financial press as well as the primarily negative
event returns reported here are consistent with this inference.
The crisis definitively proved the arguments of Stern and Feldman (2004)
that large and complex financial firms with concentrations in critical markets
were ’Too Big To Fail’. The results presented in essay 1, however, demon-
strate that the returns to firm securities were inconsistent with a broad ’Too
Big To Fail’ premium for all of these institutions, as imputed by investors.
Evidence for such premiums was only found in the debt securities of the
largest banks in the initial crisis event and the GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie
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Mac in reaction to the rescue of Bear Stearns. Federal Reserve liquidity pro-
grams created to lend to both banks and broker dealers led to no appreciable
positive change in ’Too Big To Fail’ expectations via either debt or equity
returns. There was no evidence of investor perceptions changing for AIG,
which was rescued, or Merrill Lynch which was purchased with government
encouragement. Both behaved very similarly to Lehman, which was permit-
ted to fail, displaying repeated negative abnormal equity and debt returns in
the events leading to its ultimate failure. Savings & loan Washington Mutual
faired the worst of the banks while Wachovia’s results were typically positive
until the last three events. There was no evidence that manager expectations
for government support, should they have existed, were achieved via positive
abnormal equity returns and the managers of rescued firms were removed
in the events considered. ’Too Big To Fail’, in the perception of investors,
appears to simply be an extension of pre-existing explicit government guar-
antees in place for the largest banks or implicitly assumed in the case of the
GSEs. However, both the general perception that a Lehman Brothers rescue
would have prevented the worst of the crisis and the move to broadly grant
bank holding company status to numerous non-bank financial firms such as
broker dealers, finance companies and insurers does not bode well for future
investor expectations of ’Too Big To Fail’.
In essay 2, we examine the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis (IIS Basis) as de-
fined in equation (3.5) and seek to explain it via variables reflecting market
liquidity and inflation expectations. Practitioner explanations for a positive
basis typically rely upon liquidity differences in the cash markets for the U.S.
Treasury securities needed to hedge over-the-counter inflation swap positions.
We use Treasury measures specifically designed to avoid liquidity issues and
provide zero coupon rates for direct comparison. As these measures incor-
porate market valuation of the embedded TIPS floor as reduced real rates,
our approach is biased against the existence of a positive IIS Basis. We still
find this positive basis and determine that it averages approximately 40 basis
points during the nearly five years we examine. It reaches heights in excess of
200 basis points for 5 year and shorter tenors in 4Q 2008. We find this basis
is positively related to measures of nominal Treasury market illiquidity but
negatively related to measures of real Treasury market illiquidity. We further
find the IIS Basis is negatively related to short term measures of forecast in-
flation and daily proxies we substitute for short term inflation expectations.
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We argue that this must either reflect liquidity or inflation related hedging
costs in the cash markets. Lacking the existence of inflation protected zero
coupon bonds, the existence of the positive IIS Basis leaves the market direc-
tionally one way, sell inflation swaps and buy TIPS/sell nominals to construct
a cash market long BEI hedge position.
Finally, in essay 3, we explore the implications of various choices in the
construction of event studies utilizing daily CDS spread changes. We review
the existing empirical approaches to date and construct Monte Carlo experi-
ments in the spirit of Brown and Warner (1985) for daily equity returns. We
consider logarithmic and abnormal spread changes under a series of adjusted
and market model performance measures and vary both portfolio size and
event window length to explore optimal choices for performance under tests
of both size and power. We introduce three market index measures and ex-
plore their behavior for investment grade and non-investment grade only firm
populations. We also provide a series of recommendations for implementa-
tion of an event study under potential real world limitations such as narrow
source datasets in the firm dimension and/or events with a small number of
firms meeting the requirements for inclusion within the study.
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APPENDIX A
MODELING GOVERNMENT
GUARANTEES
The model of stochastic government guarantee implicit in ’Too Big To
Fail’ insurance may first be approached through consideration of the vul-
nerable options literature.1 A vulnerable option is one where there is risk
that the option writer will not perform when the option buyer’s position has
positive value at the exercise point for an option on a third party reference
asset. This is typically the case when the option writer enters financial dis-
tress. Thus, the option buyer must consider two separate and potentially
correlated sources of risk when valuing the purchased option. First, the un-
derlying asset the option is written on and second, the assets supporting the
option writer. Confining the problem to firm assets in both the case of the
option underlying and the option writer, the more closely the firms are re-
lated, the more likely that a long put option on the health of a firm will have
value just when the option writer is unable to pay out on the option. Thus, a
private guarantee on the health of a firm is best sought from a writer wholly
unrelated to the underlying firm in question. Vulnerable option models use
a first passage time to default measure to establish the value loss compared
to a similar option written by a riskless counterparty. The greater the de-
gree of relation between the firm for which the guarantee is purchased and
the option writer, the greater the value loss. The valuation begins with a
riskless option and measures the value decline from the writer moving into
the default regime, which is absorbing for these models.
Contrast this with a government ’Too Big To Fail’ guarantee. As the gov-
ernment is assumed to be riskless, it will be necessary to appoint a proxy
measure for when the government will choose to support a firm. Further, the
government decision to support will take place during periods of economic
1See Johnson and Stulz (1987) or Hull and White (1995) for example. These are based
upon the literature of options on the minimum or maximum of two risky assets as in Stulz
(1982) or Johnson (1987) and the option to exchange one asset for another as in Margrabe
(1978). A very general class of models is presented in Rich (1996).
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distress, the opposite of a vulnerable option model. Thus, the absorbing
state for no support from the vulnerable option literature is one of good eco-
nomic conditions, requiring an assumption that all firms are supported until
economic conditions improve enough for the government to choose not to
support a troubled firm. In reality, one may imagine the government chang-
ing its mind with economic conditions. A given firm will not be supported
unless conditions are bad across firms, consistent with the contagion fears
repeatedly raised historically before and during the crisis.
To model the ’Too Big To Fail’ guarantee, denote the assets of the systemi-
cally important firm as A and the assets of whatever systemic firm asset index
the government agents will create and monitor as AG with a barrier point
HG, below which the government will provide support to the systemic firm
in question.2 Assume that HG is constant permitting all of the uncertainty
to be embedded in AG, the index observed by government agents. Both A
and AG behave with geometric Brownian motion with constant volatilities
σA and σAG , respectively. The motions are correlated, represented as ρA,AG .
Employing a simple Merton (1974) style structural model for the assets of
the firm and the assets of the government index with constant risk free term
structure r and T years to maturity, the stochastic guarantee may be valued
using Monte Carlo simulation, as it has no closed form solution.
The process for the assets is:
dA = µAAdt+ σAAdzA (A.1)
and letting  be a draw from a standard normal distribution, its discrete time
form is:
At = At−1 exp
[(
µA − σA
2
2
)
∆t+ σA
√
∆t
]
(A.2)
The valuation procedure of a deterministic guarantee for the underlying as-
sets, A, for a given firm begins with a risk neutral simulation to establish the
2One could imagine a different index for any given firm requiring a subscript i. The
presentation ignores this to improve readability. Further, one could imagine the case where
government agents use the assets of the systemic firm directly such as support provided
to Bank of America or Citigroup during the crisis when their common stock levels began
to approach $1. To the degree that government agents set the barrier in this situation
below that of the face value of the firm’s debt (HG < X) we have a “down and in” barrier
put option. If HG ≥ X we have a standard deterministic guarantee similar to deposit
insurance for the firm’s debt or a vanilla put option. Rich (1994) provides a very general
set of barrier option pricing models.
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value of the assets at time T . Next the value of the guarantee is computed
by comparing the asset value with the assumed guarantee level X as in a
standard put option
Max(X − AT , 0) (A.3)
and discount to the present at the risk free rate r. Repetition will permit
calculation of an expected value which will converge to the continuous time
closed form value presented in equation (2.3) in the text. Thus the simulation
step is to generate a standard normal random draw and calculate the asset
value at time T 3:
AT = A0 exp
[(
r − σA
2
2
)
T + σA
√
T
]
(A.4)
Moving to the valuation of the stochastic guarantee, introduce the govern-
ment monitored index, AG, its process is:
dAG = µAGAGdt+ σAGAGdzAG (A.5)
where the relation between the assets of the firm in question and the index
is captured by the correlation coefficient between the two respective Wiener
processes:
ρA,AGdt = dzAdzAG (A.6)
With a second normal random draw temporarily referred to as 
′
, the discrete
time form of the process for the government index is:
AGt = AGt−1 exp
[(
µAG −
σAG
2
2
)
∆t+ σAG
√
∆t
′
]
(A.7)
The value of the guarantee is now complicated by the level of the government
index AG and its relation to the fixed barrier HG at time T . Government
agents will only provide support when the economy is in a bad enough state
or contagion is high enough that the index they monitor is below the fixed
barrier they establish. This may be captured by modifying equation (A.3)
via the indicator function first presented as equation (2.4) in the text:
Max(X − AT , 0) ∗ 1{AGT<HGT } (A.8)
3Note that as there is no path dependency in the option the valuation may be done in
a single time step.
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The value of this guarantee has no closed form solution. The risk neutral
valuation procedure proceeds as before with the introduction of two new
steps. First, a second random normal draw 2 (
′
in prior equations) is
combined with 1 ( in prior equations) via a correlation of ρA,AG to create
ρA,AG as follows:
ρA,AG = ρA,AG1 +
√
1− ρA,AG22 (A.9)
This correlated random draw is then introduced in the valuation of the gov-
ernment index at time T in a similar fashion to that implemented in equation
(A.4):
AGT = AG0 exp
[(
r − σAG
2
2
)
T + σAG
√
TρA,AG
]
(A.10)
With time T values of both the assets and the index, the value of the ’Too
Big To Fail’ guarantee in equation (A.8) may be evaluated at time T by
simultaneously comparing the firm asset value A with the assumed guarantee
level of X as well as comparing the government observed index value AG with
the government barrier level for the application of support HG. The value of
the modified put option may be discounted back to time zero at the risk free
rate and the process repeated to establish an expectation. This expectation
is the value of the stochastic government ’Too Big To Fail’ guarantee as
implemented in the text.
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APPENDIX B
THE EVENTS
This appendix provides an introduction to the crisis, detailed descriptions
of each of the ten events and a short post-events summary.
Crisis Begins: The current crisis came to market attention during the
summer of 2007 with the large losses, restrictions on redemption and ulti-
mately the failure or closure of a number of hedge funds that invested in
securities based upon the performance of U.S. subprime mortgage borrow-
ers. While most of the attention focused upon two and ultimately three
internal mortgage oriented hedge funds of Bear Stearns, UBS’ Dillon Read
unit and its internal Dillon Read Capital Management hedge fund was the
first to be closed for subprime related losses on May 3, 2007.1 Bear Stearns
first disclosed trouble in a letter to investors restricting redemptions from
its High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund dated
June 7, 2007.2 Within a week this fund and its sister High-Grade Structured
Credit Strategies Fund were facing shutdown struggling to meet margin calls
from other Wall Street dealers.3 After abandoning efforts to save the former,
Bear created a credit line of up to $3.2 billion for the the fund to pay back
existing loans to other dealers and avoid further collateral seizures and forced
sales.4 After lending the fund $1.6 billion, Bear, too, had to seize collateral
pledged against this loan just prior to both funds filing for bankruptcy on
July 31st.5 BNP Paribas stopped valuing three of its funds and suspended
1On May 4, 2007, Taylor, Kelly, and Horowitz (2007) report the closure of Dillon Read
Capital Management after UBS disclosed the fund had $124 million in subprime mortgage
related losses.
2Goldstein (2007) reported the contents of the investor letter in an article dated June
12, 2007.
3On June 16th, Kelly (2007b) reports the seizure and plan to sell $400 million in
collateral by Merrill Lynch & Co. The reported amount increased to $850 million on June
20th in Kelly, Ng, and Reilly (2007).
4See Kelly and Ng (2007)
5Kelly (2007a) reports the collateral call and seizure on July 27th and St.Onge and
Rochelle (2007) report the bankruptcy filing.
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investor withdrawals on August 9th leading to the first concerted intervention
into markets by the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Canada, and the European
Central Bank on that day and August 10th.6
Event 1, IKB: The trouble and bailout of IKB Deutsche Industriebank
(Friday, July 27, 2007 thru Friday, August 3, 2007.) In what would be the first
bank to nearly fail and require government support, IKB, a small to medium
size German commercial lender acknowledged large losses from subprime in-
vestments in both direct exposure and off balance sheet conduit funds it ran
on Monday, July 30, only 10 days after claiming to have minimal exposure to
U.S. subprime assets during an earnings call. The size of the total exposure
was nearly €20 billion and its funding need exceeded the lending capacity
of its primary investor, publicly owned bank Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau
(KfW) requiring a rescue package from the German government as well as
private and public banks. The transmission of this information to the market
as reported in the financial press was noisy making for a difficult event win-
dow definition. As initially reported on July 31st, IKB would receive support
from publicly owned bank KfW. Yet on August 2nd and August 3rd details
of the mechanics of the rescue revealed a call placed on Friday, July 27th,
by Josef Ackerman, the CEO of Deutsche Bank, to the primary regulator
Jochen Sanio, who in turn contacted the Finance Minister, Peer Steinbruck,
and in what would foreshadow numerous similar crises in the U.S., a weekend
of meetings saw a rescue package composed for IKB that included support
from the government, public and private banks in the sum of €3.5 billion.
In confirmation of the delayed market response to the events, IKB’s stock
fell further on August 2nd (28%) than it had on July 30th (19%).7
6Kennedy (2007a) reports that BNP funds Parvest Dynamic ABS, BNP Paribas ABS
Euribor and BNP Paribas ABS Eonia invested in U.S. asset-backed securities to include
subprime mortgages. Kennedy (2007b) details the actions of the ECB’s then largest ever
lending of 95 billion euros and the Fed’s two repos of $24 billion.
7Mollenkamp and Taylor (2007) note the 19% decline in stock price on July 30th, the
unquantified subprime exposure to an off-balance sheet vehicle called Rhineland Funding,
the bailout by KfW, IKB’s largest shareholder, and KfW’s 80% ownership stake by the
German government. It also noted that just 10 days earlier IKB had played down its
exposure during an earnings call. Simensen (2007c) reports KfW’s stake in IKB at 38%
and quotes IKB as acknowledging that it’s creditworthiness had been questioned at the
end of the prior week and indicates neither IKB nor KfW would quantify IKB’s exposure
or loss to subprime markets. Kirchfeld and Buergin (2007) and Atzler, Bartz, Chung,
Davies, and Ishmael (2007) report on August 2nd that KfW had assumed €8.1 billion in
obligations to IKB’s Rhineland funding unit as announced on July 31st. Further, this was
the first mention of government involvement orchestrated by the Finance Minister Peer
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Event 2, Fed Discount Window: The reduction in discount rate, the
extension of term, and the unprecedented encouragement of discount window
borrowing by the Federal Reserve (Friday, August 17th, 2007 thru Friday,
August 24th, 2007.) On August 17th, the Fed narrowed the fixed spread
between its target Federal Funds rate and the rate applied at the discount
window (the primary credit rate) to 50bp from 100bp leading to a discount
window decline from 6.25% to 5.75%. In addition, the typical overnight
term was extended to permit term financing of up to 30 days.8 The prior
evening the Federal Open Market Committee convened and agreed to release
a statement with a revised assessment of its economic outlook emphasizing
the increase in downside risk and the Fed’s willingness to act as needed.
That Friday the President of the New York Fed and the Vice Chairman
of the Federal Reserve held a conference call with most major bank CEOs
encouraging them to use the discount window and that such use would be
viewed as a source of strength as opposed to weakness.9 In spite of multiple
Steinbrueck (also chairman of KfW’s administrative board) the prior Sunday (July 29th)
and the creation of a rescue fund of €3.5 billion composed of KfW (70%), privately owned
(publicly traded) banks Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank (15%), and other publicly (gov-
ernment) owned banks (15%). Simensen (2007a) on August 3rd reported the involvement
of Deutsche Bank’s CEO Joseph Ackerman the prior Friday (July 27th) in alerting the
government regarding IKB’s funding difficulties and the large decline in IKB’s stock price
on August 2nd of 28%. Simensen (2007b) reports on August 9th that IKB revealed on
Tuesday (August 7th) that another group of banks is supplying €6.5 billion in liquidity
lines to its Rhineland Funding vehicle besides the €8.1 billion provided by KfW. He also
reports that IKB said it had €7 billion of its own assets (at the bank level) invested in
credit portfolios the preceding March outside of its Rhineland Funding unit with 2/3 of
that in US Assets. Including another off balance sheet unit - Rhinebridge Funding, which
it would need to bring on balance sheet produced a direct exposure to US Assets of €6.4
billion excluding Rhineland’s €14 billion in assets. Mollenkamp, Taylor, and McDonald
(2007) on August 10th provide details behind the funding problems experienced by IKB
the week before its rescue. Its Rhineland funding unit which borrowed principally through
commercial paper to support its €14 billion in assets found itself unable to roll over the
positions and on Friday, July 27th turned to IKB to draw on a credit line. IKB, in turn,
had a credit line with Deutsche bank which Deutsche refused to honor. It was at the end
of this day that Deutsche’s CEO contacted the German bank regulator which led to the
weekend of negotiations. They also report that the total decline in IKB’s stock price over
the two weeks of the crisis was 33%
8See Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System (2007c) for press release.
9See Ip, Sidel, and Smith (2007) for details. Emphasis is placed on the unusual nature
of both the release of the FOMC statement and comparisons made to the 1998 Long Term
Capital Management crisis in the organization of the conference call to bank chairmen
encouraging discount window use. Authers, Beales, Callan, and Guha (2007) emphasize
the dramatic decline in US Treasury bill yields as the cause of the meeting. During the
preceding two trading days, US Treasury bill yields sustained their largest decline since
the equity market crash of 1987.
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declarations during the call that the Fed lending rate was higher than other
sources available to them, the four largest banks by assets each borrowed
$500 million from the discount window on August 22nd. Further, all issued
press releases to that effect with a resulting decline in stock prices initially
reported. On August 24th, the Fed reported that as of Wednesday, August
22nd, $2 billion of discount window lending was outstanding. The Fed also
permitted Citigroup an exemption to fund its broker-dealer activities with
discount window lending.10
Event 3, Northern Rock: The run on and bailout of The Northern
Rock, one of the U.K.’s largest mortgage lenders (Thursday, September 13th,
2007 through Wednesday, September 19th, 2007.) Yorulmazer (2008) states
that on Thursday, September 13th, at 20:30 London time, the BBC reported
Northern Rock had received emergency assistance from the Bank of England
for the ensuing day. With both locations following their respective daylight
savings time, this puts the announcement at 15:30 New York time, prior to
the close of U.S. markets. Northern Rock’s business model, relying heavily
on securitization of mortgage loans and high levels of wholesale funding left it
greatly exposed to market illiquidity in spite of a high quality mortgage port-
folio lacking a subprime focus. After a 5% decline on September 13th, shares
fell 31% on September 14th and cues began to form at its branches, the first
time a bank run had been observed in England since 1866. This continued
through the weekend and at 16:30 London time on Monday, September 17th,
the government reversed itself and guaranteed all deposits at Northern Rock.
Prior to this, the British government had never made such a guarantee and
the then current program was a coinsurance model covering the first £2,000
and 90% of the next £33,000 if a bank failed. Northern Rock shares had
fallen another 35% and other large British banks with increased wholesale
funding exposure such as Alliance & Leicester and Bradford & Bingley fell
heavily as well prior to the Monday afternoon announcement. On Tuesday,
September 18th Northern Rock shares recovered 8% and Alliance & Leicester
more than made up its prior day decline in response to the bailout.11
10Sidel, Ip, and Bauerlein (2007) report on August 23rd, the discount window borrowing
by Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Wachovia, and Citigroup. The first three issued
a joint press release while Citigroup issued its own. Ip (2007) covers the Federal reserve
report of discount window lending balance as well as the exception granted to Citigroup
as reported on August 24th.
11Lewellyn (2008) reviews the Northern Rock event, both its flawed business model and
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Event 4, TAF: The introduction of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) by
the Federal Reserve to include the implementation and results of its first auc-
tion (Wednesday, December 12, 2007 through Thursday, December 20, 2007).
In response to continued illiquidity in interbank markets for term funding the
Federal Reserve unveiled the TAF which expanded the pledgeable collateral
for borrowing to that used at its discount window (as opposed to the stricter
requirements in its open market operations) while providing anonymity for
borrowers through an auction process and a twenty eight day term for the
borrowing. The Fed was simultaneously joined by the European Central
Bank (ECB), the Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and the
Canadian Central bank with new or expanded lending operations to their
respective markets. The Fed introduced the TAF on Wednesday, December
12, one day after reducing its federal funds target and discount window bor-
rowing rates by 25 basis points each to 4.25% and 4.75%, respectively. The
terms of the first auction were announced Friday, December 14, the auction
held Monday, December 17 and its results shared on Wednesday, December
19th, which were picked up by the financial press on Thursday, December
20th.12 The auction appeared to be successful and was oversubscribed by a
3:1 ratio over its $20 billion stated amount.13
the failures of the regulatory regime to handle the crisis. He also details the depositor
coinsurance scheme in existence prior to the crisis. Yorulmazer (2008) provides the timing
of the bailout announcement, shows the relation between wholesale funding and declines
in other lenders, and provides the stock price changes on the 17th and 18th. Hume and
Larsen (2007) provides the price decline of Northern Rock on September 13th. Larsen
(2007) describes the cues at Northern Rock’s branches and limited information on the
facility provided by the Bank of England prior to Northern Rock’s opening on September
14th. Mollenkamp, MacDonald, and Perry (2007) connects the Northern Rock crisis with
European stock market and British pound currency declines on September 14th, quotes
customers unable to withdraw funds, and notes the higher credit quality of its customer
base. Perry and Singer (2007) adds details of £4.4 billion injection from the Bank of
England to Northern Rock in addition to the deposit guarantee and quotes British Trea-
sury spokesperson as extending the depositor guarantee to any solvent bank in similar
circumstances. The article also generally quotes others as pointing out that the rise in
bank shares on the 18th was indicative that the bailout, rather than being seen as only
protecting depositors, was viewed as a general bailout and a reversal of the central bank’s
previous policy.
12See Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System (2007a) for the announcement press
release. Ip and Perry (2007) provides details on the reasons for the TAF and the dates for
its first four auctions as well as a brief history of Fed actions to that point, the interbank
market difficulties, and details on the other central bank actions. Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System (2007d) details the auction terms while Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System (2007b) reviews the results. Reddy (2007) provides an overview
and interpretation of the results.
13The literature examining the efficacy of the TAF is extensive with contradictory as-
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Event 5, Countrywide: The takeover of Countrywide Financial by Bank
of America following several days of bankruptcy rumors (Monday, January 7,
2008 through Friday, January 11, 2008). Countrywide, the largest mortgage
lender and servicer with a servicing portfolio of $1.4 trillion was buffeted
by bankruptcy rumors yet again in early January and its stock price fell
approximately 40% to a new low of $5 per share during the first three days of
the week prior to the announcement of Bank of America’s purchase. Bank of
America had already invested $2 billion in Countrywide on August 22, 2007
at a critical time for Countrywide as it faced funding pressures resulting
from its inability to access the commercial paper market.14 While never
explicitly stated, more than one financial press article inferred that Bank of
America’s investments were blessed by the Treasury and the Fed given the
systemic concerns about a mortgage servicer of Countrywide’s size entering
bankruptcy.15 This is consistent with Stern and Feldman (2004) arguments
about large payment players being ’Too Big To Fail.’
Event 6, Monoline Downgrades: The downgrade fears surrounding
the two largest monoline insurers Ambac Financial Group and MBIA Inc
as well as large quarterly losses announced by Citigroup and Merrill Lynch
(Tuesday, January 15, 2008 through Friday, January 18, 2008). On Wednes-
day, January 16, Ambac warned of a large 4th quarter loss, announced plans
to raise $1 billion in equity and cut its dividend by 60% leading to a 39%
decline in its stock price as well as pulling down MBIA’s shares by 17% in
sessments. Wu (2008), McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008), and In, Cui, and Mahraj
(2008) find differing degrees of success while Taylor and Williams (2008a) and Taylor and
Williams (2008b) find it to have no effect in alleviating dramatic term funding spreads
concluding that the spreads are the result of counterparty risk.
14Politi and White (2008) report the deal with Bank of America, the repeated default
rumors during the week and the prior brush with bankruptcy during the summer before
the Bank of America initial investment. Hagerty and Ng (2007) report the size of Coun-
trywide mortgage lending and servicing businesses and quote a company spokesperson as
stating funding is ample. Whitehouse (2007) reports the funding pressures that forced
Countrywide to draw down its $11.5 billion line of credit less than a week later. White
(2007) reports the $2 billion Bank of America investment on August 22, 2007.
15Paletta, Bauerlein, and Hagerty (2008) portray the deal as a rescue, note the huge
risk shift to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should Countrywide have collapsed and state
that a Treasury Department spokesperson denied encouraging Bank of America to step
in. They also mention that regulators feared the collapse of Countrywide. White (2008)
states that the “threat of failure unnerved officials as the Federal Reserve and Treasury.”
Finally, Morgenson (2008) states in an article on the bailout of Bear Stearns, “It was the
most explicit sign yet of the Fed’s “Rescues ’R’ Us” doctrine that already helped to force
the marriage of Bank of America and Countrywide.”
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spite of MBIA having already raised $1 billion in equity capital the week
before. Thursday, January 17th, Moody’s put both firms debt ratings on
review for possible downgrade potentially affecting approximately $2.4 tril-
lion in Aaa debt guaranteed by both firms. Standard & Poors increased its
expected loss amounts for the bond insurers by 20% potentially changing
rating determinations it had set just the month before. This led to a further
fall of 52% and 39% in the equity prices for Ambac and MBIA, respectively.
On Friday, January 18th, Fitch downgraded Ambac to AA in response to
Ambac’s earlier announcement that day it was scrapping its plan to raise $1
billion in equity as a result of the large decline in its stock price. Parallel to
these events, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch announced nearly identical $9.8
billion quarterly losses on Tuesday, January 15th and Thursday, January
17th, respectively. Merrill’s results included a writedown of $3.1 billion with
bond insurers, primarily a small monoline ACA Capital which was facing
insolvency by Friday, January 18th, if it did not raise $1.7 billion. ACA had
been an active participant in CDS markets with nearly $70 billion in protec-
tion written in spite of less than $500 million in capital until its downgrade
from the S&P single A to CCC on December 19, prior to the event. The
downgrade imposed the need for ACA to post collateral, something it had
succeeded in avoiding while rated single A by S&P.16 Citigroup’s results in-
cluded a writedown of nearly $1 billion for similar counterparty concerns as
well as a dividend reduction of 41%. Most important were a number of high
profile systemic risk issues raised by the potential failure of monoline insurers
given the large impact of tiny ACA. Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase,
and Eileen Fahey, a managing director at Fitch Ratings, both made public
comments regarding the systemic risks on Thursday, January 17th.17
16American International Group’s demise is usually tied to its downgrade from AAA by
S&P immediately triggering $ billions in collateral calls.
17Stempel and Wilchins (2008) reports the Citigroup quarterly loss and dividend reduc-
tion on an $18.1 billion write down of subprime backed securities, $17.4 billion of which
were CDOs. Richardson (2008) reports the Ambac quarterly loss warning, plan to raise $1
billion in new equity and the common equity declines for Ambac and MBIA for January 16,
2008. Scholtes and Duyn (2008) adds the planned dividend cut of 60% and mentions Fitch
Ratings December statement that Ambac could lose its AAA rating should it not raise
$1 billion in new equity capital by the end of January. Ishmael, MacKenzie, Scholtes,
White, and Duyn (2008) report the share declines of Ambac and MBIA for Thursday,
January 17, 2008 on the Moody’s rating warning for both entities, the amount of AAA
debt insured by the pair ($2.4 trillion), the S&P increased estimate of expected defaults
for bond insurers and the Merrill Lynch writedowns of $3.1 billion for hedges with bond
insurers, principally ACA. The article quotes Eileen Fahey, a managing director at Fitch
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Event 7, Bear Stearns: The liquidity squeeze and bailout of Bear
Stearns by the Federal Reserve both in its opening for business on March
14, 2008 as well as its supported purchase by J.P. Morgan; the introduction
of liquidity facilities and support for non-bank primary dealers of the Fed
(Monday, March 10, 2008 through Monday, March 17, 2008). Rumors and
reports of Bear’s insufficient liquidity and capital became increasingly fre-
quent beginning with trading on Monday leading to an 11% decline its stock
price and a 30% increase in its CDS spreads that day.18 The Federal Reserve
introduced its Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) for primary dealers
on Tuesday providing an outlet for investment banks like Bear to exchange
mortgage debt for up to $200 billion in Treasury securities for up to 28 days.
However, the first auction would not take place for more than two weeks,
scheduled for March 27th. While this was greeted well in the stock market,
Bear’s shares saw little change and neither did its CDS spreads appreciably
tighten. On Wednesday, March 12th, reports surfaced that Bear counter-
parties were approaching other investment banks to step between Bear and
those counterparties in completed transactions and that Bear’s hedge fund
clients were withdrawing funds. Bear’s CEO, Alan Schwartz stated it had
$17 billion in cash, unchanged from late February, and that it had replaced
much short term funding with long term funding since the summer. This was
viewed as a sign of weakness.19 Yet, at the close of business on Thursday
Ratings, “Significant changes in counterparty strengths (of bond insurers) could lead to
systemic issues.” It also quotes Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, “What (worries
me) is if one of these entities doesn’t make it ... the secondary effect ... I think could be
pretty terrible.” Pulliam and Ng (2008) gives the background and situation with ACA to
include the increased exposure for banks should it fail to unwinds its CDS positions and
enter bankruptcy. Anderson (2008) reports the Merrill Lynch quarterly loss and the com-
ponents of its total writedown of $16.7 billion. Lucchetti and Richardson (2008) describes
both S&P and Moody’s reassessments of the bond insurer ratings attributing the down-
grade watch announcement for Ambac as a response to Ambac’s estimate of an expected
$5.4 billion pretax loss for the quarter on its credit derivative portfolio and the abrupt and
immediate resignation of Robert Genadier, Ambac’s chairman and CEO. Richardson and
Lucchetti (2008) reports the Fitch downgrade of Ambac on Friday, January 18th following
Ambac scrapping its plan to raise $1 billion in new equity capital.
18In calling the beginning of the period Monday, March 10, consideration was given
to the following reported on Saturday, March 15, 2008 in Kelly, Ip, and Sidel (2008),
”Word began to spread among fixed-income traders nine days ago [Thursday, March 6]
that European banks had stopped trading with Bear. Some U.S. fixed-income and stock
traders began doing the same on Monday, pulling their cash from Bear for fear it could
get locked up if there was a bankruptcy.”
19Walter Bagehot, the 19th century author of Lombard Street, a primer on financial
crises, was quoted in The Economist (2008c) as stating, “Every banker knows that if he
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(the same day that Carlyle Capital Corp, a mortgage focused hedge fund
under private equity firm Carlyle Group, collapsed) its cash position had
declined to $2 billion and it would be unable to close out its repo positions
on Friday morning as many counterparties had informed it Thursday they
would not roll over their repo loans when trading began the following day.
Bear approached the Federal Reserve and its clearing bank, J.P. Morgan,
and a 28 day secured lending facility was arranged to permit Bear to open
on Friday. However, Bear was informed later that day that the Fed would
not stand behind it on Monday and it needed to sell itself over the weekend.
After much negotiation and discussion, J.P. Morgan agreed to a purchase at
$2 per share but only with Federal Reserve backing through an agreement
to take the risk and fund $30 billion of the most illiquid mortgage securities.
This was announced prior to the open of Asian markets on Sunday evening,
March 16, 2008. Also announced in time for Monday’s opening of markets
was the Fed’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) effectively extending
discount window privileges to investment banks. The Fed also narrowed the
difference between the target fed funds rate and the discount window rate by
25 basis points effectively reducing the discount (and PDCF) rates to 3.25%
and increased the potential term from 30 to 90 days. As regards the support
given to Bear Stearns, Ip (2008b) states, “Officials grimly concluded that
while Bear Stearns was not too big to fail, it was too interconnected to be
allowed to fail in just one day.”20
has to prove that he is worthy of credit, however good may be his arguments, in fact his
credit is gone.” Likewise, Kelly, Ip, and Sidel (2008) reports Robert Sloan, a managing
partner at New York-based S3 Partners LLC, a financing specialist for hedge funds, “Once
Bear started to come out with: ’Hey, this is why we’re OK, this is why we’re still liquid and
you should keep your assets here,’ they were basically telling you to move your business.”
20Zuckerman and McKay (2008) reports the stock price decline and CDS spread rise for
Monday, March 11, 2008 as well as tying its relatively low price to book value and CDS
spreads compared to other investment banks as a result of its high exposure to mortgage
assets. Ip (2008a) describes the TSLF, mentions four other central banks introducing
related measures as well as the expansion in the TAF to $100 billion from $60 billion the
prior Friday, March 7th, and reviews that the step fell short of hopes that the Fed would
simply add mortgage backed securities to the Treasury debt it accepts in its open market
operations. Blumberg (2008) notes the planned date of the first TSLF auction and that
until then repo market trading will remain muted for mortgage backed assets. Ng and
McKay (2008) reports the large equity market response to the Fed’s TSLF introduction
and the muted change in Bear’s CDS spread. Kelly, Ng, and Strasburg (2008) reports
Bear’s stock price reaction on Tuesday when the market rose, Bear’s statements in support
of its liquidity position, and clients of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse
and Deutsche Bank approaching those institutions to become counterparties with Bear
in place of the clients in already completed transactions. It also reports hedge funds
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Event 8, GSEs I: The formalization of explicit government support for
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; the failure of IndyMac Bank (Wednesday, July
9, 2008 through Monday, July 14, 2008.) Although the week began with
large declines in the stock prices of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac attributed
to continuing mortgage delinquency fears and the future dilution effect of
large planned increases in equity capital, on Thursday, July 10, 2008 it was
reported that the Federal Reserve and the Treasury had been having ongoing
discussions regarding contingency support of the two GSEs. Public comments
the prior day (Wednesday) by former Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
President William Poole that both were “insolvent” and that the government
may be forced into a bailout led to large equity market declines for both
firms. Thursday’s comments of support included Senator Charles Schumer,
Chairman of the Economic Committee that the mortgage firms had “federal
lifelines” and would not be allowed to fail. A follow up article on Friday
described a potential takeover and government conservatorship for the firms
mentioning the long extant (since 1970) $2.25 billion credit lines each had had
with the Treasury, the usual argument for their implicit government support.
It also reported the frequently suggested idea of permitting them to borrow
from the Fed’s discount window as non-bank primary dealers could under the
PDCF. IndyMac Bank was seized on Friday as well, the third largest bank
failure in U.S. history. On Sunday, July 13, the Treasury formally requested
congressional approval of unlimited credit lines beyond the aforementioned
$2.25 billion lines already in existence as well as the authority to invest in
new equity of the firms. The Federal Reserve also voted that day to approve
lending by the Federal Reserve Bank to support Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae as needed. While Presidential signature of the legislation did not take
place until July 30, its outcome was not in doubt after July 23.21
moving business away from Bear, Deutsche adding to CDS premiums in transactions with
Bear, and the interpretation of margin calls outstanding against Bear as an indicator of
a weakened position. Kelly, Ip, and Sidel (2008) reviews the broad details of the 28 day
secured loan originating with the Fed and passing through J.P. Morgan Chase enabling
Bear to open on March 14 to include its being the first non-bank loan by the Federal
Reserve since the Great Depression. It also compares the run on Bear by its counterparties
with the run on Northern Rock by its depositors. Ip (2008b) describes the initial agreement
for the purchase of Bear for $2 per share and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility and other
Fed actions taken prior to the market open on Monday, March 17th. Arnold and Sender
(2008) reports the failure of Carlyle Capital Corp on March 13.
21See Haggerty and Ng (2008) for the description of the Monday declines resulting from
a negative report by a Lehman Brothers analyst. Haggerty, Solomon, and Paletta (2008)
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Event 9, GSEs II: The conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(Monday, August 18, 2008 through Monday, September 8, 2008). This event
began with an article that appeared in Barron’s the weekend of August 16-
17 speculating on the form of the US Treasury recapitalization authorized in
the bill resulting from the prior event in this study, the explicit government
support for Fannie and Freddie.22 The article predicted the elimination of
common shareholders, the elimination of dividends on preferred as well as
value declines in both the preferred and nearly $20 billion in subordinated
debt. Over the ensuing weeks speculation grew with reports of foreign in-
vestors making repeated inquiries regarding direct and guaranteed obligations
of the GSEs, well in excess of $5 trillion.23 Further, the large losses for US
banks, significant holders of GSE preferred shares, were considered a poten-
tial systemic event should the preferred be wiped out.24 The very power
reports Treasury support plans in terms of larger credit lines and Labaton and Weisman
(2008) reports on a takeover or conservatorship approach, the history of the existing
credit lines and the failure of Treasury and Fed officials to address a Thursday inquiry by
Congressman Dennis Moore as to whether failure of either firm would pose a risk to the
financial system. Labaton and Duhigg (2008) quotes William Poole on Wednesday and
Senator Charles Schumer on Thursday. Paletta and Enrich (2008) reports on IndyMac’s
seizure. Approval for the New York Fed to lend to Freddie and Fannie was reported in
a press release posted to the Board’s website Sunday per Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System (2008). The Treasury request for support plans were reported in Haggerty,
Solomon, and Reddy (2008) on Monday, July 14, 2008 and in Solomon and Reddy (2008)
on Tuesday where the motivation was attributed to the large number of foreign investors
in agency debt and the fears of some kind of breakdown in a $3 billion short term debt
offering by Freddie Mac planned for Monday morning. It also reported a Friday market-
moving rumor that the President of Freddie Mac, Richard Syron, had received a pledge
from Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, that Freddie could tap the discount
window for loans. The authority to support the entities was added to a large housing bill
passed by the House of Representatives on Wednesday, July 23, 2008 to include an $800
billion increase in the federal debt ceiling and was reported the following day by Haggerty
and Paletta (2008) at which point it was also disclosed that Presidential veto threats over
other portions of the bill were dropped. The Senate passed the bill on Saturday, July 26,
2008 and the President signed the legislation on Wednesday, July 30, 2008 in the early
morning as reported the following day in Paletta (2008).
22Laing (2008) describes the expected wipe out of common shareholders and replacement
of management and Lemer (2008) attributes the greater than 20% declines in both firms’
share prices that Monday to the weekend Barron’s piece.
23The Economist (2008e) reports Asian central banks and funds, holders of nearly 40% of
the agencies’ total debt had pulled back their purchases while agency guaranteed mortgage
debt purchases had all but ceased. Solomon, Corkery, and Rappaport (2008) states that
foreign bank concerns were among the factors leading to the conservatorship.
24Pittman and Harrington (2008) reports a series of banks such as Sovereign and Frontier
Financial with significant exposure to agency preferred shares and the implications for their
capital levels and that of the entire financial system for any significant decline in value
for agency preferred securities. Agency preferred shares were downgraded five levels by
159
granted to Treasury to support the institutions was repeatedly mentioned as
creating uncertainty for any potential private sources of capital constrain-
ing Treasury’s attempts to use its new power. Treasury had hired Morgan
Stanley to do an analysis of its options after the explicit government support
was announced in July. Morgan Stanley made a series of confidential market
inquiries in early August and met with Treasury on Monday, August, 18 in
an all day meeting to share the results. Treasury secretary Paulson was pre-
pared to act and announce the conservatorship over the Labor day weekend
beginning Friday, August 29, but the agencies’ regulator, the Federal Hous-
ing Finance Authority (FHFA) and its director, James Lockhart, required
further analysis delaying the decision for another week until the weekend
beginning Friday, September 5.25,26
Event 10, Lehman, Merrill & AIG: The failure of Lehman Brothers,
the purchase of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, the Reserve Prime money
market fund “breaks the buck,” and the rescue of AIG (Tuesday, September
9, 2008 through Wednesday, September 17, 2008). The most complex of the
events, this began with the fallout around Korea Development Bank (KDB)
withdrawing its interest in an investment in Lehman Brothers and the re-
sulting concerns over Lehman’s capital adequacy. While there is evidence
this may have begun the day before the assigned event begin day (Monday,
September 8) as Korea’s top financial regulator made public statements call-
ing into question any large investment in Lehman by KDB in Korea prior
to the U.S. market open on Monday, formal acknowledgment of the end of
talks between the firms appears to have only been released some time on
Tuesday. While Lehman fell 13% on Monday, its 45% fall on Tuesday was
widely attributed to the ending of talks with KDB and Lehman’s resulting
Moody’s on August 22 (the day of the report) to the lowest investment grade rating as a
result of “uncertainty with regard to how these preferred securities will be treated” in a
rescue.
25The FHFA is the successor to the previous regulator of the GSEs, the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) which was merged with the prior regulator of the
12 Federal Home Loan Banks, the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB). This was
accomplished as part of the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008
signed into law on July 30.
26Solomon, Reddy, and Craig (2008) details the deliberations leading up to the an-
nouncement while Solomon and Paletta (2008) first reports the planned announcement on
Saturday, September 5. The formal announcement was made the next day (Sunday) prior
to the opening of Asian capital markets on Monday, September 8.
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need for capital.27
As the week progressed Lehman’s plans moved from capital raising and
asset sales to an outright sale of the firm to either Bank of America or
Barclays over the weekend. Friday saw significant declines in the common
stock of both AIG and Merrill Lynch. Over the course of the weekend, the
attention of government officials went from Lehman, as they declared no
government support would be provided to any suitor, to AIG. By Sunday,
Barclay’s had determined it would not purchase Lehman without government
support and Bank of America agreed to purchase Merrill Lynch. On Monday,
Lehman filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization and AIG faced a
cash crunch and a 61% decline in stock price. This was in direct response
to a downgrade by rating agencies resulting in huge collateral calls from a
variety of counterparties that had purchased CDS protection from AIG.28 On
Tuesday, AIG was unable to raise $75 billion privately and the $62 billion
Reserve Primary Fund, the oldest existing money market fund, “broke the
buck” as a result of losses from its positions in Lehman Brothers’ paper.
It put a seven day freeze on investor redemptions. That evening AIG gave
up majority control of the firm to the U.S. government in return for $85
27Yeon-hee (2008) first reports the cautionary remarks of the Korean Financial Services
Commission chairman Jun Kwang-woo at 10PM EDT Sunday evening, September 7, with
more detailed reports appearing later in the day on Monday, prior to the start of the
event. Craig, Gullapali, and Yook (2008) adds on Tuesday morning that a KDB official
on Monday stated that the government comments would likely deter a deal but would not
state talks had officially ended. The article attributed the 13% decline on Monday to dour
analyst forecasts as well as the Korean statements. Farrell, Guerrera, and Jung-a (2008)
attribute the large decline on Tuesday to an unnamed Korean government official stating
that KDB had decided not to make an investment, a report that was later denied by the
Korean financial regulator. Craig (2008) states that news of the end of talks with KDB
was released Tuesday, consistent with the chosen start date for this event.
28Karnitschnig, Mollenkamp, Craig, and Lobb (2008) describes the change in Lehman
strategy from capital raising to outright sale mentioning both Bank of America and Bar-
clays. Smith, Rappaport, and Pleven (2008) mentions the decline in AIG of 30% on
Friday in response to the threat of a ratings cut by S&P as well as a cumulative 38% de-
cline during the last four days of the week for Merrill Lynch. Mollenkamp, Craig, Ng, and
Lucchetti (2008) details the planned bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers resulting from
the decision of Bank of America and Barclays to abandon a Lehman purchase without
government backing similar to that given J.P. Morgan when it purchased Bear Stearns.
Also covered in the article are Bank of America’s agreement to purchase Merrill Lynch
and AIG’s attempts to raise capital over the weekend to avoid a costly downgrade by
S&P. Craig, McCracken, Hilsenrath, and Solomon (2008) confirms the bankruptcy filing
by Lehman. Karnitschnig, Pleven, and Ng (2008) describes the downgrade of AIG by both
S&P and Moody’s on Monday, the nearly $15 billion in resulting collateral calls, and the
large stock price decline. The Economist (2008d) states AIG had $441 billion notional
value of CDS protection exposure as of its prior regulatory filing for June 30, 2008.
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billion in loans from the Federal Reserve under section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act. This enabled it to avoid a bankruptcy filing the following day,
Wednesday, September 17.29
Post Events: The study concludes with the AIG rescue due to the sheer
scope of actions that are initiated immediately following September 17, 2008.
The ensuing day, Thursday, a $180 billion multi-national liquidity injection is
enacted. On Friday the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
is proposed, a process that will stretch well into the following month. In
addition, short selling on most financial firm shares is banned and a gov-
ernment guarantee program for the $3.4 trillion in money market funds is
announced. The following week, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs are
approved as Bank Holding Companies by the Federal Reserve, Goldman re-
ceives a large investment from Berkshire Hathaway, and Washington Mutual
bank subsidiaries are seized by the FDIC and sold to J.P. Morgan Chase.
Washington Mutual’s holding company will file for bankruptcy and even the
bondholders at the subsidiary bank levels will suffer a near complete loss.
29Karnitschnig, Solomon, Pleven, and Hilsenrath (2008) Describes the AIG bailout and
mentions the Reserve Fund. Mamudi and Burton (2008) details The Reserve Primary
Fund which was valued at 97 cents at 4PM EDT on Tuesday, September 16 as a result
of $785 million in Lehman obligations valued at zero. It had seen nearly $40 billion in
redemptions over Monday and Tuesday from a level of $62 billion at the close of Friday.
This was only the second time this had happened to a fund, the first being 1994 when
Community Bankers U.S. Money Market Fund was valued at 96 cents in a bad derivatives
driven liquidation.
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APPENDIX C
DETERMINATION OF VARIANCE
ADJUSTMENT FOR PREDICTION ERROR
Section 2.2.1 introduces Cit from Patell (1976) as the adjustment to vari-
ance for the error in the prediction of firm i’s return measure outside the
observation period on day t of the event period. Equation 6a for Cit in Patell
(1976) calculated during the observation period of length T days appears as
follows for firm i, assuming a single factor market model with Rmt, the mar-
ket return on an event day and Rmτ , the market return during an observation
period day, and Rm the mean market return during the observation period:
Cit = 1 +
1
T
+
(Rmt −Rm)2∑T
τ=1(Rmτ −Rm)2
(C.1)
Note, however, we will be using four or six factors depending upon the market
we are modeling (equity or debt). As our events are clustered we can revert to
Ct as opposed to Cit since our firms all share identical observation periods for
a given event. Greene (2008) provides an equivalent expression on page 99 for
a multi-factor market model which we will implement in this work. Let Z be
the matrix of K market factors during the observation period excluding the
column of 1’s and let x represent an individual column mean from this matrix
over the observation period for a given market factor.1 Then xt represents a
factor value during event day t and the matrix M0 is as defined on page 950
of Greene (2008) as
[I− 1
K
ii′] (C.2)
and we have the following multi-factor equivalent of equation (C.1):
Ct = 1 +
1
T
+
K∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(xtj − xj)(xtk − xk)(Z′M0Z)jk (C.3)
1The actual number in Greene (2008) is K-1 as his K includes the column of 1’s, but
the formula was modified to be consistent with the definition of K as presented in the text
to this point, for example in equation (2.7) from Section 2.2.1.
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APPENDIX D
MEASURING CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP
(CDS) RETURNS
The measurement of CDS return from the perspective of the buyer or
seller of protection depends upon the successive mark-to-market process for
a CDS contract of a given tenor over a period for which the CDS return is
desired. The mark-to-market process is complex.1 Ideally, liquid quotes for
CDS tenor spreads are collected at varying time points to create a curve that
includes the tenor of the contract in question. For example, an original 5 year
contract with 4 years to maturity would ideally have liquid spread quotes for
the day in question at 1, 3, and 5 year tenors. With these spreads and an
assumption for recovery in the event of bankruptcy, a bootstrapping proce-
dure is performed to establish quarterly risk neutral default likelihoods from
time zero through the 4 year maturity in question, assuming interpolation of
the spread curve as needed prior to bootstrapping. With these default like-
lihoods and the recovery assumption, one may mark the contract to market
by examining the expected cash flows from the prospect of either the buyer
or seller of protection. For example, the seller has a likelihood each quarter
of receiving the original contractual spread agreed to at deal origination and
a smaller likelihood of paying out the principal amount minus an expected
recovery on the reference asset. The sum of all of these quarterly cash flows
each discounted at the appropriate LIBOR zero coupon rate is the mark to
market for the contract.2
Alternatively and slightly simpler, one might use a constant spread for all
payments points based upon the current four year contract rate and repeat
the process of determining a risk neutral default likelihood for each payment
by assuming a recovery rate. By taking the day over day log difference
between marks, one can produce a one day, continuously compounded return
1For a detailed overview please consult chapter 16 of Bomfim (2005).
2The LIBOR zero rate term structure is typically determined by the creation of a curve
from LIBOR deposit rates, LIBOR futures rates and LIBOR swap market rates.
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for the CDS seller or buyer of protection. Since our focus is the return
on a long debt position we will always take the perspective of the seller of
protection in a CDS contract. As recovery assumptions tend to change as
a credit becomes distressed and the recovery assumptions are not provided
by our data source, performing this process for our study is impractical. We
propose two simplified proxies.
First, we use an asset swap argument to proxy the CDS return. One may
argue that a CDS contract on a reference name is very similar to the difference
between a par fixed rate bond issued by the reference and a fixed rate LIBOR
bond at the current LIBOR swap rate for the tenor in question as follows.
The closest proxy for a CDS spread is the fixed spread that the reference
would pay in issuing a par LIBOR floater of identical maturity. Assume
the reference entity issues a par fixed rate bond instead. If a purchaser of
this bond enters into an interest rate swap agreement to swap its coupons
for floating rate LIBOR plus a spread, that spread will closely approximate
the CDS spread assuming we ignore any counterparty risk pricing effects for
the swap and the fixed rate bond is currently at par so only its coupons
play a role in the determining the fixed spread on the interest rate swap. If
the purchasing entity further enters into a LIBOR borrowing agreement to
replace the funding it used to buy the bond, it has replicated the cash flows it
would have produced should it have simply sold protection on the reference
entity for the same term to maturity as that of the bond.3
Thus, our approximation of the CDS contract from the seller of protection
perspective is as follows:4
CDS Contract ≈ 1 + Reference Entity Fixed Rate Bond
− LIBOR Interest Rate Swap− LIBOR Floating Rate Bond (D.1)
3We are ignoring the credit quality of the bond purchaser which would affect the terms
of its LIBOR borrowing as well as the spread it would receive on the sale of protection via
a CDS contract. There are other imperfections in the argument, such as the fact that the
interest rate swap is not contingent on the reference entity not defaulting leading to either
a positive or negative value to the bond purchaser in the event of default of the reference
asset should it wish to terminate the interest rate swap. For further details on asset swaps
vs. CDS, including other technical differences which, in total, are termed the CDS-Cash
basis, please see section 6.3.2 of Bomfim (2005).
4As the cash flows of a par or at market CDS contract sum to zero, market convention
is to add one to the value to express par as one.
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We may combine the LIBOR interest rate swap and the LIBOR floating rate
bond into a fixed rate bond at the LIBOR swap rate for the tenor of the
transaction:
CDS Contract ≈ 1+Reference Fixed Rate Bond−LIBOR Fixed Rate Bond
(D.2)
As the only measures we need to value these two pieces are the fixed rate
coupons on each we take the appropriate tenor swap rate for valuing the
LIBOR fixed rate bond and add the CDS spread for the reference entity
at the same tenor in question to determine the coupon on the fixed rate
reference bond. Assuming quarterly compounding for each and a T year
remaining until maturity tenor, our valuation at any point in time, t, with
st, the current annual spread on the current T year CDS contract and s0 the
CDS spread at origination of the contract, and rt, the current annual rate
for a T year LIBOR interest rate swap and r0 the swap rate at origination of
the contract, is, again from the perspective of the seller of CDS protection
and ignoring partial periods:
CDS Contractt ≈ 1+(
4T∑
t=1
s0+r0
4
(1 + st+rt
4
)t
+
1 + s0+r0
4
(1 + st+rt
4
)4T
)
−
(
4T∑
t=1
r0
4
(1 + rt
4
)t
+
1 + r0
4
(1 + rt
4
)4T
)
(D.3)
With a proxy value for the CDS contract at time t, we move on to calculating
the return on the contract. We make the following simplifying assumption
in calculating return. The seller of protection sells at par on day t and we
mark the contract to market on day t + 1 to measure a one day return,
continuously compounded. One benefit of this approach is that we keep our
bond prices close to par, where the asset swap analogy is strongest. Thus
our CDS contract return is:
C˜DSt+1 = ln
(
CDS Contractt+1
CDS Contractt
)
= ln (CDS Contractt+1) (D.4)
as the CDS contract value at time t is 1 since we assumed it was struck at
par. If we now introduce our fixed tenor of 5 years and ignore the 1 day
passing in the time to maturity for discounting cash flows we can state our
final formula for one day CDS return by modifying equation (D.3) as follows:
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C˜DSt+1 = ln [1 + St+1 −Rt+1] (D.5)
where St+1 is defined as
St+1 =
20∑
t=1
st+rt
4
(1 + st+1+rt+1
4
)t
+
1 + st+rt
4
(1 + st+1+rt+1
4
)20
(D.6)
and Rt+1 is defined as
Rt+1 =
20∑
t=1
rt
4
(1 + rt+1
4
)t
+
1 + rt
4
(1 + rt+1
4
)20
(D.7)
Thus we may produce a proxy CDS return for any given day requiring only
that day’s and the prior day’s 5 year swap rate and 5 year CDS spread for
the contract in question.
Alternatively, another method that provides very similar results is to work
with the fixed rate bond of the reference entity and measure its return from
risky spread change alone from day t until day t+ 1:
C˜DSt+1 = ln
[
1 +
(
20∑
t=1
st+rt
4
(1 + st+1+rt
4
)t
+
1 + st+rt
4
(1 + st+1+rt
4
)20
)]
(D.8)
The validity of these approximations was confirmed via the use of proprietary
data provided by a CDS market participant.
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